What lies ahead for the Modi Government as far as India’s relations with the US, Pakistan and China are concernedIJ It is essential to contemplate and offer some perspectives on the same
India-US ties, one of the most fundamental foreign relations of India, are in a state of limbo. The new BJP Government headed by Prime Minister designate Narendra Modi, has come with a decisive mandate and like many critical issues relating to foreign policy, will have to pay considerable attention and not ignore the India-US relationship.
While Modi’s priorities will be chock-a-block, many of India’s domestic issues and foreign relations will be influenced by the kind of approach he adopts towards the United States.
Many American and Indian analysts appear to be obsessed with the issue of visa denial to Narendra Modi by the United States State Department. The BJP and its supporters’ anger are palpable. The efforts by anti-Modi groups in the US to retain the status quo are equally understandable. But India-US relationship is way up in importance than whether Modi can or should visit the US.
There is no hurry for Modi to contemplate, at this stage, upon a Prime Ministerial visit to Washington. What is noteworthy is President Barack Obama’s overture towards the new Government; already he has welcomed Modi to the US, and shown willingness to work with the Modi Government to further India-US strategic partnership. Modi, on the other hand, has hardly spoken anything against the US and has never complained against visa denial to him. He has interacted with his well wishers in the US without being physically present there. He can very well conduct his Government’s relationship with the US without going to the US.
What is of utmost value to the new Government is to weigh up foreign policy priorities and make moves correspondingly. The Obama administration’s attitude towards India has a lot to do with the present wobbly position of this bilateral relationship. The White House has in recent years shown little interest in what Obama once called “the defining relationship” of the 21st century.
Arguably, Obama’s focus was on more critical concerns, such as the Syrian civil war, Iranian nuclear question, political upheaval in the Arab world, instability in Europe in the wake of the Euro-zone economic crisis, renewed tensions with Russia over the developments in Ukraine and last but not least, the Chinese assertiveness in East China and the South China Sea.
It will be inappropriate to ignore the predicaments Washington confronted in India — lack of adequate economic reforms, inertia in implementation of civil nuclear cooperation agreement, diplomatic mishandling of multi-role aircraft acquisition and a few other issues.
President Obama visited India early in his administration, unlike all of his predecessors, with lofty hopes of further building on the strategic partnership established by former President George W Bush and India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. But apparently, his administration officials were dejected over lack of adequate and reciprocal Indian responses. The deterioration in the relationship finally culminated in the diplomatic discord in the wake of the Devyani Khobragade episode.
It is worth mentioning that both Barack Obama and Manmohan Singh during their respective second term in office had to encounter enormous domestic political polarisation. Both the leaders also struggled hard to come to terms with continuing economic challenges faced by their respective countries.
The tough question for Washington and New Delhi in the last few years has been how to implement the “big ticket” items of bilateral cooperation announced earlier and with much fanfare. The real test for the Modi Government in years to come is to quietly work towards effectively translating promises made by New Delhi and Washington into ground realities — the earlier the better.
Some such promising areas of cooperation and teamwork would include boosting mutual trade and investment, implementing the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, deeper cooperation in counter-terrorism measures, and defence and security cooperation outlined in the 2005 defence framework agreement.
In other words, the Modi Government should pay more attention to carrying out agreed areas of mutual collaborations and assistance rather than undoing the already-established structures of bilateral relationship or searching for any new “big ticket” or spectacular issues.
As Modi expectedly seeks to restore India’s economic dynamism by inviting foreign investment, acquiring sophisticated technologies and best of management practices, promoting more robust collaboration between corporate India and the US big business houses is indispensable. In the backdrop of European economic crisis and limitations of Russian and Japanese expertise, the US market certainly looks more prospective in this area.
As India prepares itself to meet head-on the uncertainties of post 2014 Afghanistan, continuing India-US counter-terrorism cooperation is vital. India’s escalating engagements in the economic and political affairs of the Asia Pacific, moreover, demand greater India-US synchronisation, especially in the emerging milieu of the US strategy of “rebalancing” in Asia. Indian foreign policy-makers must realise that a large number of Asia-Pacific countries that are India’s growing trade/investment partners are either US allies or new strategic partners. Most of them welcome a strong US presence in the region and India’s ability to be a major player in Asian multilateralism thus would require a healthy solidarity with the United States.
What calls for cautious Indian watchfulness is, however, a growing cold confrontation between US and China. The US administration has of late extended support to its Asian allies and strategic partners that are weary of China’s claims of sovereignty over large swathes of South China Sea and China’s naval assertiveness in the region as well as vis-à-vis Japan over the disputed island of Shenkaku/Diaoyu in East China Sea. The cold confrontation has often times led to US-China naval face-off.
China has been watching India’s mounting security closeness with the US. India-Japan security cooperation and India-Japan-US trilateralism, coupled with Washington’s pivot to Asia strategy have generated a perception in China that a new containment strategy is shaping up. The UPA Government walked a diplomatic tight rope to convince the Chinese that New Delhi rejects any notion of “containment” strategies in the age of globalisation.
The test for the Modi Government would be to craft a policy that would not allow China a veto over India-US security ties and simultaneously would not make it easy for the US to play the “China Card” vis-à-vis India.
Pakistan is another factor that affects India’s relations with the US. If the Modi Government attempts a substantive transformation in India’s policy towards China and Pakistan, and it can confidently do so with the clear mandate given by the Indian electorate, the key goal of “strategic autonomy” in foreign relations can be realised. A cooperative China and a stable Pakistan at peace with itself and that does not fall prey to an imaginary Indian imperialism will not come in the way of India maintaining a robust strategic partnership with the US. The core goal of India’s strategic partnership with the US should be empowering India to an extent that ensures the country’s “strategic autonomy” in foreign policy decision making.
India should feel confident in the future that even if it takes a pro-US stand on critical national security issues, it would not mean giving up strategic autonomy but rather exercising its strategic autonomy.
The writer is the Chairperson of the Centre for Canadian, US & latin American Studies, JNU