China’s Military Power
Authoir: GD Bakshi
Publisher: KW Publishers, Rs 980
It is undecided but certain that China will attack India. Given the names associated with this book, it is fair to presume that the Indian Army does not rubbish this military assessment of China. This is very worrisome, writes Pravin Sawhney
It is certain that China will attack India; when, is undecided. “The chances of a (Chinese) pre-emptive strike on India in the 2014-20 timeframe in case of an economic crisis (in China), and beyond the 2025-30 timeframe, in case the Chinese economy does well, therefore, cannot be ruled out,” is the core of the recently released book, China’s Military Power: A Net Assessment by Maj. Gen. (Dr) GD Bakshi.
Why will China fight a war with IndiaIJ “India is one of the biggest countries in Asia and if it is humiliated militarily, the rest of South Asia will fall in line automatically,” the author writes.
What should India do in terms of military modernisation and war strategyIJ The Indian Army should raise another strike corps (60,000 troops) for ladakh in addition to the one already under raising (17 mountain corps) for Arunachal Pradesh.
The Indian Air Force should have a 60 combat squadron force (each squadron is 20 aircraft; the sought strength by the air force is 45 squadrons; at present the force has 35 squadrons against an authorised strength of 39-and-half squadrons). The IAF should acquire Russian long range bombers TU-22 or TU-94, which do not have to refuel over China.
The Indian Navy should quickly operationalise the sea leg of the nuclear triad, and lease four conventional submarines to fill the dwindling submarine fleet. On the nuclear front, 90 warheads with India, as against 90-110 with Pakistan and 300-400 with China are not enough to deter China-Pakistan combine. So, India should have Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs are small warheads in a nuclear payload on a ballistic missile, which when released hit different targets) on its ballistic missiles.
Meanwhile, India should cobble together an Asian-NATO style alignment. “The core of this alliance structure would be India-Japan and Vietnam. The Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia may form the second tier”. An Indian alliance with the United States should be made only if relations between the US and China deteriorate. This Asian-NATO alliance will ensure that a bulk of Chinese military will be tied down against India’s alliance partners.
Once this is done, India should pre-empt and attack China. The Chinese rapid reaction forces do not have ground holding capability and its defensive forces ‘are weak and second rate’. In case of an attack by Pakistan-China combine in ladakh, India should escalate the war by activating other sectors like “Aksai Chin, Sikkim, or Arunachal”.
The above military assessment is from the book sponsored by the Centre for land Warfare Studies, Indian Army’s only think tank. The book is written by “one of India’s most combat experienced officers”; the book’s foreword is by a former chief of Integrated Defence Staff (responsible for tri-services acquisitions) lt Gen. HS lidder; and was released by a former army chief, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhary. Given the names associated with the book, it is fair to presume that the Indian Army does not rubbish this military assessment of China. This is very worrisome.
China has few reasons to fight with India. The gap between the two sides in terms of national aspirations, strategic thinking, military capabilities and doctrinal art is unbridgeable by India and makes actual fighting unaffordable. Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping launched his Four Modernisation programmes — on economy, science and technology, defence and industry — he had his sights high: he had pitted China against the US for supremacy in Asia.
India, on the other hand, kept its sights low on Pakistan; waking up fitfully to the Chinese threat after the 1999 Kargil war when it started nibbling land on the disputed border.
Appreciating the essence of globalisation and the internet, China, in a world inter-connected with trade and information revolution, understood that the Cold War enmity model was passé. So, when China, by 2008, achieved its Four Modernisation objectives and became the foremost power in Asia, it unveiled a unique strategy of cooperation and confrontation — primarily against the United States — to conceal its intentions.
Conscious that it would not be able to take on the US militarily in a conventional war, China developed asymmetrical military assets referred to as anti-access and area denial capabilities. These assets comprising anti-satellite capabilities; cyber warfare; long range accurate ballistic and cruise missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles; and plethora of sea-denial submarines and so on have got the US worried because they can intimidate US’s allies and weaken their political resolve by inflict psychological defeats without going to war.
As the border dispute with India is not defined as China’s core concern — like Taiwan, Tibet and South China seas — it has little reason to go to war, especially when its military coercion — in the form of regular incursions and intrusions like in April-May 2013 in Depsang plains — is working well. India is under immense psychological pressure on the disputed border with China than it is on the border with Pakistan.
If India, under domestic pressure, reacts and challenges China’s unending aggression on the border, Beijing would wait for India to initiate conflict. As China ‘fights only in self-defence’, it would unleash its asymmetrical capabilities. The latter would blind Indian forces by destroying their surveillance nodes and command and control centres (remember the US in the first 1991 Gulf War against IraqIJ). What will the Indian Army do when enemy forces do not join warIJ
Moreover, the book, being army-centric with the air force and the navy in support roles, provides a roadmap to fight the last war (1962 war). There is no mention of mind-boggling Chinese asymmetrical capabilities as if they do not exist. Shouldn’t this be matter of concernIJ
The reviewer is the Editor of Force