Philippines President has initiated measures to downgrade security ties with the US when other ASEAN nations are trying to cope with China challenge, opines Rajaram Panda
The political and security situation in Southeast Asia has been undergoing significant churning in the past few months. What is noteworthy is that despite scoring a significant victory at the international court of arbitration on July 12 on its claims over some portions of the contested South China Sea, Philippines is pursuing a kind of policy both at home and abroad that challenges the established norms of state policy and also challenges the ethos of ASEAN unity.
Since coming to power in May 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte is “confronting a paradox of power”, as described by Richard Javad Heydarian of De la Salle University, wherein he not only attempts to radically reform and revitalise the country’s emaciated institutions in his own way, but is also strengthening his grip on the country’s political system. The means adopted by him are somewhat akin to those pursued by the former President Ferdinand Marcos and therefore disapproved by the civilised world. This makes Duterte the country’s post powerful President since the fall of Marcos regime.
On the foreign policy front, he has not hesitated to offend the US by undermining Philippines policy towards that country and also uttered insulting words for President Barack Obama. His use of words such as “putangina”, an expletive, and “let him go to hell” for Obama are certainly not civilised expressions and deserve to be universally condemned. Not only that he has initiated measures to downgrade the security ties with the US, at a time when other ASEAN member nations are shivering under the shadow of China’s military might and seeking collective means to cope with this challenge. Duterte’s singlehanded approach threatens to nullify the region’s collective approach on how to address the security challenges and could undermine ASEAN solidarity.
Domestically, he has launched an era of terror by launching ruthless means to deal with the drug menace. He has reduced the legislature, wherein he enjoys a ‘super majority’ into a presidential rubber stamp, besides defanging the underfunded judiciary by taking upon himself the task of dealing with the drug problem with the intention to expose the inefficiency of the judiciary, even though that meant resorting to extra-judicial measures. He has also not hesitated to launch a charm offensive with the armed forces and law enforcement agencies by virtue of being the commander-in-chief.
In order to further legitimise his authority and obtain compliance of the judiciary, Duterte will soon appoint majority of Supreme Court Justices with the clear intention to further enhance the executive’s influence over the judiciary, thereby consolidating his authoritarianism.
As a part of his charm offensive, he provided better compensation, equipment, training and legal protection to the Philippine National Police (PNP) to make them enablers in his fight against crime. He also promised better health benefits and emergency care, doubling the salaries and taking care of the families of the country’s armed forces with a view to end the historical tense relations between the armed forces and the Government. By taking the police and the armed forces on board, Duterte feels emboldened to launch his drive against the country’s illegal drugs and organised crime, for which he has already earned applause when he was the Mayor of Davao City before being catapulted into the Presidency.
Drug crimes had plummeted 75 per cent after Duterte became Mayor. Surprisingly, notwithstanding his authoritarian rule and determined policy of putting an end to the drug menace by executing many of those involved in either possession of or trade in drugs, Duterte enjoys 91 per cent trust rating among the electorate, the highest on record. It remains unclear if Duterte’s brand of leadership, seen as synonymous with autocratic by certain quarters, can remain sustained for long, though for now his determined crackdown on drug-pushers seems to have the support of a large section of population. Duterte’s war on drugs, coupled with the policy of diplomatic confrontation with the West, had a telling effect on the country’s stock market due to the fear of growing political uncertainty.
While he seems to have taken control of his policy at home, his conduct of foreign policy has left much to be desired. Duterte may have been encashing on his strongman populism by cracking down on the drug mafia and executing at will, but his conduct of dealing has raised concern in the international community from the perspective of human rights violations and jeopardising judicial/legal process in dispensing justice.
Protectors of human rights claim that many of the 3,600 killings so far were extra-judicial murders. Duterte has vowed to kill many more to cleanse the country of the drug malaise. He has also earned the dubious reputation of being foul-mouthed in utter disregard to diplomatic niceties. First he insulted the US Ambassador to Philippines, then the US President, and later the European Union Commission with the use of unparliamentary language.
Duterte asked foreign countries, including the US, not to meddle in Manila’s affairs and to withdraw their forces from the Philippines. As part of the security arrangement between the US and the Philippines, army personnel of both countries — around 1,400 US soldiers from Washington’s base in Okinawa, Japan, and another 500 Philippine army personnel in the 33rd iteration of the Philippines — were engaged in the Amphibious landing Exercises (PHIBlEX33) from October 4 to 12 at multiple locations on the island of luzon and the Province of Palawan between the South China Sea and Sulu Sea. The war games included joint amphibious landing drills, live-fire training, and humanitarian civil assistance exercises. The drills are reportedly designed to advance military cooperation, improve interoperability and help strengthen bilateral military capabilities.
Though the manoeuvres were the first between the two countries since Duterte came to power, he categorically announced that this “would be the last”. His Defence Minister Delfin lorenzana echoed Duterte by saying that Philippines “can live without [US] assistance”. The decision to announce this was a clear demonstration of breaking away from military cooperation with the US. Philippines Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay went further by saying Manila is “compelled to realign” its foreign policy and not submit to US demands. He was candid in saying that the Philippines would seek to engage with China while not being too close such as it was with Washington. It seems Duterte is allowing himself to fall into the trap laid by Beijing without realising the long-term consequences to the Philippines and implications for the region’s future by becoming too cosy with China.
Much to the worry of the rest of Asia, Duterte not only cancelled joint patrols with the US in the contested waters of the South China Sea, he is making the victory achieved at The Hague tribunal on the South China Sea in its favour over China meaningless by deepening military cooperation with the Asian juggernaut. Though he is expected to visit China on October 19 and has promised to talk with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, about the tribunal’s verdict of July 12, it is unclear what exactly he would talk. It is possible to know his mind when he visits Japan soon after his China visit. Duterte is also likely to visit Russia soon. From these, one can infer that his foreign policy strategy is undergoing perceptive churning, the significance of which is difficult to judge at the moment.
This much is sure that by reviewing the country’s foreign policy towards the US and reaching out to China, Duterte is bringing in a new element of realism, the implications of which could be problematic for the rest of Asia as political and security issues are no longer state-centric but have regional focus. ASEAN as a regional organisation must be feeling the heat, first by the manner in which Cambodia played the bad boy role at the EAS summit in laos and now the Philippines under Duterte. Beijing seems to be smiling all the way.
The writer is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan