Ever since veteran Bharatiya Janata Party leader lK Advani wrote on his blog that Jawaharlal Nehru had called Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel a “total communalist” when the latter forcefully suggested military action against the Nizam of Hyderabad, charges have been flying thick and fast.
Union Minister Manish Tewari, always quick off the block when it comes to disparaging BJP leaders, questioned the very source — former civil servant MKK Nair's book — from which Advani had quoted. Sections of the media have dug up experts who claim that such a flare-up never took place. In fact, they insisted, both Nehru and Sardar Patel were in complete agreement over action against the Nizam.
There is no reason why Nair should have fabricated the conversation. He has provided meticulous details about the meeting where Nehru is said to have blown his top. Some experts have been claiming that there is nothing in the historical documents available to substantiate the author's observation about Nehru's virulent outburst. In the first place, do they expect the then Prime Minister's “total communalist” remark to have gone on the record for future generations to readIJ In any case, there is enough material to conclude that Sardar Patel and Nehru were not on the same page over action in Hyderabad. The former had to struggle hard and determinedly to have his way in the face of opposition from Nehru and his clique.
The critics do not have to take Nair's word for it. Journalist and author Balraj Krishna provides us with more than a glimpse of an explosive meeting, in his well-researched book, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel: India's Iron Man. In an account that is similar in tone to the one that Nair had narrated, he writes in the chapter, ‘Integration of States': “At one of the meetings of the Defence Committee, of which Nehru was the Chairman, there was so much bitterness that Sardar Patel walked out. Seeing his seat vacant (VP) Menon told a Rotary meeting in Bombay, ‘I too walked out five minutes later.' This seemed to have shaken Nehru out of his complacent mood; it mellowed his opposition, though not completely.”
As regards the Cabinet meeting that formally endorsed the military action, Balraj Krishna writes, “Patel faced a formidable task in overcoming Nehru's reluctance to go that far (military action).” It should be clear from these passages that Nehru was opposed to Patel's forceful argument for a military response against the tyrannical Nizam who had let loose his police and goons on the large Hindu majority population in Hyderabad, and was plotting to side with Pakistan in destroying Sardar Patel's carefully-built Union. Yet, if Nehru eventually gave way, it was more because of Sardar Patel's doggedness than out of his own belief.
Balraj Krishna offers even more material that shows the complete variance in opinion between Nehru and his deputy on the subject, and none of this substantiates the claims that ‘secularist' writers are now making. He says that the “most formidable obstacle” before Sardar Patel in proceeding with his course of action against the Nizam was “Mountbatten's outlook and his convincing of Nehru to his point of view”. The author then goes on to contrast the “administrator in Patel” who instinctively felt that “India could not survive with a hostile force in its belly” with that of “the politician in Nehru” who had his sympathies with the “emotional problems of the huge Muslim minority in India” whose feeling would have been hurt by “any rough treatment of the Nizam”. It did not matter to the Prime Minister that the Nizam's forces were targeting Hyderabad's innocent Hindus and plotting to dismember India.
While Nehru was opposed to military action, he had no alternative solution — or did not have the courage to suggest one. He, therefore, outsourced the task to lord louis Mountbatten, much to Sardar Patel's displeasure. Balraj Krishna writes, “To Patel, this was sheer appeasement, very much in contrast to Nehru's treatment of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.”Although the Sardar agreed to the suggestion, against his wishes, he kept the Hyderabad issue firmly in his hands. The author observes that Sardar Patel's grip did not allow “Hyderabad to be internationalised, as it happened with Kashmir…” And, while the Sardar had agreed to Mountbatten's role, he introduced his trusted adviser VP Menon as a ‘co-negotiator’ in order to “ensure a close watch on Mountbatten's negotiations”.
Again and again, Balraj Krishna makes the point that Nehru posed a challenge to Sardar Patel on Hyderabad. On one occasion, when the Nizam had the cheek to suggest that he was “ready and willing” to make a treaty of association, not accession, with India, Patel was incensed. But he held back because of “Mountbatten's persuasion and Nehru's submission to Mountbatten”. If Nehru had had his way, perhaps he would have accepted the Nizam's proposal in the ‘larger interests of the Muslim community'. Thankfully, that was not to be.
Nehru's meekness was well known to the Nizam and the other anti-India forces in the country, which is why they wished to deal with him or his people rather than Sardar Patel, who was resolute as a rock. A leader of the Razakars — the Nizam's notorious private militia — Kasim Razvi, is quoted by the author as saying in anger and frustration, “Patel belongs to the class of Hitler…” So does Narendra Modi for the Congressmen.
The author narrates how Sardar Patel felt freed from the shackles after Mountbatten left the country. With his moral support gone and the situation in Hyderabad turning from bad to worse, Nehru had to eventually endorse Sardar Patel's offensive against the Nizam. Such was the Sardar's soaring confidence that he even indulged in some wit. When an anxious Nizam sought to know from a third party the progress about the ‘Mountbatten settlement', which had prevented an immediate invasion by the Indian Army of Hyderabad, the Sardar quipped, “What settlementIJ Tell him (the Nizam) that the settlement has gone to England.”
Even so, Balraj Krishna observes, “Patel's path was not all that clear. Mountbatten's policy still dominated Nehru's mind”, and the Prime Minister was keen to follow it “with an open mind”. The indecisiveness did not amuse Sardar Patel, who said, “This is the time when we should take firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation.”
That Sardar Patel not only strongly differed with Nehru on the Hyderabad issue but also did not have faith in the latter's ability to resolve the matter, is evident from his remark to a friend. He said, “Hyderabad remained unresolved due to my prolonged illness.” (He had suffered a heart attack and was out of action for four months.)
Those today, who wish to gloss over the truth or seek to whitewash it, cannot change the historical reality.