Nehru’s flawed Forward Policy exposed by leak of classified Henderson report
In poll season, a large section of the classified Henderson Brooks report on the 1962 Sino-India War blaming then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s “flawed” ‘Forward Policy’ and the Army leadership for the humiliating defeat became public on Tuesday adding to the woes of the beleaguered Congress-led UPA Government.
According to the report, the political leadership headed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the military top brass are to be blamed for the 1962 debacle in the 15-day war. New Delhi actively pursued the “Forward Policy” to have military outposts in areas claimed by Chinese and carrying out aggressive patrols which increased the chances of conflict. This happened under the false impression that China will not use military force, the report stated. However, the report pointed out that India lacked military wherewithal and the muscle to sustain such an operation.
The startling revelations are part of the famous Henderson Brooks report. Retired British journalist Neville Maxwell, now settled in Australia, has now put large portions of the “Top Secret” document on the internet leading to a political storm in India.
The Defence Ministry refrained from commenting on it. “Given the extremely sensitive nature of the contents of the report, which are of current operational value, it is reiterated that the Government of India has classified this report as a Top Secret document and, as such, it would not be appropriate to comment on the contents uploaded by Neville Maxwell on the Web,” the Ministry said in a statement.
The Army had asked then Major General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat to submit a report about the lapses and weaknesses leading to the 1962 debacle. The two officers gave the detailed report in 1963 but that has been kept under wraps since then despite repeated demands to make it public.
Maxwell uploaded 126 pages of the report, which maintained that the then political and military leadership misread the intentions of the Chinese and thought China would not escalate hostilities whereas militarily Indians should have thought “exactly opposite.”
It pointed out during various top-level meetings, one of which was attended by Nehru, the Army Headquarters and the then Intelligence Bureau Director were of the view that China was unlikely to use force against Indian posts even if they were in a position to do so.
“The review, undertaken as Forward Policy, was primarily introduced to baulk the Chinese claims in ladakh. Had the developments stemming out of it been correctly apprised by the Army Headquarters and correlated to NEFA (Arunachal), it is possible we would not have precipitated matters till we were better prepared in both theatres,” the report said.
Moreover, the Army leadership had also overruled the concerns raised by the Western Command, which said it was ill-prepared to implement the policy and it would be “defeated in detail” in case of hostilities, the report said.
The Western Command’s position was realistic, the report said, but Army Headquarters apparently stuck to their belief that the Chinese would not resort to any large-scale hostilities, a presumption belied by its attack as its Army ran through Arunachal Pradesh and captured large parts of ladakh.
“The General Staff Branch Army Headquarters not taking note of this warning of Western Command could only be attributed to an incorrect assessment of Chinese reactions, together with a sense of complacency that nothing would happen,” it said.
The report said Army Headquarters chose to ignore Western Command’s caution about military weakness on the ground as the Forward Policy was being executed. In fact, the Western Command had submitted to the Army Headquarters a “Reappraisal of the situation on ground as on August 15, 1962”, setting forth long-term and short-term recommendations which were brushed aside.
“This review is not concerned with the probability of conflict with or without the Forward Policy but with its introduction the chances of a conflict certainly increased. What is pertinent here is whether we were militarily in a position to implement this,” Brooks report said.
“We acted,” it said, “on a military ‘unsound’ basis of not relying on our strength but rather on believed lack of reaction from the Chinese. “Militarily, it is unthinkable that the General Staff did not advise the government on our weakness and inability to implement the Forward Policy,” it said, questioning the actions of lt General BM Kaul, the then Chief of General Staff, who played a key role in shaping the Policy and resigned following the debacle.
Henderson Brooks Report Highlights
‘The background to the Government’s decision on ‘Forward Policy’ is not known. Nor are the minutes of the meeting laying down guidelines for Forward Policy available’ In a meeting in the Prime Minister’s Office on November 2, 1961, attended by the Defence Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chief of Army Staff and the Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) ‘it appears the DIB was of the opinion that the Chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and they were not likely to use force against any of our posts even if they were in a position to do so’
‘This was contrary to the annual Army Intelligence review-China-Tibet 1959 which clearly indicated that the Chinese would resist with force any attempt to take back territory held by them’
‘The Chinese had deployed a well-equipped division with supporting arms opposite ladakh with well developed roads. However, we were thinly spread out with no supporting arms worth the name and with poor communication within various sectors. Thus in case of hostilities we would be defeated’
Western Command had given a realistic picture of Army preparedness but ‘the General Staff Branch Army Headquarters not taking note of this warning of Western Command could only be attributed to an incorrect assessment of Chinese reactions, together with a sense of complacency that nothing would happen’