While the blame game between the Congress and the BJP rages over the Naxal attack at Darbha Valley in Chhattisgarh last week, facts clearly point to the failure of Central agencies in checking the onslaught of the Maoists. Documents with The Pioneer suggest the Union Home Ministry was not satisfied with the outcome of the much-hyped joint operation against Maoists.
“Operational results were not commensurate with the CRPF deployment in the lWE (Naxal-affected) areas,” Union Home Secretary RK Singh told the CRPF top brass at a comprehensive review meeting of the paramilitary force at the North Block on April 17.
Making this candid observation a few weeks before the Darbha valley attack, Singh had issued specific directions to the paramilitary forces to emphasise on good basic/refresher training, including stress on ingenuity and training by case studies. At the meet, Singh also compared the operational performance of CRPF with that of the Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds and stressed on the need to generate real time intelligence.
Singh further said that area of responsibility of each company should be well defined, demarcated and marked on maps. He also directed CRPF DG Pranay Sahay to emphasise that each battalion/company commander must gather intelligence, plan and execute operations in their respective area of responsibility based on intelligence inputs to eliminate dreaded Naxals and effect maximum seizures of arms, ammunition, explosives and other incriminating materials.
Ministry sources admitted the expanse of the area of responsibility for a battalion in difficult and inhospitable regions of Naxal strongholds to the tune of 200-250 km is impractical. Also the linear fashion of deployment around the police stations is flawed as it exposes the battalion to attack from all sides. The grid fashion of deployment, as is the practice in Jammu & Kashmir, is a time-tested measure.
“A lot more initiative needs to be taken at the company and battalion level and this aspect be specifically monitored by IG (Operations) CRPF in the State concerned,” Singh noted.
Technology can aid the operational performance, however, it can never be substitute for good, bold leadership in battle. It would be useless to lament on the lack of hardware as the reason for lack of results in operations. Technical intelligence, UAVs and other hi-tech gadgets cannot substitute for lack of good training and leadership-in-battle qualities of officers for operational flexibility, he said, directing the CRPF to train its personnel deployed in Naxal-affected areas and arm them to “independently” undertake operations in their area of responsibility.
Underscoring continuous training is an inescapable need, Singh highlighted the importance on developing group cohesion, espirit de corps, good frontline leadership, improvement in firing standards and small team tactics. Battalion and company ethos and camaraderie should be promoted in order to inculcate battle-worthy leadership of the officers.
The ministry has also asked the paramilitary to document and disseminate the experiences gained in anti-Naxal operations through an institutionalised mechanism. The CRPF has also been asked to form a group of officers with field experience to formulate additional case studies for use in training sessions.
The Home Ministry is sitting over proposals for procurement of about 500 hand-held satellite phones, over 7,000 night vision devices, about 4,000 GPS, man-portable hand-launched UAV, about 650 personal tracker kits among others.
Even basic requirements like blankets and e-ticketing facility and creation of over a 100 posts for Dog Breeding and Training School, Taralu is hanging fire for over a year. Hiring of helicopters from Pawan Hans for evacuation purposes has been delayed for years and lack of air ambulance is another demoralising factor for achieving optimum operational efficiency.
As many as 82 battalions of paramilitary forces are deployed in anti-Naxal operations across the Red Corridor, out which a sizeable 35 battalions are engaged against the Maoists in Chhattisgarh.