There appears to be a growing recognition of the fact that the Quad will need to engage more actively with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region
The recent Quad meet in Tokyo was much watched globally as leaders from the United States, India, Australia and Japan got together to discuss various global and regional issues. It was of course a powerful moment in optics, too, and a clear message to China that the Quad means business when it comes to security and safety, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. But the one thing that didn’t get as much attention as it should have was the visit by US President Joe Biden to South Korea before he landed in Tokyo. While South Korea is not a member of the Quad yet, it nevertheless remains an important country when it comes to the security calculations in the Indo-Pacific region.
As a report in The Hill recently pointed out: “South Korea’s active engagement in the Indo-Pacific region acts as a force multiplier in building a principled security network — one in defence of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and democratic values.” It is also imperative that the US-Korea-Japan ties strengthen to counter the Chinese influence in the region. With two in the above trilateral being Quad members, the South Korean engagement will only lend strength to the Quad.
There seems to be a growing recognition of the fact that the Quad will need to engage more actively with other countries in the region. Even if most do not want to become formal members of the Quad, their participation at some level is needed. One positive indication to this effect has been the signing of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), an economic plan that seeks to set standards on labour, supply chains, clean energy and anti-corruption. It has 13 nations as signatories to the framework and it offers not just a plan to counter China in the region but also for other countries to share an economic framework with the Quad nations, along with the militaries and defence.
According to a report in the Lowy Institute, “At the February 2022 meeting of Quad Foreign Ministers, the group reportedly agreed with a suggestion of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison that the Quad should be expanded to include ‘dialogue partners’.” The debate as to how Quad should engage with countries like South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia, for instance, is still out in the open. The world has also changed in the last few months with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a closer Russia-China axis emerging. India, of course, is doing some delicate balancing act by not condemning Russia and still maintaining its position in Quad. But the fact that the Russian actions could embolden China to consider a military takeover of Taiwan is the reason why the US President clearly stated that the US would intervene militarily if that were to happen. So the Quad has to now deal with the newer complications.
The problem is also that in the Indo-Pacific region, most countries are cautious of taking on China. Even India hedges its arguments in some finely-worded diplomatic jargon. Smaller nations like Vietnam and Indonesia are even more careful. So if the US wants a security framework in the Indo-Pacific region to have teeth, it will need some of these smaller countries on board. The Quad can continue to have just four formal members but unless it expands in a creative fashion, the Chinese threat is unlikely to be countered. The challenge for the Quad is also to convince the Asean nations to see it as credible provider of security in the region vis-a-vis China.
For India, the Quad provides a unique opportunity to create space for itself as a global leader. The other three members of the Quad have also pursued India actively since India still remains hesitant to drop its non-aligned status in the world. Whether it is China or Russia (in the case of the Ukraine invasion), India is more cautious than its Quad partners. While the other three pursue India to fall in line with their stand, it also offers India that valuable space to manoeuvre the Quad to its own national interests, too.
The Quad nevertheless gives hope to many in the Indo-Pacific region of emerging as an effective check on China’s growing assertiveness. But in order to achieve that objective, two measures that need to be put in place are; one, recognising that the Quad has a long way to go before it can be taken as a serious counterbalance to China; and, two, only if more countries become partners or allies to the idea of the Quad, will we finally see the emergence of a group of four that can then effectively restrain China in the region. So, it seems there is a lot of work cut out for the Quad in the near future.
(The author, a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst, holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart: Untold Stories of 26/11’, was published. The views expressed are personal.)