Jaishankar meets Wang Yi, insists on peaceful solution. China may not want a war but will continue its pinpricks
Bonhomie visuals are always good but how much of them means anything at all? Will Russia, in the end, be able to make China see reason, the risks of alienating India over its border imperialism and the threats to a bipolar world order as it pushes more nations towards the US? At least it has nudged the two for another round of talks after Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart hardly translated to any action on the ground. Instead it further aggravated the situation in Ladakh where India and China are at daggers drawn. Has External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, given the depth of his understanding of and experience with China as a career bureaucrat, convinced Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi about the cost of Siachenisation at the icy heights? Of course, he is very hopeful of diplomacy winning at the end of the day on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting. He is betting big on linking the perceptional differences of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and sorting them out as central to bilateral relations, primarily the economic one. He is hoping to drive home the point that China had emerged as one of India’s biggest trade partners and had deeply penetrated Indian markets only because there had been peace and quiet on the LAC for over 30 years. Disturbing it would mean hurting Chinese expansionism in business, a fact that has already been demonstrated with the Government banning the highest revenue-yielding Chinese apps. But as multiple rounds of talks at both the political and military level, including that of Singh’s, have failed so far, and the Chinese are adamant about not going back to their earlier positions in April, one wonders what will they extract for a breakthrough and what will India have to yield without both sides looking bad to their domestic audience. Besides, China won’t easily give up its newly-acquired spurs in the Pangong Tso region simply because it doesn’t want India to have a strategic edge in monitoring its designs in the Karakoram, by way of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Aksai Chin. And it knows that Indian troop capabilities and ramped up border infrastructure are a big deterrence for its covert incursions into and usurpation of our land. Besides, there is a history of trust deficit, where the Chinese have changed the rules of disengagement almost overnight. For example, the Chinese commander at Chushul had spoken to his Indian counterpart about following established protocol and ceasing movements at night. Yet, that very night, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops stealthily moved towards our posts. And with PLA directly taking orders from Chinese President Xi Jinping, nothing could have higher official sanction. So, there is a possibility that China would settle for pin-pricks, just under the escalatory threshold, and activate new flashpoints along our shared Himalayan border to stretch us out militarily. That it doesn’t want war stems from the understanding that it had sought a meeting with Singh in Moscow. But then given its current goodwill deficit and India’s acknowledged compliance with the “rule of law” globally, it perhaps wants to show that it is faultless about diplomatic behaviour, attempting negotiations but blaming India for failure. Or it could continue to hold positions but cease provocations for the time being.
Significantly, Jaishankar met his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov before his meetings with the Chinese side. And though officially Russia has described the Ladakh standoff as a matter of bilateral concern, it is trying to bring some sort of an alignment within the framework of the SCO. The Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral axis can hold off the US and the West and maintain some sort of multi-polarity but Ladakh has jeopardised such prospects. Particularly for Russia, its failure would rob it of its counterweight potential in world politics. While India has used the RIC to emphasise the need for respecting each other’s sovereignty, China is pressuring Russia to scale down its defence supplies to India in view of the border escalation. Caught in the middle, Russia is delicately trying to assuage both without upsetting the autonomous bilateral relationship each nation has harboured with it. Besides, it also needs India to counterbalance itself against Chinese heft and its mega ambitions. Already, it is in China’s economic trap with Beijing investing heavily in Russian infrastructure and gas lines, the latter already funded for a 30-year supply. China is also working with Russia on a mutually beneficial East-West transport corridor to Europe and opening up the Arctic Circle route. So its hands are somewhat tied. Of course, it acknowledges India’s $5.4 billion S-400 deal but beyond defence and given India’s pro-US tilt, there has not been much growth in our non-defence trade. While we are aiming to scale up trade to $30 billion by 2025, bilateral trade between Russia and China is already at $110 billion. India has recently stepped up investment in the Russian far-east to strengthen its economic footprint. The maritime corridor between Chennai and Vladivostok should significantly boost bilateral trade and keep Russia invested in taking up our advocacy in current geo-strategic contexts. The challenge for India will be to not upset the US, which keeps on extending a mediatory hand. If Russia, with its intent compromised beyond a point, isn’t able to convince China to simmer down, then we would still need the US to fight our wanton neighbour.