Nearly three decades after the ceasefire began, the Naga peace process remains trapped in unresolved demands, with patience wearing thin
For all these years, Nagaland has been a relatively peaceful state. The state saw long years of insurgency that ended, or so it seems, in 1997. The 1997 truce with the NSCN-IM was a turning point. The 2015 Framework Agreement promised a final deal. Eleven years on, it still remains a promise.
Three pressures now converge. First, patience is wearing thin. NSCN-IM leader Thuingaleng Muivah, 92, has repeatedly threatened a return to armed struggle. Such warnings are partly a bargaining tactic, and a people weary of bloodshed have little appetite for war.
Second, the Naga house is divided. The NSCN-IM faces a breakaway Eastern Flank, rival factions and the NNPGs, all competing for legitimacy, often through “taxation” of traders, contractors and residents. Fragmentation makes a deal harder to sign and militancy easier to justify.
Third, the social fabric is fraying. The October 10 clash between the Tikhir and Yimkhiung communities in Pungro, Kiphire, left one person dead, homes burnt and dozens displaced. Add Manipur’s turbulence, and the situation becomes even more fragile.
The Centre has made a sensible start. Appointing Ajit Lal as interlocutor and bringing a Union Minister into the talks addresses a long-standing demand, and the NSCN-IM has welcomed both. New Delhi cannot wish away Naga distinctiveness; Article 371A already protects Naga customary law and land.
A settlement could deepen that asymmetry through greater powers for Naga institutions, a recognised cultural flag and carefully drafted language on shared sovereignty, without a parallel constitution. The NSCN-IM, for its part, must accept that a sovereign flag and constitution are not on offer and stop treating them as the price of peace. Both parties should publish what has been agreed and what remains open; secrecy has bred suspicion.
Any deal must also include the NNPGs, the churches, the hohos and the eastern tribes, whose demand for greater autonomy deserves answers rather than delay. Locally, the state government must enforce the memoranda that settle inter-tribal disputes before the next festival becomes the next fire. Security forces must act with discipline and sound intelligence, since every Oting-style error hands insurgency a ready argument.
Naga fatigue with violence is the strongest safeguard against a relapse, but fatigue is not a policy. The window opened by Lal’s appointment is narrow. Delhi and Kohima should use it to turn a long ceasefire into a lasting peace before time and events decide for them.