Citing rising terrorism, Pakistan’s federal government is weighing intervention in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Imran Khan’s PTI stronghold. Is security the priority, or is the establishment seeking to dismantle Khan’s influence?
Pakistan’s “establishment” (read: military) has never been comfortable with political competition it cannot control. With Imran Khan incarcerated, his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) under sustained pressure, and Field Marshal Asim Munir presiding over an increasingly military-dominated political order, the prospect of Governor’s Rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) represents a decisive escalation. Khan’s remaining formal political power rests substantially in the province his party governs. Curtailing that authority would strike at the final institutional bastion of a politician whose popular appeal has survived imprisonment, exclusion and political pressure.
The immediate justification is national security. Following an emergency meeting chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the federal cabinet reviewed KP’s deteriorating security situation and cited the provincial government’s “deliberate disengagement from the fight against terrorism”. The Prime Minister’s Office said ministers proposed that the Prime Minister advise the President to invoke Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution, potentially enabling emergency measures and federal intervention in provincial administration.
The argument is politically potent. Pakistan faces a dangerous resurgence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) violence, with militant attacks, fragile border security and deteriorating relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan placing enormous pressure on the state. No provincial government should escape scrutiny over its counter-terrorism performance. But a genuine security crisis does not automatically establish that extraordinary constitutional intervention is necessary, proportionate or politically impartial.
That distinction is where the controversy begins. For years, Khan’s opponents have branded him “Taliban Khan”, invoking his advocacy of negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban and opposition to certain military strategies. The TTP’s renewed violence now offers the federal government an opportunity to revive this association, portraying PTI as unwilling to confront militancy or sympathetic to forces destabilising Pakistan. Yet insinuation is not evidence. The TTP, Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities and PTI’s provincial governance are related questions, but they are not interchangeable.
Allegations of deliberate accommodation or obstruction require substantiation. If the government possesses compelling evidence against the provincial administration, it should present that evidence and pursue lawful remedies. Otherwise, invoking terrorism to discredit political opponents risks transforming national security into an instrument of political management.
Articles 232 and 234 are not blank cheques for neutralising an inconvenient provincial government. Any intervention must satisfy constitutional requirements and withstand legal scrutiny. An emergency proclaimed in the name of national survival cannot become a shortcut around an electorate whose verdict has produced an unwelcome political outcome.
For the “establishment”, however, the strategic attraction is obvious. Khan’s incarceration has removed him from the immediate contest for executive power without extinguishing his political appeal. PTI’s provincial government provides an administrative platform from which the party can demonstrate its legitimacy, mobilise supporters and challenge the federal dispensation. KP is therefore more than a province. It is PTI’s remaining institutional sanctuary, a source of political visibility and an important base for sustaining its organisation.
Removing or subordinating its government would narrow the party’s capacity to translate popular support into practical influence. It would also diminish Khan’s leverage in future negotiations concerning his imprisonment, political rehabilitation or return to national politics.
The proposed intervention could complete, at the provincial level, what the broader pressure campaign against Khan has pursued nationally. His personal liberty is curtailed, his party’s federal political space is constrained, and now its last major governing platform faces potential federal control. The distance between electoral popularity and the exercise of power would become even more glaring.
Who benefits from that distance? The PML-N and PPP sustain the formal civilian governing arrangement, but the military remains Pakistan’s most consequential power centre. Under Field Marshal Munir, its influence over national security and political competition remains central to understanding the country’s direction. Civilian institutions carry responsibility for governing, while unelected power retains enormous influence over the political environment.
The critical question is whether intervention in KP reflects constitutional necessity or a convergence of interests between a vulnerable federal coalition and a military “establishment” determined to prevent Khan’s political resurgence.
The government’s stated security concerns deserve examination, but so do the political consequences of its proposed remedy. None of this diminishes the suffering of KP’s citizens, who deserve protection from militant violence and competent administration. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence, policing, prosecution, coordination with federal agencies and a coherent strategy towards Afghanistan. It does not become more effective simply because an opposition party loses its provincial government.
Indeed, political exclusion may deepen the instability the state claims to confront. If PTI supporters conclude that electoral victories are provisional, subject to reversal whenever they threaten entrenched interests, faith in constitutional politics will erode further. A state that confuses opposition with subversion risks making democratic dissent harder to distinguish from genuine security threats.
Ultimately, emergency rule in KP must be judged by evidence, constitutional necessity and the public interest, not political convenience. Strangling PTI’s last governing foothold might consolidate control in the short term, but it will neither defeat the TTP nor stabilise the Afghan frontier. Pakistan’s “establishment” may succeed in shrinking Khan’s formal domain of power. It cannot assume that coercion will extinguish his popular appeal or manufacture lasting legitimacy. The deeper crisis remains a political order in which electoral mandates appear subordinate to unelected authority. Until that contradiction is addressed, Pakistan may achieve another consolidation of power without achieving the stability it desperately needs.
The critical question is whether intervention in KP reflects constitutional necessity or a convergence of interests between a vulnerable federal coalition and a military “establishment” determined to prevent Khan’s political resurgence
The writer is a former Lieutenant Governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry, and a military veteran; Views presented are personal.