This, however, doesn’t mean the end of jihadist terror, for our neighbourhood remains as dangerous a place as it ever was
The killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a US strike in Afghanistan is surely a big blow to the terrorist group he headed since its founder Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011. One good consequence seems to be the absence of a successor. For all we know, the outfit may choose, elect, or select a successor, but he would not have the importance that al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s comrade, had. US President Joe Biden expressed his satisfaction over Zawahiri’s death, hoping that this would bring “closure” to families of the 3,000 people killed in America on September 11, 2001. He would also be hoping to gain some credibility in the matters pertaining to defence and security, especially after the messy and bloody exit from Afghanistan a year ago. As many as 13 American soldiers had died in it. The retaliation brought even more flak for the US leadership: it killed 10 innocent people, including an aid worker and seven children. So, Biden was extremely cautious this time; he reportedly “asked detailed questions about what we [security officials] knew and how we knew it.” This time the target was neutralised, with no collateral damage—till the time of writing these lines no damage was reported. Al-Zawahiri’s death raises some questions and highlights a few facts that India should never lose sight of.
First, how come that a terrorist, carrying a reward of $25 million on his head, was living in Kabul and the Taliban, who promised the US of not hobnobbing with Al Qaeda, didn’t about it? The possibility that the rulers in Afghanistan were sheltering and harbouring him is very high. This also gives the lie to the belief, held by many in New Delhi, that we can do business with the Taliban 2.0. The fact, however, is that what we have in Kabul is Taliban II, not Taliban 2.0. Just men will be men (as the tagline of an advertisement says), the Taliban will be Taliban. There is also a possibility, though: someone in the Taliban, and someone very high in the hierarchy, betrayed al-Zawahiri, for $25 million is a huge sum by any reckoning. At any rate, this doesn’t show them worth doing business with: you can deal neither with incorrigible jihadists nor with quislings. Then there is Pakistan, the permanent trouble maker in the region. Its propensity to indulge in mischief, even when on the brink of an economic catastrophe, is enormous. It is highly unlikely that nobody in Rawalpindi had even a hint about the Americans’ plans to kill the top terrorist. Did they sell him to the US? Washington, after all, has a lot of say in the workings of the International Monetary Fund? A few billion dollars would be a lot of relief for the Pakistani economy. The lesson we can learn from the killing is that our neighbourood remains as dangerous a place as it ever was.