Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” was elucidated at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing on October 19. listing his 14-point fundamental principles that are central to China’s envisioned socialism, Xi reiterated that the CPC must ensure a “people-centric” developmental approach, while the nation must equally ensure party’s supremacy in a “new era”. What does Xi’s advocacy of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” in a new era mean for China’s regional and global standingIJ
Charting out the success that China has attained within the purview of the CPC, the Chinese President eloquently expressed that the developmental path of the nation is witnessing a “period of strategic opportunity”. Xi emphasised how China achieved rapid urbanisation. He also stressed on development, tackling corruption in the system to offer a new image to the CPC, and addressing the existing provincial disparities in the country. Underlining the success of lifting 60 million people out of poverty over the last five years, Xi highlighted the gross domestic product (GDP) of China rising from $8 trillion to $12 trillion, thus making the Communist state an attractive investment destination for the world. These narrations were on expected lines as the Congress is one forum where the President of China and the party’s General Secretary would like to highlight the success story the country has written under their leadership. As it goes with any Congress, the 19th National Congress of the CPC prepared a road map for China’s developmental path domestically under Xi till 2022 and beyond. What, however, is interesting to note is that Xi’s “14-point” fundamental principles equally emphasised on key foreign policy issues which are crucial to China’s national interest.
Underlining a “holistic approach on national security”, Xi strongly advocated “one country, two systems”, “national unifications” and Beijing taking a lead for shared future of mankind. What do these mean in China’s overseas national interestsIJ
Underlying these issues are China’s national security matters concerning Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and matters linked to land and maritime territorial interests. Building a holistic “national security” approach has been a prime goal under the Xi regime for some time now where the focus is on strategic hinterland, mainly Xinjiang and Tibet. Even though Beijing launched a “go West” strategy in 2000 to promote economic development in the hinterland, both Xinjiang and Tibet have been problematic regions for the Dragon in the past two decades. Xi’s stress on “national security” is meant to tighten Beijing’s grip further on Xinjiang and Tibet. In fact, exerting control over domestic security matters has been pursued concurrently along with the overseas security and strategic matters in China. Xi’s speech at the CPC Congress made it clear that the same approach will continue.
The Chinese narration of national security is closely linked to territorial integrity and sovereignty. Beijing, under the Xi leadership, has been making a statement in recent past that China would not compromise on matters linked to national security. This was candidly spelled out in Xi’s speech at the 19th National Congress. Passing a strong message to Hong Kong and Taiwan, Xi drew a red-line saying that Hong Kong and Taiwan could enjoy prosperity and growth only under the “one country, two systems” without being ambitious to seek an autonomous future without mainland China. Xi was, therefore, quite straightforward about Taiwan in his 19th National Congress speech. In fact, without offering any remote prospect to Taiwan’s bid for Independence, Xi was categorical in making a reference that Taiwan must aim to have a “peaceful national unification” that both Hong Kong and Macao enjoy with mainland China. The Chinese assertion over Taiwan in Xi’s speech is not entirely a new phenomenon: Beijing time and again has made clear its intensions and strategies towards Taipei. What is new, however, is the Chinese assertion that is liked to Beijing’s ambitious grand strategy in a “new era” which signals that the country has made a departure from its “peaceful rise” strategy. Xi’s assertion that the CPC is in the process of building a “world-class” armed forces by the middle of 21st century explains this intent. It is a clear message to the region and the world at large that China will aim to assert itself over national security issues, mainly matters relating to territorial integrity and sovereignty.
A direct message to India could probably stem from Xi’s speech where he said that Beijing would like to settle disputes with neighbours “through dialogue” without making any compromise on its national interests. This is in reference to India on the boundary dispute as much as a reference towards the Southeast Asian countries who claim free navigation rights on the South China Sea. A flexible approach from Beijing, therefore, may not be really an expected proposition in future. Besides, Xi’s emphasis that China would like to continue to emerge as a leader of the developing world comes as a conflicting subject matter since the intent is to deny India the requisite space to lead the developing world groupings. Beijing, under Xi’s stewardship, is trying to make it clear that no other country, other than China, is the leader of the developing world.
In brief, Xi’s emphasis to build a “moderately prosperous society” is a new national security strategy which should not be seen in isolation. This vision of Xi is not entirely a domestic economic proposition, rather it is a strategy linked to Beijing’s overseas national security interests which might pose challenge to other rising countries in the region, particularly India. This is associated with China’s rise. Xi also emphasised on revitalising the role of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to help China build good and stable overseas deals. Striving for “moderately prosperous society” and achieving a “socialist modernisation” by 2035 is, therefore, a strategy linked to the CPC’s overseas interests to secure more energy and financial resources, to eventually promote Xi’s pet-project “Belt and Road Initiative”, and to keep up the economic development momentum. The aim is to expand China’s overseas economic interests through connectivity and corridor projects by establishing robust trade and economic contacts and to build a regional and global consensus in Beijing’s favour to position China as the driver of globalisation. This would pose a stronger challenge to India since New Delhi has seen the Belt and Road Initiative not so much positively. With the 19th National Congress, the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative has entered into the second stage where the Chinese thrust is to execute connectivity and corridor initiatives along with other projects. India needs to take a serious note of this.
(Dr Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)