Self-styled spokespersons would bear in mind that the big idea in India-US relations is geo-economics, not geo-politics. loose talk of alliances in front of the camera at the slightest provocation, instead of remaining responsibly reticent, can unwittingly undermine ‘strategic orchestration' of a considered narrative and do immense disservice to the nation
Prime Minister Modi has catapulted foreign policy — or external relations, to be more precise — centre stage in a manner not seen since the heady days of Pt Nehru, when the nation’s diplomatic machine acquired its reputation of a penchant for punching above its weight. Every foreign interaction of his has evoked unprecedented public enthusiasm and pride, the last two — with China and Japan — in particular. The “commentariat” have been compelled to concede the recent foregrounding of India’s strategic salience internationally.
So far so good. However, moving from the mood of the moment to the needs of the long-term, and from the individual plane to that of institutions, a note of caution might be in order. Because the wherewithal for translating the gains from strategic diplomacy into tangible benefits is not in place — the institutional capacities of the strategic policy and decision-making machinery in Government are not great; not at all, in fact, in relation to the likely demands on it now, as the country shifts to high gear in its engagement with major powers.
B-schools posit a “strategic management” function in case of the modern-day firm to address its vital vulnerabilities and opportunities lurking over the horizon. Tasks of a cross-cutting or structural nature that cannot be left to (even seniormost managers in) line departments with tunnel visions limited to their turf and are therefore, defined as a domain in itself, directly under top management. The fact that there is no corresponding term for it in the government — even the vague terms “higher management”, or “systems approach,” are no longer much in vogue — speaks for itself in this regard.
This is an aspect that will be central to the forthcoming interaction with the remaining big players in the power quadropole on the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape, the weightiest of them all with its own “middle kingdom” complex no less than the original. The formidable institutional strengths of the US Administration (with forbidding complexities in its systemic norms, control mechanisms and procedures), and proclivity to have them prevail on the other side, will be a new element to be contended with. For it will be engagement with USA Inc., and not straightforward geo-politics, that will be the primary driver here, with associated vexatious demands for “boldly” opening up the economy (and undertaking systemic reform) in accordance with its preferences (rather than Indian priorities) in play and only individuals — unbacked by institutional capacities — on the Indian side batting against the pace bowling.
Comprehensive and fundamental refurbishing, going far beyond the basic toning up of bureaucracy already initiated (and aimed at shaking it out of its set ways and making organisational/management innovation and synergy a palpable reality, not mere bookish buzzwords) — nothing short of governance reform 2.0, in other words — is, of course, what is called for. It can be argued that that is a tall order, inappositely conflated with foreign interactions. Be that as it may, the point is that a beginning has to be made somewhere — unless one opts for an all or nothing approach. The strategic establishment, especially the security related sections and those overlooking the eco-system germane to economic diplomacy (which, like others in GOI, are known to function in silos in a timeless world), are appropriate candidates for the kick off. And if it has to be triggered by the imperatives of external strategic engagement, so be it.
Only a few aspects can be highlighted in this first piece.
‘Strategising’ is no one-off exercise — the real work begins after media glare and blare have faded away. When the baton is handed over by the individual (leader) to the institutions under his direction, which is where systemic inertia and complacency tend to set in frequently. Often under the mistaken assumption that all that needed to be done had been done (and reflected in the understandings arrived at between the leaders). Without need for reinforcement or rear guard action subsequently at bureaucratic levels, to guard against foot dragging at these levels, in follow through negotiations, with a view to price extraction or backtracking or whatever. And to bolster the concrete content of the understandings (couched invariably, of necessity, in lofty but ambiguous terms).
The importance of follow up action (on high-level understandings and commitments), the bane of the Indian system, cannot be overstated. Every Indian Ambassador has a fund of sob stories to tell, each more glaring than the other. Not to mention those of outsiders, with their higher standards and expectations.
Then the question of quality. Inter-Ministerial institutional capacity for drawing all strands of the issue at hand together and weaving them into a coherent whole will have to be developed, and demonstrated, to shed the current image of porosity of the decision-making structures, which invites pressures and lobbying. The capacity to ensure that overall considerations, and not sectional interests, drive and determine decisions. And aim for optimal outcomes, instead of “satisficing” with sub-optimal ones.
For example, in the case of China, the foremost challenge will be to prevent the industrial parks idea from becoming a panacea for alleviating the trade deficit. And to ensure that it results in augmentation, and not weakening (or wiping away), of existing manufacturing capacity — in the SME sector, above all. (Besides maintaining a permanent watchful eye on the security front, mindful of the (systemic) asymmetry in-built in India opening up to Chinese investment because of its being state controlled on their side.)
Development of capacity for effective monitoring of the impact of the proposed industrial parks on the economy in that wider sense — i.e. on manufacturing competitiveness (and market penetration at the Indian end and market access at the Chinese end), as well as tracking the net flows of foreign exchange they generate (with the secondary and tertiary loops factored in) — would be a daunting but eminently doable task. As also evolution of a phased approach, limiting investment in these parks initially to sectors in which Chinese industry is in the process of vacating due to high labour intensity and costs (or has an acknowledged lead or superiority technologically or marketing wise) and prohibiting it in those in which Indian industry is still fledgling (or in a consolidation phase and not yet in a position to withstand competition) or restricting it to technological upgradation/modernisation of existing units. Evolving an appropriate policy design, as above, could perhaps form part of the remit of the revamped Planning Commission to be, which could also be mandated to make strategic assessments of (the actual unfolding of) such initiatives (offering opportunity but also risks) periodically to enable mid-course corrections to well intentioned starts gone astray.
Another, a more basic one, is the need to overcome the most fundamental non-tariff barrier of all — lack of felicity in the Chinese language — that comes in the way of purposive interaction between the two nations in all fields, including political. The handicaps of having to depend on the interlocutor’s interpreters unfamiliar with thinking and the larger setting at one’s own end should need no elaboration. It is, at minimum, a recipe for making certain that only an overall flavour of one’s articulation goes through to the other side, with nuances falling by the wayside. Thus, we have no way of knowing what exactly was put to the Chinese President, with regard to the message the PM sought to convey on the sensitive boundary and border issues, in the absence of a practice of (formally recording) reverse translations (of the Chinese interpreter’s remarks). It is not clear if the MEA has any such standard operating procedures in place for high-level diplomatic interactions. It would seem not, going by the visibility of Chinese interpreters (and absence of Indian ones) from the visuals of the Chinese President’s visit and judging by some stray indications (from actual translations heard in video footage casually). And, most tellingly, from Hindi versions of English documents and vice versa (including in this visit), which betray no finesse.
A related aspect is the question of thoroughness in follow up media monitoring of coverage of the interaction (with all foreign leaders) to facilitate understanding of matters in proper perspective. How the visit is projected by the Chinese leadership back home, for instance, to their own people in their domestic media (as distinct from the projections in their English language media, which have little validity for they are made for the benefit of the outside world), can obviously tell a lot about their (real, as opposed to stated) approach to India-China relations. Aspects of speeches and statements highlighted to their own citizenry, and aspects under-played or omitted altogether, can be extremely revealing of intent and thinking. In a State controlled media environment, the considerations and calculations of the powers that be are embedded, necessarily, in their projections to their publics (both civil and military), and that design can therefore easily be discerned at our end if examined with a keen eye.
Yet there is no agency in the country that undertakes such an exercise — of monitoring coverage of India in the Chinese media comprehensively, with a flair for nuance — even temporarily during high-level visits, let alone on an on-going basis. This is a serious gap reflective of the lackadaisical and intellectually lazy way we do things in our country.
Monitoring of the domestic media of the country of accreditation is standard in diplomatic reporting but that, and other similar work undertaken elsewhere within Government, has, for obvious reasons, to remain confidential. There is none in the public domain, and that is a national shame. For all it requires is a little money for hiring language experts. Proposals for (funding of) such an exercise (and others for intensifying the non-official gaze on China) submitted by this writer languish, unacknowledged, in various quarters, both official and academic. The Ministries of External Affairs and Defence should take it upon themselves to sponsor such programmes in the interest of promoting better informed public opinion which, in turn, will be conducive for greater stability in India-China relations (without officialdom itself having to go on the defensive from time to time, as at present). Else the relationship will continue to be vulnerable to shrill calumny in an age of the digital media prone to marking meaning in debates in decibels dished out on the basis of dubious information.
Other aspects of the current national strategic scenario will be mused upon in coming columns. This one concludes with the hope that all ‘spokespersons’ (especially self-styled ones outside the formal set-up) would bear in mind that the big idea in India-US relations is geo-economics (enticing entrepreneurial energies in the two countries for realising the full potential of the relationship, above all), not geo-politics. loose talk of alliances, etc, — becoming volubly defensive in front of the camera at the slightest provocation, instead of remaining responsibly reticent — can unwittingly undermine “strategic orchestration” of a considered narrative and do immense disservice to the nation. The power of understatement, and a sense of reserve, for magnifying the kernel of a proposition manifold, should be borne in mind. And the national weakness for premature crowing, simplistically presuming a lot and going overboard, overcome — sooner rather than later.
(The writer is former Ambassador of India to the UN and other International Organisations in Vienna, Austria, Ireland and Vietnam. At present, he is Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru)