Modi diving into Swachchh Bharat mission after whirlwind trip to the US is metaphorical of the Herculean task of clearing cobwebs from Augean stables of Govt’s decision-making machinery
A whirlwind tour across the world behind him — an eminently successful one by any standard — Prime Minister Modi has his tasks cut out on the domestic stage. His plunging into the Swachchh Bharat campaign personally on return, without losing a moment, is the right metaphor for the much bigger task of clearing cobwebs in the Augean stables of the decision-making machinery in Government that waits. Not just in fulfilment of the promise made (with regard to reform of “policies and processes” affecting potential investors), but also in respect of internal strategic decision-making.
Strategic diplomacy done, dexterously by all accounts, the more difficult dimension of strategising — refurbishing of institutional capacities of the Indian State to match those of its peers — comes to the fore, inevitably, as his team takes stock of the gains made and opportunities opened up and gets down to working out a strategy for realising them. (As well as reflecting on the overall scenario thrown up, all things considered, including damage containment efforts necessary for addressing the faux pas committed.)
Both the recent US and Chinese high-level interactions underline this requirement starkly, each in its own way of course.
Full marks are due for the creative manner in which the US visit was choreographed, cleverly allowing the right notes to be played at the right time at the right place for raising India’s profile and appeal in the US while steering clear deftly of dimensions that could have taken the projection in counter-productive directions. (Some excesses, relatively minor, apart.)
The joint editorial in The Washington Post with President Obama was a brilliant idea, enabling much better outreach than the conventional formal joint statement. As with the PM’s sotto voce remarks to the prestigious Council for Foreign Relations audience packed to capacity, it was carefully worded to project a correct picture of the India-US partnership amid a welter of wild conjectures and suggestions doing the rounds amongst the chatterati — namely, as a force for “greater stability and security” regionally and globally, which “can help shape international security and peace for years to come” and which would seek to set now, more than before, “a new agenda, one that realises concrete benefits for our citizens”.
The message clearly was that this is the sense — of benign and beneficial bilateralism — in which the description “natural allies” of former PM Vajpayee had to be understood, not as an alliance against anyone else. That this was no mere word play was evident from the host of new areas of collaboration — clean energy and climate change resilient technologies, above all - identified as action points. The only dissonant note came, paradoxically, from where it was least expected — the official joint statement, which could have shown greater sophistication (out of sheer professionalism, if not in anticipation of trends in the offing).
Back to institution building, the US court serving summons on a Head of Government on an official visit to their country, utterly inapt and untenable though it was, deserves note for an important feature of the US system it brings out, that might be worth a ponder in a sister democracy yet in the nascent stage of nation building comparatively speaking - that of institutions running in auto-pilot mode, without need for high-level intervention to activate them. (Or the other way round, of rank, position, etc, being able to prevent activation or stop a train in motion in its tracks, as it were. The legal suit slapped on the Indian Deputy Consul General in New York on grounds that had nothing to do with any fundamental interest of the US State illustrates that second aspect very well.) The ‘auto-pilot’ feature of the system’s functioning lends it tremendous leverage in dealing with its interlocutors, putting them on the back foot, ipso facto.
This is not to imply naïve adulation, or suggest simplistically that emulation can bring similar rewards. The latter stem from content — “comprehensive national power”, to juxtapose a Chinese conceptualisation here — and not form (institutional capacity). But only to draw attention to an aspect that bears reflection in the Indian context, which is a polar opposite. Rarely does any action in pursuance of a strategic interest or imperative kick into life on its own, institutionally, despite much talk and awareness all around. Most of the time, it has to be initiated at the top, or the name/authority of the topmost leader of the land invoked, to get things moving.
That unenviable task, of drawing different strands together into a coherent whole, currently falls to the lot of the National Security Adviser’s (NSA) office — set up in recognition of the problem of coordination, at a level below that of the Prime Minister himself or herself, in a Cabinet form of government. At least three Ministries — Home, Defence and External Affairs — are involved, invariably, on day to day security issues, and many more, much of the time, on strategic ones of greater complexity. Relieving the PM of some of the load thus, becomes an imperative.
But there is a limit to how much an individual, virtually unsupported by an institution, can do. In the first place, the NSA’s mandate does not extend beyond the realm of security; strategic issues with cross-cutting economic and technological facets remain outside his purview. There is need for similar relief for the PM in respect of (the internal dimensions of) economic diplomacy, for the Ministry of External Affairs (to whose lot it falls to coordinate with other Ministries in follow up today) simply cannot provide that in the very nature of things (despite being at the receiving end very often) as a Ministry without a locus standi on domestic affairs. And yet, it must not be done behind their backs, as it were, if strategic coherence is not to be lost. This is something that will be of immense salience in the myriad follow up negotiations that will be necessary with the US side in pursuance of the many understandings arrived at during the US visit of PM.
Secondly, even within the security domain, there will be a tendency for clogging at the NSA’s level if everything is pushed up routinely (or is required to be). This will make for functioning in fire-fighting mode, sacrificing the important, much of the time, for the urgent. An institutionally embedded mechanism of coordination must ensure freedom for the office of the NSA to pick and choose subjects requiring their attention, and rest assured that all other aspects will be attended to by the Ministries concerned in the routine without need for intervention or monitoring by them.
In this context, the question of appropriate nomenclature is of interest, though not naturally of decisive import. The NSA is more an actor, performing the coordinating function, than an adviser - why not designate him then as the National Security Coordinator, instead of NSA (a title borrowed perhaps from the USA unwittingly)IJ An advisor’s job being to advise, he must be fed information, and the more the better — so it might be argued in justification of offloading all kinds of pieces of paper (relevant, irrelevant, whatever) on his desk. Not so in case of a coordinator, who cannot reasonably be flooded with information on issues other than those he is actually coordinating, or declares to be interested in coordinating in due course as they move up in priority.
The problem, of course, is more complex than one of correct designation or nomenclature. The Allocation of Business Rules of the Government of India, which allocate specific subjects to individual Ministries and Departments of the Union Government, and the Transaction of Business Rules, which govern their day to day functioning, make no mention of ‘strategic interests’ of the State (which invariably involve more than one Government agency). Therein lies the source of turf battles, both of acquisition as well as abdication. There was little (need for) appreciation of cross-cutting, inter-Ministerial domains at the time those Rules were framed. A revision, based on a relook at the system as a whole, would seem to be called for. (One way might be to institute a practice of a Minister without Portfolio in the PMO at all times, whose remit would be coordination on all subjects claimed by more than one Ministry (or none), and those of a strategic nature added to the Rules on an ad hoc basis from time to time on advice by the PM).
In the case of China, a relook at the SPR (Special Political Representatives) mechanism has become necessary as a result of the unfolding of events on the border during and since the Chinese President’s visit. It is not advisable anymore to rest content with that mechanism, which cannot be said to have delivered great results on resolution of the boundary question more than five years after it was agreed between the two countries that “the SPRs shall complete at an early date the task of arriving at an agreed framework of settlement...”
The present approach of a ‘three-stage roadmap’ — proceeding ‘top-down’ from abstract principles and parameters to specifics of territorial adjustments - needs to be reversed (i.e., replaced by a ‘bottom-up’ one, beginning with a prior understanding on the specifics of the eventual boundary alignment) in the light of the experience of four decades of normalisation, of endlessly prevarication on the part of the Chinese in addressing the issue in earnest. A truly political approach, entailing negotiations, not just talks, for coming to grips with the nitty-gritty is what is called for.
It is time for the matter to be taken up by the top most leaders of both countries in their hands directly, in tangible terms of the specifics of the settlement, instead of their surrogates shadow boxing with words and phrases that can be interpreted and reinterpreted ad nauseum. The PM had already voiced his concern regarding the desirability of an early settlement of the issue to the Chinese President. The current circumstance of a vacancy of the SPR’s position on the Indian side can be utilised to seek a shift to high gear in pursuance of that suggestion, making a bid to persuade the Chinese side of a common interest in forestalling volatility in the relationship (that is otherwise a real danger in an age of 24x7 digital media and hot-headed younger generations assuming centre stage in both countries).
Finally, this writer would hope that Iran, like Russia, will also be a part of this first round of strategic diplomacy of the new Government, for more reasons than one that cannot be elaborated upon here except to say that they are not unconnected to the US visit. There may be some making up to be done there but it will be well worth it.
(The writer is former Ambassador of India to the UN and other International Organisations in Vienna, Austria, Ireland and Vietnam. At present, he is Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore)