The Government's policy of suppressing Maoist violence by military force will work in the short term. However, to effectively eradicate this movement once and for all, there has to be equitable development even in the most backward regions
In 2009, the Union Government evolved a National Coordinated Offensive plan to fight Maoists. This plan has since been vigorously followed by the Union Government especially after the success of the Greyhound Operation in Andhra Pradesh. The States of Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha have also been selected up by the Union Government for special quasi-military operations against Maoists on the lines of the Greyhound Operation.
This year, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has already decided to deploy 8,000 additional troops and 14 IAF choppers, apart from the 80,000 CRPF personnel across 70,000 sq km of territory. The Government’s strategy is to use maximum firepower in a concentrated manner in select regions where Maoists are active. Yet, gun battles between the Maoists and the Government’s well-armed para-military forces have often not succeeded in the liquidation of the insurgents.
The ideologically-motivated movement of the Maoists requires deep scrutiny, especially as the democratically elected Union and State Governments attempt to eradicate the problems faced in backward regions of the country. A brief description of the origins of the Naxal movement in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh should help contextualise the movement.
After separating from the CPI(M), Kanu Sanyal and Charu Majumdar launched an armed struggle in 1967 from Naxalbari village in West Bengal’s Darjeeling district. Their ‘war’ was similar to the efforts of the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh. Siddhartha Shankar Ray, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, launched a ruthless offensive against the Naxal leaders and it yielded the desired results. But now, after a gap of many years, the Naxal movement in West Bengal has re-emerged. This should lead us to examine the appeal of this ideology for the poor and tribal population in extremely backward regions of India.
The manner in which economic development has happened in post-Independence India has created serious regional imbalances and much social inequity. Maoism, therefore, has found fertile ground in the underdeveloped, backward States of Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Odisha and even in Andhra Pradesh where certain regions remain undeveloped. In these areas, the insurgents have mobilised the discontented, dissatisfied and disempowered masses. But note that the Maoists have not been able to take violent movement outside the backward regions. Clearly, then it is the lack of development that breeds non-conformist, anti-democracy movements.
The only way to eliminate the Maoist challenge, once and for all, is to follow the policy of bullet for bullet in the short term but also to push for development of the backward States in the long term. The first strategy is a legitimate response from any democratically elected government towards an armed insurgency. However, it has its limitations. The deployment of security personnel cannot be a substitute for good governance.
The Government recognises this fact, yet its development initiatives have not yielded the desired results. For example, there are many special schemes and plans for the poor, but they are often badly implemented. As a result, India is paying heavy price for misgovernance because the bureaucracy is insensitive to the poor. Further, Maoist also oppose every developmental scheme introduced by the Government. The only option here is to activate local institutions such as the panchayats which can then be responsible for the implementations of the development schemes.
Even this approach has limitations. After all, it is hard to imagine that the South Korean owners of Posco will understand the plight of the Indian poor.