Japan’s political culture, which relies on discipline, societal values, traditional beliefs, nationalism, and technological expertise, amongst others, was invoked and used by Modi with much finesse and sophistication during his visit to the State
Diplomatic speeches have always played an important role in the art of statecraft. In the fifth century, BC Thucydides in his famous classic, The History of the Peloponnesian War, underlined the importance of speeches and diplomatic envoys. Recognising this Thucydidean method which emphasised on discourses and speeches, some scholars started revisiting the conventional claim that Thucydides is the father of realism. Instead, they argued that distinct political cultures of various Greek city-states made them respond to issues of war, justice, morality and power differently. The reason why Thucydides becomes a departure point for understanding Modi’s recent visit to Japan is the extensive use of political rhetoric, which becomes significant because it was directed to address the very unique political culture of Japan.
Political culture has generally been understood as being composed of unique attitudes, beliefs and orientations, which people in a given society develop towards objects within their political system. The unique cultural traits which people of a given society inculcate over a period of time thus entails normative beliefs, and a set of ideational, political and social values which then form the content of the larger cultural construct, within which societies are located. In this regard, Japan’s political culture, which relies on discipline, societal values, traditional beliefs, nationalism, and technological expertise, amongst others, was invoked and used by Modi with much finesse and sophistication.
Modi’s visit to Kyoto, a town which represents Japan’s traditional values, his mention of the Bhagawad Gita, which he gifted to Japan’s Emperor, the analogy of Japanese hardware and Indian software and representing India not as a land of snake charmers but a land where Indian now play with a ‘mouse’, were well intended brachyological terms used by Modi.
Significantly, the conscious frames, which resonated with the unique political culture of Japan, indeed made the Modi-Abe visit a moment of celebration. Not only the media celebrated this visit with much fanfare but Modi’s promise that India guarantees democracy, safety, security, and justice garnered a $35 billion investment. This investment becomes significant against the backdrop of the Asian century, where two leading Asian economies have committed close cooperation on security and economic issues in the years to come. In fact, almost setting the agenda for Japan, Modi said, “Just as India is focusing on look East policy, it seems Japan is now pursuing a “look at India Policy.”
Officially termed as the “dawn of a new era in India-Japan relations”, the Tokyo declaration thus sets the blueprint for convergent Indo-Japan interests in the twenty-first century. These have been termed as political, defence and security partnership; global partnership for peace and security in the region and the world; civil nuclear energy; non-proliferation and export control; partnership for prosperity; exploring science, inspiring innovation, developing technology and connecting people and leading the future. While Modi has framed the terms of the relationship as the three Ds — democracy, demography and demand — one can identify templates on which this cooperation has been envisaged.
The first locus on which the cooperation stands is information sharing and communication on issues relating to both security and development. The formation of National Security Secretariat in Japan in early January this year and the institutionalisation of dialogue between Foreign and Defence Secretaries (two plus two) of both countries is a case in point. Moreover the mention of maritime and cyber security in particular has the potential to increase the zone of agreement to other like-minded countries (read the US).
The second locus seems to stand on creating a “vision of the field” for effective action. This seems to be slating out the issue areas for regional and international action. The Indian Ocean Region, regional forums such as ASEAN and theaters of transitions, conflict and tensions such as Afghanistan, North Korea, West Asia including Gulf regions find an explicit mention here.
The third locus is on functional characteristics of energy security, acknowledging the dangers of dual use of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation and nuclear safely emerge as two areas of functional cooperation between the two countries. “Agreement for cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, thus received some attention in this regard.
Finally, the fourth underlining element is on the complementarities which exist between Japanese experience and strengths of Indian entrepreneurship. The India-Japan investment promotion partnership, with a target of doubling Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment and the Official Development Assistance of almost $474 million to India Infrastructure Finance Company, is significant. Notably, the partnership arrangement between ancient cities of Varanasi and Kyoto is a cocktail recipe for the tradition-modernity template, which both countries have endowed to the framework of bilateral cooperation.
However, any references on Modi’s visit to Japan will be incomplete without the mention of the much talked about China factor. It is interesting to note that Modi brought in the analogy of vistaarvad (expansionism) verses vikasvaad (development). While the analytical value of this dichotomy does not go beyond political rhetoric meant for public consumption, given the tension on the South China Sea, another Thucydidean insight on “fear as an emotion” might prove useful. If at all some indirect references to China were employed as an instrument of diplomatic signaling (with the potential of alliance of like-minded countries emerging in the Asia-Pacific region), one needs to be wary of the strategic weight that fear as a hostile emotion contains for the Asian century. In this regard, Modi should have avoided such statements.
What Thucydides was perhaps underlining in the History of Peloponnesian War was the motivational impact of fear on human nature. Thucydides emphatic note on fear as a causal factor which leads to the Peloponnesian war reveals that a public culture which generates fear and distrust can indeed lead to great tragedies. Given the salience of “hostile” emotions in political life, how the great game in Asia opens in the twenty-first century would therefore require political acumen and insight from the Asian leaders. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in mid-September becomes interesting and would be watched carefully in this regard. Thus, will the destiny of Asia go beyond derterminism or towards more transformational pathways is an interesting point for discussion and departure.
looking at the broader picture of India-Japan relations, one can say that Modi’s recent visit to Japan is more of a continuity of policies enunciated by the UPA Government. Perhaps what makes it different is the conduct of diplomacy, and Modi indeed needs to be applauded for it. Continuity through change then can perhaps best describe Modi’s recent visit to Japan.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Dept. of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi)