Geneva II conference provided an apt platform for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to leverage their regional positions. But the presence of one was set to hamper the other’s manoeuvering. Saudi Arabia might not have achieved what it has if Iran had participated in the talks
Geneva II conference on Syria began on January 22, 2014 with warring sides indicating no readiness to compromise on ending bloodshed. While Syrian Foreign Minister rejected outright US Secretary of State John Kerry’s demand for President Bashar al-Assad to step down for a transition government, the opposition groups participated in the conference with a sole aim of removing Assad from power. Kerry asserted that the man who had led a ruthless response to his own people cannot be allowed to gain the legitimacy to govern the country. However, the instant retort came from Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem: “No one can grant or withdraw the legitimacy to the President other than the Syrians themselves.”
Muallem seemed to talk sense by questioning the Opposition’s claim to represent the Syrian people. “If you want to speak in the name of the Syrian people, you should not be traitors to the Syrian people,” the Foreign Minister had added.
Ahmad al-Jarba, the head of the opposition, Syrian National Coalition, demanded the immediate signing of a deal reached at the last peace conference in Geneva in June 2012 seeking “the transfer of powers from Assad, including for the Army and security, to a transition government.”
Expectations of a breakthrough at the meeting were always low, however there is a consolation. The Syrian regime and Opposition groups are sitting together on the negotiating table for the first time since the start of the conflict in March 2011 is indeed a mark of some progress. In a speech UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said “After nearly three painful years of conflict and suffering in Syria, today is a day of hope; you have an enormous opportunity and responsibility to render a service to the people of Syria.”
Notably Iran, the close ally of Assad, was absent from the conference, after Ban rescinded invitation at the eleventh hour under intense US pressure after Syria’s main Opposition group threatened to boycott the talks. The Opposition groups were adamant on rejecting the invitation to the conference if Tehran participates in the negotiation. Even at the start, Iran had refused to be bound by the precondition of the June 2012 communiqué, which is the main demand of the US and the Syrian Opposition groups, to remove Assad from power.
As Iran has been Assad’s prime regional ally for more than 30 years, supporting his regime with military advisers, money and material, Iran could have played a major role in finding a viable peaceful solution in Syria. After several rounds of talks between the UN Secretary General and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif regarding the issue, Ban did not succeed in convincing Iran about the preconditions. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said, “We regret that Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has withdrawn the invitation under pressure.”
Russia has strongly condemned the UN decision to exclude Tehran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey lavrov said that Ban Ki-Moon’s decision to revoke the invitation to Iran to attend the conference would have a negative effect on the UN image and could also endanger the peace talks. lavrov reiterated Russia’s position that the presence of Iran was crucial for the success of the Geneva II conference.
The civil war in Syria has taken on post-Cold War overtones with Russia and the United States backing opposite sides. The controversy over Iran’s participation in the conference has exposed deep differences between the two superpowers over Syria.
Syrian crisis and Saudi-Iran rivalry
The political turmoil in Syria has presented Iran and Saudi Arabia an alibi to involve in a proxy regional conflict. When dealing with the reasons for the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran on Syria, one must consider the internal dynamics of both the countries and the notion of internal security dilemma that have aggravated tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. The case of Syria warrants examination of the importance of internal factors within Iran and Saudi Arabia that have molded their behaviour towards Syria. While both countries have desired to play leading roles in helping solve the Syrian problems, Iran has offered substantial funding and military support to Assad, and Saudi Arabia has strongly backed Opposition groups.
As Geneva II conference provided an apt platform to leverage their positions, both sides hardened their stands. Iran indicated its willingness to participate in the conference without any pre-condition, which it had attempted to frame through the prism of a recent rapprochement with the US and European Union over its nuclear programme. Saudi Arabia had also coveted to play a significant role in any rapprochement, but it was possible only when Iran was absent from the talks.
Due to the Arab transformation, there is a broader shift in the balance of power in the region. The current uprising in the Arab World has given Iran an opportunity to exploit the political turmoil and encourage the formation of “Shia Crescent” extending from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and lebanon. Shias are in majority in Iraq and the post-Saddam government is controlled by Shias, who are biased towards Tehran. Iran has also close relations with Hezbollah and has been supporting them with arms and ammunition besides providing Hezbollah forces training. Therefore Assad’s presence is necessary for Iran’s interest.
As long as Iran and Saudi Arabia stoke the fire in Syria by blindly supporting their respective allies, those who believe in a military solution to the Syrian crisis will be encouraged to continue the struggle. A truce between Iran and Saudi Arabia therefore can contribute to finding a solution to the Syrian crisis.
Forecast
It was commonly believed that Geneva II will not find a breakthrough instantly. First, for any peace conference to achieve certain goals, the ground has to be prepared first. Second, an agenda needs to be agreed by both sides, and there has to be adequate influence on parties to conflict to allow some compromises to be made. Syrian opposition groups are not united, some opposition groups rejected the UN invitation to attend the talks and termed those attending Geneva II as traitors. Most of these points are not put on agenda in the Geneva II conference.
In the light of present development, it can be argued that the uprising in Syria may see a solution, but that does not guarantee an immediate solution. With or without Assad, Syria is set for long-drawn civil war because there are evenly matched warring parties who are not ready for a ceasefire any soon. Western powers and Gulf Cooperation Council States in general and Saudi Arabia in particular perceive the overthrow of the Assad’s government as a humiliating political and strategic defeat for Iran. The shift in balance is important, but it is not vital. Rather, it sets the point for a prolonged conflict that would break up Syria into belligerent opposition and pro-Assad groups.
The Iranian government has blamed Western and Arab nations, specifically Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia, of fomenting terrorism in Syria by arming opposition groups. However, there is still time to put an end to the bloodshed in Syria. No doubt it requires hard and tough decisions and on both sides of proper understandings and arrangements.
Overall, the ruling regime and the Opposition groups cannot trust each other and will not coincide on Assad’s future. If there can be one positive outcome of Geneva II, it is that the US and Russia should work together to resolve the crisis than be in opposition to each other on key issues such as prisoners release, delivery of aid and localised ceasefires. Both countries should also work together on the matter related to tackle the worsening humanitarian condition in which the Assad regime has imposed barriers on the delivery of food, medicine and aid. With no one ready for any compromise, world powers especially the US and Russia are likely to make efforts to take the initiative forward.
(The writer is Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)