Much of the credit for Narendra Modi's change of heart and an assured successful China visit, starting May 14, would go to Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar. He was able to convince the Prime Minister that playing hard ball with China will not help India become a global power
China will roll out the red carpet for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden visit starting May 14. The stage for this was set by Mr Modi himself, when he, after blaming China for its “expansionist designs”, and consequently having suffered Chinese belligerence during President Xi Jinping’s September 2014 India visit, conceded in a recent interview that “in so far as the border is concerned, the most important point right now is that peace and tranquillity must not be disturbed”. The need for an early border resolution or for defining the line of Actual Control will, however, get mentioned in the joint statement after the visit.
Much of the credit for Mr Modi’s change of heart and an assured successful China visit would go to Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar, India’s longest served Ambassador to China. As an able diplomat, he seems to have convinced the Prime Minister that playing hard ball with China will not help India become a global power. However, underplaying core concern (disputed border) with China would only vet its appetite for more concessions. Moreover, playing second fiddle to Beijing will not help India become a global power. The situation becomes precarious as by not talking with Pakistan — an emerging regional player — India appears to be losing its regional role in Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics and even the Middle East.
Unfortunately, India, while clutching onto its strategic autonomy mantra, may well find itself struggling for a regional role with little to show on the world stage. However, to China’s satisfaction, the bilateral agenda will focus on trade and commerce, including tangible ways (smart cities) to reduce trade deficit loaded in China’s favour. Beijing will cooperate in showing some results and plenty of hope on this issue as this will lead to India endorsing Mr Xi’s ambitious ‘one road one belt’ project. India may explain to Chinese leadership that joining it will not be possible since the Sino-Pak economic corridor passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
The contentious disputed border issue will be addressed for ‘strategic communication’ as both sides had agreed during the 18th round of border talks in March. While reiterating mutual commitment to the 1954, 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 agreements, both sides are expected to announce more meeting points in ladakh, where there are now 12 areas of lAC differences beyond the two identified by both sides in 1995. Thus, in addition to the sole Chushul meeting point, the two sides are exploring possibilities for meeting points at Track Junction, Pangong Tso, Chumar and Demchok in ladakh. Talks regarding hot line links between local levels in ladakh and between the Army Headquarters and Chinese Theatre Headquarters in Xinjiang are also expected to show positive outcome. What is forgotten is that more human interfaces may help resolve disputes faster (depending upon how China assesses them) and not prevent them from happening.
Analysts back home are expected to welcome Mr Modi’s visit since the traditional understanding is that China, as recently put by Mr Arun Shourie “is the principle challenge in the long run”. Moreover, as Mr Shyam Saran believes, “The longer the status quo continues the more likely is the lAC to eventually morph into a settled boundary”. This thesis is reinforced by another belief that grown bilateral economic interests will temper China’s quest for power and domination.
Interestingly, the above hypothesis has the support of the military, which believes that China is a future threat. With vowing not to allow a repeat of the 1962 war humiliation, our Generals are satisfied with more confidence-building measures for peace on the lAC. According to the Air Force (I have checked with two recently retired Chiefs of Air Staff), India has about 10 years to build its capabilities before China strikes on the border. This assumption is based on the Chinese White Paper on defence, where it mentions completing its mechanisation (mobile rapid reaction forces) and informationisation (networking of all military assets and sensors for a short, swift and intense regional war) by 2025. Consequently, the Army is raising its Mountain Strike Corps (90,000 troops) and the Air Force has got its authorised combat squadron strength increased from 39.5 to 42 squadrons (each squadron with 20 aircraft). A few aspirational Air Force voices are talking of an Air Force with 55 combat squadrons for a two-front war.
Not to be left behind, the Navy has its own plans independent of the land war. According to a retired Admiral, given the disputed borders with China and Pakistan, India’s choices for influencing geo-politics in the north are limited. However, in the India Ocean Region, the Navy has the ability (for nearly two decades) to hold the People’s liberation Army Navy at what Chinese themselves dread — the Malacca dilemma. Numerous analysts fascinated by the sea believe the same. For example, Mr Brahma Chellaney writes that “boosting Sea lanes of Communication interdiction capability would allow the Indian Navy to dominate key maritime routes and help improve the Chinese military’s behaviour along the Himalayas”.
The above military assessments have the ear of the Government because it fails to distinguish between defence and security matters and treats both as issues of equal concern. When China alters the lAC — a military line — it gets away with its act as it argues that the lAC is not agreed on the maps or ground. However, if it were to alter the international border in India’s south, it would be an act of war. No country goes to war without knowing what political objectives and military aims it hopes to achieve by the bloody act. More to the point, why would China go to war over the disputed border, when it is able to subdue India by its military coercionIJ China understands that military coercion is the future of warfare. It successfully demonstrated it in April-May 2013 in Depsang Plains in ladakh because it has built a formidable war capability over years.
However, if the Indian Navy were to interdict Chinese shipping in the SlOC of the IOR, China would hit back at land, sea, air, space, cyber and through Pakistan, with which it has built military interoperability (not to talk nuclear), with its might. One wonders if Indian analysts can comprehend such a scenario. Thus, contrary to what most Indian policymakers and analysts believe, China, owing to its excellent border management, is not a future military threat. It is an immediate threat which is psychologically defeating Indian soldiers perched on high altitude posts on the lAC by its regular border transgressions. Instead of protesting, India makes light of Chinese intrusions by saying both sides do the same, which is not true. While India may decide to underplay Chinese military coercion for peace and economic gains, the world, including India’s neighbours, knows what is going on. Mr Modi should know this when he leaves for China.