New Delhi understands the US government’s compulsions and takes such steps that do not compromise its national security and yet enable the two countries to engage meaningfully on a full range of possibilities
One hopes and trusts that the visit of Mr Puneet Talwar, US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, next week will see significant forward movement in India-US defence cooperation. There are reasons to be optimistic about such an expectation given an energetic Defence Minister in the new government with, hopefully, equally energetic Defence Ministry officialdom. An active and mutually productive defence cooperation between the two countries will be beneficial to both. It will be, to use an oft repeated cliché, a win-win situation.
In addition, both countries seem to be keen on enhancing such cooperation. According to the most recent Ministry of Defence Annual Report, “India’s defence relations with the United States of America (USA) are an important element of the broader strategic partnership between the two countries.” For their part, the US Congress and executive also seem to be equally keen on an enhanced defence partnership with India. The 2013 National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal 2013 specifically had a section requiring the “Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit to Congress a report on the prospects for expanding defense trade between the United States and India within the context of their bilateral defense relationship.” An earlier DoD report to the Congress in November 2011 stated: “The United States wants to develop deeper defense industrial cooperation with India, including a range of cooperative research and development activities.
The United States is committed to providing India with top-of-the-line technology.” In the Joint Declaration on Principles for Defence Cooperation announced during Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit in September 2013, the United States agreed to treat India on par with its closest partners in terms of technology release and both sides agreed to identify transformative co-development and co-production projects within a year. This was subsequently restated during Prime Minister’s visit to Washington earlier this year when their joint statement affirmed that “The Prime Minister and the President stated their intention to expand defense cooperation to bolster national, regional, and global security.” The two leaders reaffirmed that India and the United States would build an enduring partnership in which“both sides treat each other at the same level as their closest partners”, including defense technology transfers, trade, research, co-production, and co-development.”
Still procedural and the general trust deficit between the two countries, although much reduced now from earlier times, seem to be holding back full cooperation, even though in the recent past there have been a number of high-level visits by US defence officials — Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel in August followed by Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and logistics, Mr Frank Kendall, now followed by Mr Talwar’s visit.
In certain areas of defence cooperation there has already been substantial advancement. The US has emerged as the biggest supplier of defence equipment in recent years with cumulative defence orders during the past decade exceeding US $12 billion. In the three most recent financial years, 2011-14, expenditures on defence imports from the US accounted for nearly 40% of the total expenditure on imports from all countries (`326.15 billion out of total `834.58 billion) more than from any other country. With the completion of the C-17 contract, India now operates the second largest fleet of C-17s in the world. In respect of military-military interaction, joint exercises between the three services of the two countries have increased in scale and complexity since the signing of the New Framework in 2005. There have been more than 60 such exercises in the past decade. Regular joint exercises have become a common annual feature in the training plan of both the countries.
It is, however, in the “hard” areas of defence cooperation —coproduction/co development/ Joint R&D that there has been very little forward movement. Even though it was reported that at least 17 co-production/co-development proposals have been forwarded by the USG to GOI, including a proposal for co-development of the next generation javelin missile, so far there have been no firm agreements on any of these 17 proposals. Nor does there seem to be any major cooperative defence R&D project between the two countries.
How does one proceedIJ US rules, regulations and conditions for close defence cooperation are dictated both formal laws enacted by the Congress and various other statutory requirements. Hence notwithstanding the Joint Statement sentiment that “both sides treat each other at the same level as their closest partners”, in practice it may not be always possible. For instance there are certain exemptions for NATO allies which would not be applicable for India. Still, the fundamental requirement should be to treat India in matters not governed by other laws on an equal footing with close allies, sort of a MFN treatment.
There are certain elements where this can be done by executive orders. For example, in response to frequent complaints from its European partners about delays in licensing of munitions items, the US Administration had a programme, DTSI Defense Trade Security Initiative, which went some way towards addressing such concerns. While it was initially limited to NATO allies, subsequently some elements of DTSI were extended to Sweden as well.
India has, in the past, expressed concerns about US licensing procedures, especially in munitions items and the delays encountered. It should not be difficult for the US to extend to India as well some elements of DTSI. There are other elements of US laws, which are statutorily available only for NATO and major non-NATO allies, for example, items requiring export licences for items for incorporation in communication satellites, COMSAT, rules. India, in collaboration with US communication satellite providers can provide such communication satellites at very competitive prices. However, at this moment the licensing requirements for such components and systems to India are cumbersome and time-consuming. Extension of COMSAT facilitation to India will go a long way towards space cooperation in communication satellite technology between India and the US.
Extension of such facilities to India may require some Congressional amendments/additions to laws, but the strength of the House and Senate caucuses on India and Indian-Americans which are the largest of their kind in US Congress should make such a task relatively simple. In short, there are a number of executive actions and simple changes to US laws that will take into account US national security interests and at the same time will take India-US defense cooperation to high strategic levels. India, too, for its part understand some of the compulsions on US government and take such steps that do not compromise its national security and yet enable the two countries to engage meaningfully on a full range of possibilities.
(The writer is Consulting Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi)