Instead of discussing military and diplomatic options when few exist, Indian policymakers and experts should be talking about military reforms (which are much more than modernisation and acquisition) necessary to build requisite military power
The domestic reaction to the terrorist attack on the Uri Army base (political rhetoric and unrealisable military options by experts of all hues) was similar to earlier ones in Jammu & Kashmir from across the line of Control. What has changed this time is the appreciation of General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, about its strengths and India’s weaknesses. This needs to be understood with clinical objectivity and corrected, as otherwise, further terrorist attacks, more devastating than the present one, cannot be ruled out.
In Rawalpindi’s estimation, India has no military option. Unfortunately, this is true. Unlike what the Director-General Military Operations, lt Gen Ranbir Singh said, the Indian Army does not have the capacity and capability for military retribution. Doing so, however limited, would spiral into war, since escalation has its own dynamics.
While the Indian military (the Army and the Air Force) would find it virtually impossible to fight a short and swift conventional war (up to two weeks), the Pakistan military, today, can fight a much longer conventional war. Since results show most on the ground, the Indian Army, in terms of capacity lacks equipment (artillery, air defence, tanks and so on), ammunition (both specialised and dumb), war wastage reserves and so on. The Indian Air Force has its own well-known critical shortfalls.
Since capability refers to war training, Pakistan military is far ahead in terms of intra-service (within the Army and the Air Force), inter-service (joint training between the Army and the Air Force for air-land battles), and training between the Pakistan military and China’s People’s liberation Army, especially in high altitude and mountainous terrain where major results would show. China would support Pakistan with unlimited supply of arms, ammunition and help in all domains of war, namely, Army, Air Force, Navy, electromagnetic, space and cyber.
With its conventional prowess, Rawalpindi scores heavily at all levels of war: Strategic (quick decision-making for surprises), operational (theatre campaigns where wars are fought and won), and tactical (war materials). Unlimited bravery of the Indian soldiers alone will not decide a war outcome. The reality is that Pakistan does not need to resort to its nuclear weapons; it can, with Chinese support, make sizeable gains in the conventional war domain.
There are two more war-debilitating factors for India. Since the political leadership does not understand military power, it, fearing nuclear weapons, would hesitate to use the military option. Worse, it is not clear if most Generals, who have risen in rank and stature doing counter-insurgency operations since 1990, fully understand the two adversaries (Pakistan and China) and the nature of warfare with each. If they did, they would, citing increased external threats, opt out of counter-insurgency ops (by training the paramilitary forces for it) and go back to the basics of war preparedness.
The other factor is the unrest in Kashmir, which, in war, would compel the Army to fight on two fronts: Pakistan and keep its men and operational logistics safe from increased terrorism from within.
Regarding the diplomatic front, it will not be possible to isolate Pakistan. Today, Rawalpindi is an important partner in China’s One Belt One Road project, meant for global dominance by creation of new security architecture for Asia. Russia has agreed to be part of this architecture and Pakistan has made the transition from the old (US-supported security architecture) to the new. Given this, appealing to the US to compel Rawalpindi to control terror into India will not work. Ironically, today the US needs Pakistan more as it worries about its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of jihadis.
Thus, three geo-strategic players (with capability, capacity and political will to influence events well beyond their borders), namely, the US, Russia and China, woo Pakistan. They realise its importance as a major geopolitical pivot capable of helping them make inroads into Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and the Muslim world. Since all these nations have deep counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, they cannot be expected to pay more than lip-service to India’s regular complaint about terror unleashed by Rawalpindi. If anything, they support the Pakistani stance that both sides should resolve their issues (including terror and Kashmir) through bilateral talks. These nations would have difficulty in accepting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agenda that, instead of bilateral talks on the entire undivided Jammu & Kashmir, India would only talk on terror emanating from Pakistan, and how to get Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan back from Pakistan.
So, why has Rawalpindi increased infiltration by terrorists and direct attacks on Indian security forcesIJ Because nothing short of talks on Kashmir resolution is acceptable to it. The Manmohan Singh Government had, through the Manmohan-Musharraf formula, raised the bar for peace high; nothing less would bring peace. What should India doIJ It should adopt an offensive posture, and start the comprehensive bilateral dialogue, which was agreed by both sides in December 2015, with Pakistan.
The offensive posture has four elements: One, dismantle or better still, not resurrect, the fence after the 2016 winter when it would get damaged by vagaries of nature. This would worry Rawalpindi, and raise the morale of our own troops; they like nothing more than preparing for and fighting an identifiable enemy.
Two, the Army should move from internal security to border-guarding role. This will not be easy for the Government and the Army. In the absence of political initiatives (both within Kashmir and with Pakistan) for the Kashmir resolution, using the Army in the Valley is the easy way out. On the other hand, the Army leadership, snug in the present counter-insurgency role where it gets awards, status and power, will do it best to not give over this task to the paramilitary forces. Three, focus on war preparedness by realistic assessments of adversaries and warfare, and capability and capacity-building. And four, undertake military reforms at both policymaking and war-fighting levels.
Simultaneously, India should start talking with Pakistan, preferably through the National Security Advisors’ channel. Once this happens, terrorism will abate. It needs to be realised that India is not Russia or China. President Vladimir Putin could seize Crimea, move forces into Ukraine and yet be sought by the US for peace in Syria. Similarly, China can claim the entire South China Sea, oppose the US’s military pivot for Asia, and yet be sought by Washington on major global issues including North Korea. This is what military power is about, which all geo-strategic players have and India lacks.
Military power is certainly not about numbers crunching. If this was true, a six-lakh Pakistan Army would not be daring 13-lakh-strong Indian Army with unending terrorism. The good news is that Pakistan, despite not spelling out its nuclear weapons declaratory policy, has built strong conventional war capabilities indicating that nukes would not be used early in war.
Thus, instead of discussing military and diplomatic options when few exist, Indian policymakers and experts should be talking about military reforms (which are much more than modernisation and acquisitions) necessary to build military power.
(The writer is co-author, with Ghazala Wahab, of the book, ‘Dragon on Our Doorstep’, to be published by Aleph Book Company in winter 2016)