The main obstacle to a coup in banana republics, is usually the fear of international isolation. The West's silent acquiescence of the coup in Egypt has shown Pakistan that coups are acceptable, so long as they follow a certain modus operandi
In June last year, Imran Khan had claimed in an interview that ‘the age of coups in Pakistan was over’. Imran Khan, of course, isn’t exactly known for his intelligence — ‘Im the Dim’ being considered the subcontinental version of a Ken doll, but the hope was that being the Inter-Services Intelligence’s chosen puppet at least his statement carried some authority. Many such euphoric statements were also made about Egypt — but as time progressed, and economic mismanagement worsened, a rather vocal section of the Egyptian people clamoured for and got a coup.
History seldom repeats itself, but it does tend to rhyme, and picking out the relevant rhymes is the important bit here.
Possibly the most important lesson of Egypt has been the West’s reaction to the coup. While not gleeful for sure, the West has not imposed any sanctions on Egypt. More than a decade back when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan, by contrast, he faced near total international isolation, but not the new leaders of Egypt. The main obstacle to a coup in banana republics, is usually the fear of international isolation. What the West’s silent acquiescence in Egypt has shown Pakistan is that coups are acceptable, so long as they follow a certain modus operandi which goes something like this: First ensure the economy teeters on the brink, then ensure the security situation deteriorates, consolidate the Opposition, make a lot of jobless hooligans and thugs come out on the street, protest, burn a few buses, and the Army basically ‘bows to the will of the people’ and enacts a Government change. The careful avoidance of the word ‘coup’ in Egypt is telling and probably sets the template for the next Pakistani coup.
Economic mismanagement in Pakistan is so obvious it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that one out. The Pakistani elite — usually military associated, are blasé about their comeback; that Pakistan’s economic indicators have been like this for the last 20 years, and it is the informal economy of Pakistan that keeps the country moving. The issue though is that the International Monetary Fund and World Bank cannot lend based on informal economy statistics.
The dismal security situation is equally obvious from the near daily terrorist attacks, and ethnic strife either between the Pashtuns and the Mohajirs in Karachi, or between the Shias and the Sunnis all over.
The two prerequisites of an ‘acceptable’ coup, therefore, are in place, and have been in place for quite sometime. It is important to note here that both of these are directly the military’s responsibility. Pakistan’s defence spending is so beyond its means, that the ruination of the formal economy can in no small part be attributed to it. Further, its control of about 70-90 per cent of Pakistan’s formal economic activity through the Fauji Foundation has given it the incentive to thwart any competition it may face, despite severe mismanagement. Similarly the internal security situation is largely a result of the Pakistan Army’s quaint notions of terrorists being force multipliers — much the same way a normal Air Force would see aerial refuelling tankers, jamming aircraft and airborne early warning platforms. The omission in India and on part of Pakistan’s civilian leaders has been that for a very long time, these jolly jihadis were seen as an aspect of Pakistani power projection abroad. What we are now beginning to understand is that they are an equally potent tool of the Pakistani military’s internal security mechanism to keep civilian Governments off balance.
According to reports, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has decided to ‘take a backseat’. What this means is that he won’t micromanage affairs and cajole the judiciary into doing his dirty work for him, but to be absolutely clear, he certainly won’t tolerate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif meddling with the defence budget, Fauji Foundation or the terrorists training camps or security policy in general. As a result, Mr Sharif can neither fix the economy nor can he improve the security situation. In short this Government, like the last, is hardwired for failure.
Second critical question is who are the likely beneficiaries and whyIJ In all likelihood since the Egyptian coup hasn’t been labelled because it placed civilians in charge, presumably the Pakistani military may end up choosing a civilian face, precisely to avoid international censure. The likely beneficiary will be someone vacuous enough to swallow their agenda hook line and sinker, but ‘respected’ enough to make the media swoon, and powerless enough that they can be disposed easily. The only person to fit all three categories — sexy powerless bimbo — would be Mr Imran Khan at the moment, though Ms Hina Rabbani Khar and her Birken bags that set the Indian media aflutter might also be a probable candidate.
last and possibly the most important question is what would determine the timing of the next coup or a Government changeIJ Given that the chess pieces have been in position for quite sometime, and Western disenchantment with President Asif Ali Zardari evident for a while, the question is why hasn’t the military acted yetIJ For starters, the Army needs a civilian shield for its manipulations in Afghanistan. It has to support the Taliban and destabilise Afghanistan, but publicly pretend it is not doing so. At the same time it is obliged to support and actively seek drone strikes within Pakistani territory, while claiming publicly that it is opposed to these strikes. A civilian Government is required first to face international flak and at the same absorb domestic discontent.
One tripwire for a coup then is the day the Pakistan Army loses the benefit of this plausible deniability. Signs are that once the American drawdown is complete in Afghanistan in 2014, the Americans will be loath to buy the Pakistan Army’s lies. At that point, a civilian Government loses its utility. But if the Army takes over directly, its international isolation will only increase and the Army will be associated with both economic and security collapse. At any rate, 2014 will set in motion something big for Afghanistan, but more so for Pakistan.