The Pakistanis speak of full-spectrum deterrence, which includes tactical nuclear weapons against India, only to attract global attention for Kashmir. They have the twin advantages of Chinese military support and an operational edge. Why would they use their nukesIJ
With relations between India and Pakistan at its nadir, there has been a flurry of international seminars in Delhi and writings on what if Pakistan does another 26/11. Without exception, Indian Army analysts have drawn two conclusions. Another 26/11 will result in retaliation by India leading to a conventional war, and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons with less than five kilotonne nuclear yields will be met with an appropriate response. These war scenarios betray an ignorance of realities between India and Pakistan.
Whatever the provocation, a war between India and Pakistan isn’t possible. This has nothing to do with nuclear weapons or the Government’s lack of determination to give it back to Pakistan. The emergent battlefield has tilted so much in Pakistan’s favour that a war, if fought by India, will lead to complications with little results to show. The following narrative will help understand the complexity of the existing non-linear battlefield.
Having announced in 2013 that the 2,395km China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connecting Xinjiang in China with Gwadar in Pakistan will be the flagship of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s spectacular Belt and Road economic plan, thousands of Chinese are working on connectivity in Pakistan. They are in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, opposite the Jammu international border and along the entire border with India.
Presuming that the Indian Army unleashes its Cold Start doctrine into Pakistan supported by airpower and long-range land firepower (290km BrahMos and 150km Prithvi missiles, 70km Smerch and 40km Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers), Chinese civilian casualties in Pakistan will be unavoidable. What will China doIJ It is unlikely to open the second war front against India. The Peoples liberation Army could order readiness of its potent mobile rapid reaction forces, and place its war assets on high alert. This will place India under intense psychological pressure with the spectre of a two-front war staring in the face. The PlA, meanwhile, will increase aggressive patrolling on the line of Actual Control, a euphemism for border transgressions and intrusions.
This will lead to a catch-22 situation for the Indian Army. It cannot move any troops from east to west (against Pakistan). On the contrary, war assets and troops belonging to the China front which are elsewhere (on the Pakistan front) will need to be sent back post-haste. China will react harshly to any increase in Indian troops’ strength or war assets close to the lAC as under the 1993, 1996, and 2013 bilateral treaties this is permissible only ‘by mutual consent’. Violation of the treaty by India will be an act of war, and China’s stated policy is to fight in self-defence.
If India does not increase troops on the lAC, Chinese troops, taking advantage of the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement which does not allow ‘tailing or following’ of patrols once inside the adversary’s territory, will induct hordes of forces through innumerable gaps in the 2,000km long border in Arunachal Pradesh, which is ‘South Tibet’ for them.
like the April-May 2013 three-week intrusion in the Depsang plains (north ladakh), numerous Chinese columns will cross into Arunachal Pradesh, without fear of being ‘tailed or followed’, pitch tents, and occupy Indian land without firing a shot. Interestingly, PlA had practiced occupation of the Indian Air Force’s Advance landing Ground during its Strike series of exercise in 2010. If India attempts to force Chinese troops to go back, it will be war. If it does not, it will be national humiliation, and India’s international standing will nosedive.
The situation will be equally dim in Kashmir valley. like in the 1999 Kargil war, the Indian Army will be compelled to withdraw troops to the line of Control by giving up on counter-insurgency operations from most of Jammu & Kashmir. The void left behind will not be filled up by paramilitary forces because the Army, with disdain for the latter’s professionalism, has during peacetime refused to hand over internal security duties to them. Hence, the Army’s internal lines of communication will be extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
let’s assess the loC and the border where the Pakistani military will have three major advantages over the Indian military. One, given the interoperability between the Pakistani Air Force and the Indian Army with the PlA where the two sides have reached the end-game of fighting combat missions together, the Pakistani military will have capability to fight a long duration war. The two Air Forces and Special Forces have been exercising in high altitude across Pakistan Occupied Kashmir since 2011. This means uninterrupted supply of spares, ammunition and air and land strike platforms for Pakistan military.
The military objective of choice for Pakistan will be north Kashmir. For Pakistan, the area north of map point NJ 9842 where the line of Control terminates is no-man’s land. For China, since December 2010, it does not have a border with India in ladakh. By implication, from China’s perspective, India’s lAC in ladakh in on Pakistani territory. What stops the Pakistan Army from continuously raining Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, and using armed unmanned vehicles on Indian troops in Siachen and ladakhIJ India’s retaliation across Gilgit-Baltistan will be dangerous as Chinese workers may be collateral damage.
The situation becomes worse for India as the Army lacks necessary wherewithal for war-fighting including ammunition. Northern Army commander lt Gen DS Hooda had admitted to the media in July that the Army lacked spares and ammunition for war (with Pakistan). He did not admit that the Army lacked training and mind-set for war too, which was a major observation flagged by the 1999 Kargil war committee after the localised conflict the same year.
The second operational advantage of the Pakistani military will be in electronic warfare, which the PlA considers the fourth dimension of combat after land, air and sea. According to the US Defence Department’s 2015 report to Congress, “PlA EW strategy focuses on radio, radar, optical, infrared and microwave frequencies in addition to adversarial computer and information systems.” Given the interoperability between the two militaries, implications for the Indian military are obvious. The PlA will be able to jam communication, radar and satellite equipment, rendering the Indian military’s command and control ineffective.
The third advantage will be in the plethora of long range conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles (provided by China) available with Pakistan to halt India’s Cold Start at the Thar border itself. While Pakistan’s retired Strategic Plans Division chief, lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, had spoken about full-spectrum deterrence, hinting at the use of TNW as the response to Cold Start, it is a ruse. When the Pakistani military has the twin advantage of PlA support and an edge at the operational level of war (where campaigns are fought), why would it use nukes, and that too on its own territory knowing well that it has high profile targets close to the Indian border (lahore is 40km from Amritsar)IJ Pakistan’s Babur and Nasr cruise and ballistic missiles will be game-changers. Not by their use, but because of the absence of any bilateral understanding on missiles, India will worry about them being nuclear.
The wily Pakistanis have spoken about full-spectrum deterrence and TNWs merely to draw the world’s attention to Kashmir, where the world fears a conventional war could end up in a nuclear weapons exchange. The clear message to the Indian military is that its 2009 two-front war theory has been overtaken by events.
(The writer is editor, FORCE news magazine)