Without a defined end-state, or clarity over what is required of the Army in counter-insurgency operations, the Army will neither be fit for war nor will it have the desired troops' morale to face external threats, which are many and in regular frequency
The Army is unlikely to recommend lifting or tinkering with the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from the Kashmir valley at least till 2017. The senior-most Army officer in Srinagar, 15 Corps Commander, lt General Gurmit Singh, implied this when he said that the Army should not review the situation until then. “This is a defining moment and the next three years will determine the Army’s role in internal stability operations here”, is what he told me. Given his enviable record of having served the last decade in various senior counter-insurgency positions in the troubled State, it will need a decisive next Government in Delhi to do otherwise.
In a candid conversation, the General said, “Jammu & Kashmir will be affected by the turbulence in Afghanistan. Infiltrations across the line of Control will increase and Pakistan’s twin focus will be to replace terrorists’ senior leadership in J&K which has been decimated and activate more sleeper cells within the State. Moreover, two elections (parliamentary and Assembly) this year in the State will give added opportunities to trouble-makers.”
In a rather dramatic exposition, he informed that he faced his 9/11 situation within days of assuming command on June 11, 2013. On June 24, terrorists fired at two Army vehicles held up in evening traffic on the busy Hyderpora (heart of Srinagar) bypass, killing eight soldiers and injuring 15. “Now if they could do this in full public view, it meant that we needed to review our strategy to reinforce deterrence with a balanced approach”, he said. This has been done at various levels: Professional, behavioural, with the hearts and mind strategy (Operation Sadbhavana), and training.
Over the next two hours, the General impressed me with changes that he has brought about in CI ops. He told me that “killings must be based on real-time intelligence with surgical precision ensuring no innocent casualties and human rights violations. While foreign terrorists should not be spared, local terrorists should be targeted with care as they operate amongst civilians. The life of a terrorist is never more than five years. Even if he is allowed to live another day to avoid collateral damage, his end comes soon enough. The soldier must be truthful, ethical, responsible, professional, and must exercise utmost restraint.”
According to the General, his headquarters maintains a list of surrendered, released and suspected terrorists, which runs into many thousands. With the help of the police and the Army’s own intelligence, it is possible to both update the list and monitor these people. Because of these fence-sitters, it is a futile exercise to indulge in the number-game of terrorists in the State, something on which all security agencies always differ widely. This feeds into the propaganda of the terrorists who are adept at exploiting the media — print, electronic and especially cyber. He also spoke at length on how brilliant synergy has been created between security stakeholders beyond the formal Unified Headquarters, the need to interact with the media at all levels, and to understand that people need to be dealt with understanding and compassion.
Next, the Army in his area of responsibility has strengthened its anti-infiltration grid on the loC by moving up to 10 battalions (about 12,000 soldiers) forward from the hinterland. With the help of the fence (called the Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System denoting the limit of infiltration) and available surveillance devices (land and aerial), surveillance centres have been established at brigade levels. These assist in eliminating terrorists before they merge with the population and reduces allegations of human rights violations.
Probably his biggest contribution has been in Operation Sadbhavana where the corps spends up to Rs22 crore annually. From national integration, the focus has shifted to capacity-building. Each year, the corps funds about 80 tours of Kashmiri people to other States in India. The beneficiaries of this exposure used to be people from different walks of life which besides goodwill and photo-sessions did not generate lasting benefits. Now, professionals like farmers, horticulturists and even taxi-drivers are sent on learning tours so that they come back and enrich the State with their experiences.
The General has read well and even contributed to the Army’s CI doctrine which was first released by Gen JJ Singh in 2006, and updated by the present Army Chief, Gen Bikram Singh, in 2013. Undoubtedly, lt Gen Gurmit Singh, who is the highest operational commander for CI ops, as per the doctrine, knows his beans well. The problem is with conventional war preparedness, where, according to the doctrine, his boss, the Northern Army Commander, lt Gen Sanjeev Chachra, wears two hats: He is both the senior-most theatre commander for conventional war, and represents the Army at the State-level Unified Headquarters chaired by the Chief Minister. Unfortunately, the conventional war preparedness at both the theatre and the Army Headquarters gets a low priority as CI ops hog the limelight.
When I asked the Corps Commander about his challenges for conventional war preparedness, he instinctively told me that his corps needs more logistic tunnels (infrastructure to keep War Wastage Reserves, including ammunition and spares), night fighting devices, aviation assets and Special Forces to name a few. Does this imply that training for conventional war is being neglectedIJ He immediately recovered and said that he had enough stocks of ammunition and spares, and his formations did regular operational training and discussions. Unfortunately, his soldierly cover-up did not square off with the Army Chief, Gen Bikram Singh’s earlier admission to me a few months ago that necessary WWRs will be restored over the next few years after his urgent initiation of this case with the Ministry of Defence.
The truth is that the Defence Minister and the Army’s higher leadership have simply neglected conventional war preparedness at a time when threats on the two military-held lines against Pakistan and China have enhanced exponentially. There is an urgent need for the Army to assess conventional threats, review existing war doctrine, and progressively give over CI ops to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Government.
This is not all. When I asked the Corps Commander about the enormous stress that the soldiers undergo for having been continuously in a war environment since 1990, coupled with the extraordinary restrain they have been asked to exercise in the face of the elusive terrorists, his reply was evasive. He spoke about courage and other human virtues underplaying the cases of suicides amongst soldiers. Ironically, the day after our meeting, on March 11, there was media report that a soldier, Sunil Kumar had committed suicide in Ganderbal with his service rifle while being on sentry duty at night.
What the Army refuses to understand is a simple phenomenon: How do terrorists survive in the State until eliminated by security forces, while a single soldier dare not be alone at night in the same StateIJ The truism is that the people want a political resolution to the Kashmir problem more than the Army’s Operation Sadbhavana. Without a defined end-state, or what is required of the Army in CI ops, the Army will neither be fit for war nor have the desired troops’ morale to face external threats.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)