Rejuvenation of the country’s defence sector needs bold measures rather than the baby steps the Modi Government has been taking. The Defence Minister must take the bull by the horns rather than be seduced by the webs of fantasy which the heads of Forces spin
In a season when the Modi Government has been praised for having delivered on foreign policy, its performance on defence has been unsatisfactory, especially when expectations from a BJP-led Government on security issues are usually high. Since defence and foreign policies are two side of a coin for major powers — one without the other remains less cogent — defence matters require a re-assessment rather than a re-arrangement.
On entering office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did two unusual things: He did not appoint a full-time Minister for Defence and instead gave additional charge of the portfolio to his confidant, Minister for Finance Arun Jaitley. And he made it known that the Prime Minister would confabulate with the Defence chiefs each month. Mesmerised with his spectacular electoral victory, analysts gave positive spins to these actions.
It was argued that with both economic and defence portfolios with a political heavyweight, defence acquisitions would get a boost. Meeting regularly with defence chiefs signalled that, if not the Prime Minister himself, his National Security Advisor Ajit Doval would be the de facto Chief of Defence Staff. Hopes rose when Mr Doval reportedly said that as per the BJP 2014 election manifesto, the nuclear policy (formulated in 1999 by the Vajpayee Government) would be reviewed. The unsaid bit was that conventional threats (from Pakistan and China) and how to deal with them too were under the scanner.
Discerning watchers saw an unfolding of a defence policy (the first since Independence) in Government’s utterances. It seemed that defence acquisitions would no longer be ad hoc — decided by the services headquarters and the Defence Ministry, and rubber-stamped by disinterested politicians — but would follow the defence policy scripted by the Prime Minister’s Office. Money, it finally appeared, would be spent wisely to ensure what it should do: Deter Pakistan from proxy wars and China from unabated border transgressions.
Expectations were belied soon. The regular interaction between Mr Modi and the services’ chiefs was discontinued. Changing his stance, Mr Doval ruled out a re-assessment of the nuclear policy and dashed hopes of formulating a defence policy. By getting the Prime Minister to say that “threats are known but the enemy may be invisible” to the first combined defence commanders’ conference, Mr Doval posited terrorism as the focal point of the PMO. Hereafter, Mr Modi’s foreign policy acquired two distinctive features: Combating global terrorism and Make in India. The latter was meant to transform India into a manufacturing giant (in the defence sector as well) by garnering foreign capital and technology.
In walked the full-fledged Minister for Defence, Mr Manohar Parrikar, six months after the ground rules had been laid down: Focus on Make in India and support defence services’ acquisition list, never mind their operational necessity and viability — a cart before the horse stance. The defence services’ fantasy slogan (built upon politicians’ ignorance and disinterest) of fighting a two-front war against nuclear-armed formidable adversaries in cahoots with each other, was accepted as doable.
For example, Mr Parrikar slashed the Army’s new mountain strike corps (90,000 troops) by half, as it was unaffordable. Had he ordered a rationalisation of forces (called Field Force Review), he would have discovered that the Army has enough manpower and resources within to do what it should on the two fronts. This would have led to another startling discovery of why the Army is reluctant to make up its critically depleted War Wastage Reserves (ammunition, stores and war withal) at the cost of empire building.
Both the recent Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Standing Committee on Defence reports tabled in Parliament have mentioned that the Army is unfit for war. In March 2012, then Army chief General VK Singh had written the same thing to the Prime Minister. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, Army chief General VP Malik had conceded major war deficiencies by saying that “the Army will fight with whatever it has”. The Army is reluctant to spend over Rs1,00,000 crore on WWRs from its finite kitty because it believes that war with nuclear adversaries is unlikely. Increasing manpower, which will result in more promotions, is considered a better option.
The Navy does the same. Instead of focusing on its primary operational role, it is involved heavily in coastal defence, anti-piracy and supposed power projection roles. Rather than consolidate its limited war-fighting assets (over whose maintenance Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi resigned in frustration a year ago), especially with increased threats looming large, it is frittering them away on secondary high-profile tasks. Not to be left behind, the Air Force has its own long wish-list premised on the belief that it can play the lead role in a war on either or both fronts simultaneously in impossible-to-win wars. Reviewing operational preparedness of the defence services, which would displease the uniformed fraternity, was not part of Mr Parrikar’s brief.
The Defence Minister has stuck to his focus and cleared defence projects worth over Rs1,60,000 crore in six months, which is a stellar performance when compared with the previous Government. His approach has been straight-forward: Reviewing long-stuck major projects, especially those listed as critical by the defence services, and procuring equipment through Government-to-Government deals under the Make in India label. Unlike its predecessor, the Modi Government has ensured that high-profile defence contracts help balance India’s political standing with major powers — the United States, Russia, France, Japan and so on.
Meanwhile the Defence Procurement Procedure is under review and is expected to be released in July. According to insiders, the new DPP will be used to procure mostly low-visibility items like bullet proof jackets etc through open tendering. In both procedures, there will be ample scope to involve India’s public and private sector. The Government hopes to kill two birds with one stone: Please the defence services with minimum procurements and create the impression of boosted technology transfers.
But, since the Government has not shown much enthusiasm for good business practices, this seems a far cry. For example, the 49 per cent foreign direct investment cap, a greater management say of foreign companies in joint ventures, level playing field between indigenous public and private enterprises, total revamp of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and sizeable investments in defence research, are areas where bold rather than baby steps are needed. These, unfortunately, continue to be handled with kid gloves.
(The writer is editor, FORCE newsmagazine)