Denial of NSG membership to India at the Seoul meeting earlier this year is by all accounts an unacceptable loss of face for us, hardly behoving a country which is asserting to find its rightful place on the big table at the global stage.
Maxim of “not giving up without trying” may be quite valid in our everyday lives but cannot guarantee our prestige and credibility in international affairs.
Surely, we could not have underestimated Chinese antagonism and if we persisted with our membership application to shame or isolate China, that objective does not seem to have been attained. In any case, such emotional considerations hardly bother a self-confident and resurgent China. If the idea was to put the proposal on the table and be satisfied with incremental progress in the hope that gradually we would be able to win over the Chinese, then the disturbing assumption is that we would be prepared to pay the price that the Chinese would demand from us.
If we expected the US to drive a hard bargain with the Chinese on our behalf to secure NSG membership for us, that betrays naivety on our part. In fact, I would not discount the US and many countries ostensibly supporting our candidature to be hiding behind the overt Chinese opposition. This is quite evident in the case of our quest for UNSC permanent membership.
The NSG, presently comprising 48 members, was set up after India’s nuclear test of 1974 to regulate export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology by member countries. One of the conditions is that the importing country should have a full-scope safeguards agreement allowing international inspections of all its nuclear facilities. However, India was granted an exemption in 2008, opening the doors for nuclear imports needed to implement country’s ambitious nuclear power generation programme, on the condition that it would adhere to the NSG guidelines and work with the member countries in limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. India had also given an assurance that it would continue with its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.
Subsequently in 2011, the NSG strengthened its guidelines on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies but that would not impact the prospects of India securing required nuclear supplies for its peaceful programme. Foreign Minister of France, for instance, while speaking on the amended export rules, emphasised that France planned to continue adhering to exemptions for India set forth by the NSG in 2008. Similar assertions were also made by the US and Russia noting that the new NSG guidelines in no way detracted from the exception granted to India.
Other countries which have already concluded bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India, which include the UK, Australia, Canada, South Korea and Uranium-rich Namibia, are also likely to continue their cooperation with India given substantial commercial considerations.
In any event, whether or not we are able to secure requisite nuclear supplies from a country has nothing to do with our membership of the NSG since all conditions for export, including the stipulations of 2011 amendment to the guidelines, apply equally to both members and non-members.
It has been suggested in the media reports that India’s membership of the NSG would enable it to access state-of-the-art technologies and equipment not only from the US but other sources as well. This argument is not valid since there is no unique dispensation relating to the US and all countries which have signed bilateral agreements with India can undertake nuclear supplies to India under 2008 exemption granted by the NSG. That exemption, at least in practical terms, overrides restrictions imposed by other instruments (such as Pelindaba Treaty in the case of African countries) on exports to non-NPT States.
It has also been erroneously suggested in media commentaries that NSG membership would enable India to export nuclear equipment and technology thus providing a fillip to our manufacturing sector. India is committed to adhering to NSG guidelines while undertaking export of nuclear materials and that does not change even if it becomes a member of the NSG. India has developed some technologies indigenously and there is no restriction on exports subject to NSG guidelines being met. By the same logic, we could also secure international cooperation to strengthen our manufacturing infrastructure and capacity for exports as long as there are credible guarantees of our remaining committed to NSG guidelines and non-diversion of imported materials and technologies for our weapons programme.
NSG membership would admittedly enable India a say in the formulation of norms for nuclear exports. But that advantage seems quite marginal given our limited interest in nuclear exports, at least in the foreseeable future. In so far as our own peaceful nuclear programme is concerned, overseas supplies would be contingent on our bilateral arrangements and political dynamics of the day. NSG membership would hardly make a difference.
If membership of the NSG hardly brings any tangible benefits to us, there is no justification for projecting it as a major foreign policy priority for the Government. Membership would certainly bring us prestige and greater visibility on the world stage but if it comes at an unacceptably high price which China seems intent on extracting from us, then we should have a rethink in the matter.
China has blocked our entry to the NSG on the grounds that we are not a signatory of the NPT even though that is not a mandatory requirement and flies in the face of the specific exemption granted to India by the NSG in 2008. It has also sought to mischievously club India with Pakistan despite our proven track record on non-proliferation which is the primary objective of the NSG, apart from the commitment to no first use of our nuclear weapons.
The US has said it was working on a roadmap for our membership but has advised us at the same time to resolve this matter with China bilaterally. China on its part has told us that the door for membership was not entirely closed on us and a dialogue at the official level is going on. But that may have been initiated by the Chinese to ensure a smooth passage of G-20 summit held in China earlier this month and the chances of any meaningful resolution appear remote unless we are prepared to “fully comprehend Beijing’s concern on South China Sea”. There could be additional demands as well.
India has affirmed “importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation in South China Sea” urging all parties to “show utmost respect” for the UN-backed tribunal’s ruling. China is obviously not satisfied with our guarded response.
Over the years, China has shown scant consideration for our concerns. To give just a few examples: repeated transgressions on the border; announcement of proposed $46 bn China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes though Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir; blocking of the inclusion of dreaded terrorist Maulana Azhar Masood in the UN sanctions list; active campaign to scuttle expansion of the UNSC and permanent membership for us; and, imposition of regulatory hurdles on the import of Indian pharmaceutical and meat products into China, despite our ballooning trade deficit which reached $53 bn in 2015-16. Given such an antagonistic posture adopted by the Chinese, it would not at all be prudent for us to show any accommodation for them. That would amount to timidity.
We do want peaceful relations with China in order to better focus on our developmental imperatives but a weak-kneed approach in dealing with our northern neighbour would not serve our broad long-term interests. My friends in the armed forces tell me that we are not any longer in a 1962 situation and are fully prepared to face any misadventure from China.
In fact, the time has come when we should be prepared to exercise all the leverages available to us on China: we must continue to maintain our principled position on SCS; focus on improving our ties with Vietnam and upgrade their maritime security capabilities as a matter of strategic priority; enhance our political and economic linkages with Japan; consider imposing restrictions on Chinese imports which would deny to our consumers cheap low-quality products but which in the long run could augur well for our “Make in India” campaign; and, even consider tweaking our position on Tibet a little bit which can be achieved by our Prime Minister publicly receiving Dalai lama in Delhi. Unless we have the stomach to make China sweat a little it would continue to ignore our sensitivities and even take antagonistic position on issues affecting us.
(The writer retired from the Indian Foreign Service recently. He served as India’s Ambassador to many countries, including Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago and South Africa)