Playing the Nehruvian ostrich is not going to help India’s interests. Sitting back and twiddling our thumbs can only result in further irrelevance if and when a civil nuclear deal between the US and Pakistan becomes a reality
Slowly but surely the momentum seems to building towards offering Pakistan a nuclear deal similar to the one India has. It is true that the two countries are as different as chalk and cheese or, to quote former US President George W Bush, “different countries with different needs and different histories”. Yet, how India deals with this issue may prove the ultimate test for the incoming Government — whether it chooses to be hard-nosed, Right-wing, realist, or one that chooses to parrot our ancient traditions, culture, etc to use nationalism as an excuse for a staid, unimaginative and harmful policy that continues to burden us. Sadly, the opportunity the BJP had to reject the ‘no first use’ has been squandered for just these same supposedly cultural reasons.
Yes, there are many reasons for India to be unhappy with any such deal. For us the India-US nuclear deal was a triumph on two fronts: First on the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan in the US policy discourse. The second was a tacit US acceptance of Indian exceptionalism. However it is time for us to consider if such de-hyphenation and exceptionalism are in some circumstances blinding us to massive geopolitical gains to be had in the region, although they might necessitate some galling concessions.
There are compelling arguments to bringing Pakistan into the nuclear fold that probably benefits India more than it does any other country. Today, Pakistan is inching towards greater isolation than ever before in its history. As a result, its room for manoeuvre is extremely restricted, with very little by way of options but more dangerously with very little to lose. India’s position today vis-à-vis Pakistan has in fact never been stronger.
Assuming that every Indian stereotype of Pakistan is in fact accurate and this is a country on the cusp of collapse, this is the best time to get the international community to negotiate with Pakistan, and get the best possible terms. India, historically though, nurtures this myth that forgoing seemingly good options today, yields a brighter tomorrow (the Nehruvian policy of ‘multiplying one’s options’). Sadly, while it sounds good, in practice this policy has been a miserable failure. India chose to play nuclear ostrich through much of the 50s and 60s and ended up living on the fringes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, till it decided to cut its losses and accept the limited victory of the India-US nuclear deal. Similarly, after testing a device in 1974 it chose to put its weapons programme in deep freeze, presumably again with the intention of ‘multiplying its options’, the net result was that India had to undergo another set of sanctions in 1998. If anything, India’s nuclear policies are the classic example of the failure of India’s Nehruvian delusions. If they were accepted under the guise of non-alignment in the 20th century, the powers that be are now peddling these failed policies as being in keeping with ‘Indian culture and heritage’.
let us then apply a simple cost-benefit analysis to what India would gain by letting Pakistan into the nuclear order today, even assuming the maximalist Indian arguments as facts.India’s first complaint is that while in India the military and civilian programmes are de facto being bifurcated, in Pakistan any such bifurcation would be a farce. Consequently, a nuclear deal would simply help Pakistan’s military programme, not set it on a parallel path.
While the fear is valid, any such nuclear deal will force a de facto separation of civilian and military facilities, by essentially blocking a coup. Indeed if a coup were to take place once such a deal is activated it would be tantamount to a military takeover of the civilian nuclear programme. That mechanism alone empowers the civilian administration in Pakistan, and removes significant power and leverage from the military. This correction of the civil-military balance in Pakistan has been something of a holy grail with Indian diplomacy and a nuclear deal gives us one of the strongest means to do so.
The second fear is that a deal would materially rewards Pakistan. This is wrong. Unlike Indian reactors which were running woefully under capacity owing either to India’s incompetence at procuring nuclear raw material in the black market or its insufferable ‘holier than thou’ attitude; Pakistan’s was adept at manipulating the black market to keep its reactors running. If anything a deal would force Pakistan to expose its black market sources. This will give India and the international community vital clues as to how Pakistan managed its clandestine acquisitions and in so doing would irretrievably compromise Pakistan’s illicit supplier network.
India’s third worry is that a nuclear deal will amount to a tacit approval of Pakistan’s aggressive nuclear posturing. Possibly, but what if such a deal were tied to ‘good military behaviour’ equivalent to India’s — specifically the adoption of ‘no first use’IJ Here the hyphenation that India dreads so much could be turned into our favour in the battlefield. Similarly one sine qua non of the deal will be Pakistan’s adherence to both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, both of which will cap Pakistan’s capabilities. Such a deal will not only loosen the military’s control over the nuclear programme, but also curtail Pakistani military’s options.
Obviously there is a high possibility that Pakistan will abuse the programme as it has almost every deal before. But dangling a carrot either forces Pakistan into a rhetorical action trap or it exposes Pakistan as not being serious about integrating with the international community. At best, Pakistan’s revisionism is curbed at worst — it stands exposed and isolated and Indian obstinacy cannot be blamed for it. All these are viable options that are available to India today. If only it is willing to grab the bull by the horns, and proactively advocate such a deal, India would end up controlling the debate on such a deal and would shape the contours of any agreement to suit India’s interests.
Clearly, playing the Nehruvian ostrich is not going to help. Sitting back and twiddling our thumbs can only result in further irrelevance if and when such a deal becomes reality, in much the same way our obstinacy and obstructionism have painted us out of the picture in Afghanistan.