Much of eastern Ukraine’s infrastructure has been destroyed, and some of its population displaced. A bloodbath in Donetsk would make reintegrating the region into a coherent nation even harder. Making that task impossible is precisely what Putin intends
The Ukrainian Army has made considerable advance in its fitful war with Russian-backed separatists. Peter Poroshenko won the presidency in May on a promise to defeat the insurgents; and his forces’ victories have begun to fufil it. They have also persuaded some outsiders that Vladimir Putin has relinquished his bid to control or conquer eastern Ukraine.
The separatists have been ousted from their erstwhile stronghold of Sloviansk; they have fallen back on Donetsk, the biggest city in the region, and are frantically appealing to Putin for help. Unfortunately for them, the Ukrainians have also managed largely to halt the flow of Russian “volunteers” and weaponry across the border. An optimistic reading of this situation is that, wary of incurring further economic punishment that Russia can ill-afford, Putin has abandoned the separatists to an inevitable rout.
On the contrary: the conflict has entered its most perilous phase. Donetsk is a city of 1 million people. The desperate rebels, whose favourite tactics include kidnapping and human shields, would have no qualms about sacrificing some of them. But the cost of an urban battle would be measured not only in lives lost but also in future state-building. Much of eastern Ukraine’s infrastructure has been destroyed, and some of its population displaced. A bloodbath in Donetsk would make reintegrating the region into a coherent nation even harder.
Making that task impossible is precisely what Putin intends. His urge to prevent Ukraine escaping Russia’s influence is long-standing; recent setbacks, such as Poroshenko’s trade deal with the European Union, will have strengthened his resolve. Using the country’s east as a brake on westward moves in Kiev remains his best option. True, some Russian troops have pulled back from Ukraine’s eastern border; Russia’s Parliament has revoked its authorisation for their deployment. But Putin can wreak havoc without them, even if Donetsk falls, through sabotage and guerrilla strikes.
That is why, as well as holding the Ukrainian Government to its vow to be patient with Donetsk, the United States and the EU must redouble their pressure on the Kremlin — by, at the least, expanding the list of officials and cronies subjected to travel bans and asset freezes. Putin may no longer be fortifying the insurgents as energetically as before, but at the same time he has not persuaded them to disarm. At home he faces powerful nationalist calls (largely of his own making) to defend them. The West must make the cost of interference prohibitive.
The blithe outside view is that existing sanctions have forced Putin to back down. Even if that were true (and it is unlikely to prove so), it would be an argument for maintaining the pressure on him rather than easing it. In fact, the West’s overall role in this strange, confected conflict has been inglorious. It connived in Putin’s pretence that he had not invaded eastern Ukraine — even though, in a clandestine, complicated way he plainly had —because to say otherwise would have required a drastic response. In recent weeks, both America and the Europeans issued ultimatums to the Kremlin, then did nothing when they expired, leaving Poroshenko little choice but to prosecute his war. In this way, although most of the blame belongs to Russia’s paranoid, vengeful leader, the West’s reticence has contributed to Ukraine’s tragedy. Now it must act.
Ukraine, comparable in size and population to France, is a large, important, European state. The fact that it occupies the sensitive position between Russia and NATO member states like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania adds to its geostrategic significance. Many Russian politicians, as well as ordinary citizens, have never been fully reconciled to Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and feel that the country belongs in Russia’s political and economic orbit. The US and European view (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) is that a strong, independent Ukraine is an important part of building a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Ukraine is much poorer than other European countries, despite advantages such as rich soil, a strategic location, and a substantial heavy industrial sector. In 2011, Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product per capita in PPP terms was only 21% of that of the EU average and only 43% of Russia’s. In 2010, its foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita was $979, less than half of that in Russia and about a quarter of Poland’s FDI per capita. Foreign companies often cite rampant corruption and serious shortcomings in the rule of law (including a weak judiciary) as key stumbling blocks to foreign investment. Ukraine’s real GDP growth is dropped by an estimated 1% in 2013. In late 2013, Ukraine’s foreign exchange reserves dropped to dangerously low levels, raising fears that Ukraine could default on its sovereign debt.
Ukraine’s political crisis has exacerbated the country’s economic problems. Ukraine’s currency, the hryvnia, has slid by nearly 30% this year. The fall in Ukraine’s currency increases Ukraine’s real debt burden (which is denominated in foreign currencies) and hurts ordinary Ukrainians in part because it makes imported consumer items more expensive.
Tax revenue has taken a hit because many residents in the cities seized by separatists have not been paying taxes. Fighting and Russia’s closed border have also reduced output in local plants. Before fighting broke out, the rebel-held regions accounted for about one-sixth of Ukraine’s economy and 27 per cent of exports.
Higher military expenditures are also a drain on the Budget. Ukraine has requested an extra $1 billion for military spending, although the IMF said the Government offset that with spending cuts in other areas. Replacing destroyed tanks and planes that were shot down will add more costs later.
While there have been several steps recently to help de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, including a ceasefire that seems to be holding and the start of peace talks, the situation on the ground remains deeply worrying.
There are encouraging signs towards de-escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, and political and diplomatic steps are beginning to emerge towards the resolution of the crisis.
The recent peace plan for eastern Ukraine put forward by President Poroshenko included de-escalatory measures such as amnesty for those who did not participate in ‘serious crimes’, disarmament, decentralisation of power and early local and parliamentary elections, and a programme for creation of jobs in the region.
At the same time, the President - upon the advice of his military commanders that the border with Russia has been secured - announced on June 20 a week-long unilateral ceasefire aimed at giving armed militia a window of opportunity to disarm.
The armed militia groups have agreed to reciprocate to the ceasefire, despite previously rejecting the President’s offer and continuing their offensive. Also, peace talks have reportedly started with representatives of armed groups in eastern Ukraine.
While the peace plan has received support from key parties in the country, the region and beyond, there is still hard work to be done. The international community needs to support Ukraine in surmounting the current crisis and finding a peaceful and lasting resolution to the challenges facing the country.
The peace plan and ceasefire are positive steps in the right direction. This creates a window of opportunity for human rights and humanitarian confidence-building measures.
(The writer is a PhD scholar having expertise in Russian studies)