In theory, the legitimate authority to use violence in a given state is its armed and security forces. They are the guardians of the state’s constitution, rule of law and territorial integrity, and thus their monopoly over the use of violence is a must in order to protect the state and its citizens. When a government does not possess violence monopoly, it engages in power-sharing deals with political groups with use of force capacity to establish a fairly peaceful governing order to achieve its goals. Such governments are described in the limited Access Orders and the Political Marketplace regime theories.
Case Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s state security forces lost violence monopoly when different factions overthrew the Communist regime in 1992 that resulted in the disintegration of the country’s national army and security forces. Consequently, the state’s violence monopoly fell into the hands of factions (Hezbe Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami, Junbish-e Milli and Hezb-e Wahdat) involved in ousting the Communist regime. They were (and still are) political parties with military wings.
Jamiat formed a Government headed by its leader Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani on June 28, 1992, and declared its armed forces along with defected Communist regime military personnel as the guardians of the state. Hezb-e Islami of Hekmatyar refused to join and demanded the removal of Jamiat’s military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud from the Ministry of Defence, which indicated its fear of losing violence monopoly.
For that reason, Hezbe-e Islami declared war against the Jamiat-led Government. Wahdat and later Junbish followed suit. As a result, there was an oligopoly of violence in Afghanistan. Kabul alone was divided among factions involved in the war. Jamiat controlled centre of the capital and others occupied districts on the outskirts.
Taliban’s rise & fall
The rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s significantly affected the order of violence oligopoly in Afghanistan. They eliminated the military might of all parties involved in civil war. They killed the leader of Hezb-e Wahdat and forced General Dustom of Junbish-e Milli and Hekmatyar flee to the neighbouring countries. They also pushed the Jamiat-led Government retreat to Panjshir Valley and Badakhshan province. Even so, Jamiat remained the ultimate force to fight the Taliban and overtime recuperated its violence monopoly.
First, the Taliban elimination of Jamiat’s rivals handed Jamiat the leadership of the anti-Taliban front. Hence, a centre of command known as Jabha-e Moqawemat (the Resistance Front) was created on the basis of the 1992 Government and supports were extended to other anti-Taliban forces to regroup under Jamiat’s command. Jamiat assisted all parties, including Hezb-e Islami (later, joined the Taliban), Wahdat and Junbish to enter the Jamiat-led anti-Taliban coalition. This process significantly strengthened Jamiat’s military might and sphere of influence further to its long-time military competitors’ strongholds. For instance, facilitation of an escape passage to Hekmatyar through Panjshir Valley won the hearts of many Hezb-e Islami senior commanders to pledge allegiance to Jamiat.
Second, the technical and military hardware supports directed to Jabha-e Moqawemat from countries with the anti-Taliban sentiment in the region and beyond were done mainly through Jamiat’s overseas military attachés. lastly, when the international community intervened militarily in Afghanistan after 9/11, it revived Jamiat-led anti-Taliban forces what they called, the Northern Alliance. As a result, Jamiat’s monopoly over the use of force in Afghanistan became nationwide and the Taliban were defeated by the end of 2001.
Nation-building & monopoly transition
The Bonn Conference of 2001 followed by the formation of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in June 2002 facilitated a peaceful transition of power from Jamiat to the transitional president, Hamid Karzai. The process of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) was implemented, in which Jamiat and its allies surrendered most of their heavy artillery and machine guns to their alliance Government. However, the transition also helped Jamiat’s rivals, the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami reclaim violence monopoly in remote parts of Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, Karzai’s Governments were heavily dependent on powerful political figures with direct influence over armed groups across the country. For this reason, Karzai had utilised the influence of Marshal Fahim and Ahmad Zia Massoud, two of Jamiat’s main figures. Through them, he offered Jamiat and its affiliates socio-political and economic incentives in order to restrain from use of force and allow the evolving Afghan national army and security forces to monopolise violence.
President Ghani’s leadership
President Ghani has been in the driving seat since 2014 when the Unity Government was formed in a 50/50 power-sharing accord with Jamiat, brokered by the UN and the US. Nevertheless, Ghani inherited a state with national army and security forces backed by the US and NATO militaries that give him some use of force leverage to accelerate the transitioning process of violence monopoly from Jamiat to the state. He has adopted a direct anti-Jamiat policy, in which he has been removing Jamiat personalities from Government leadership and the state security institutions. He has isolated Jamiat representatives in the Unity Government and has been attempting to remove General Atta Noor, the powerful Jamiat figure from the realm of Balkh province.
Ghani has also forced General Dostum, his first vice president and a longtime anti-Taliban ally of Jamiat, in a self-imposed exile to Turkey. He seems to be in the process of dismissing the Deputy Chief Executive Officer Muhammad Muhaqqiq and another longtime anti-Taliban ally of Jamiat.
On the other hand, Ghani has already signed a peace agreement with Hekmatyar, in which the Hezb-e Islami leader, an eternal Jamiat rival is granted various privileges and his name is cleared from the UN Security Council Blacklist. A recent report claimed that Ghani’s national security team has been in constant contact with the Taliban in secrecy without keeping the power-sharing partner Jamiat involved. Hence, the President is accused of ethno-nationalism, since Hekmatyar and the Taliban leaders are from the same ethnic group as him.
Current developments
like the Taliban time, once again Jamiat, Junbish, and Wahdat have formed a coalition, the United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. Even though their move has received criticism for forming an opposition alliance against the very Government they hold leadership positions, they base their rationale on the following developments:
In conclusion, if Afghanistan is to transform into a stable and successful state, the transition of violence monopoly from all political parties to the country’s armed and security forces must take place vigilantly. While this transitional process is continuing to shape, collaboration with legitimate parties with use of force capacity is highly important to avoid conflict
(The writer is a PhD candidate in Government and Public Policy School at OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat. Prior to this, he was the Regional Cooperation Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.)