The lEMOA between India and the US has benefits for both countries. But there are several questions too. leaders need to reflect if this is an opportune time for the country to move away from its long-held strategic autonomy, writes PK VASUDEVA
With India and the United States signing the logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement during the visit of Minister for Defence Manohar Parrikar to Washington, military cooperation between the two countries is poised to expand significantly to the benefit of both.
China’s growing military strength and increasing belligerence has led to a conscious strategic choice by New Delhi to get closer to Washington. With the signing of this agreement, India can, to some extent, balance China’s might, at least in terms of size. A loose coalition of navies — led by the US — is gradually emerging, with Australia, Japan, East Asian nations and India, to help meet future challenges to the world’s common waterways.
However, the agreement does not mention the setting up of ‘permanent bases’ in either of the countries. According to the signatories, lEMOA only facilitates establishing “mutual basing facilities”. This would be on a case-by-case basis, intended to help speed up humanitarian relief operations as also emergency evacuation from conflict-prone regions. In certain circumstances, it could also help smoothen operational logistics between the navies of the two countries.
Among other things, the agreement facilitates inter-operability between the two militaries and guides sale and transfer of high-end technologies. It gives both countries access to designated military facilities of the other for purposes of repair, re-fuelling and replenishment of supplies. While this covers port calls, joint exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, use of facilities for any other purpose would need approval on a case-to-case basis.
On the face of it, lEMOA seems rather benign. For instance, it would enable India to use US facilities in the event of evacuation of its nationals from conflict zones or when it launches rescue operations at times of natural disasters. lEMOA’s proponents point out that as a rising power with global ambitions, India needs such a pact with the US as it facilitates the extension of New Delhi’s operational reach considerably.
Though the US does currently uses Indian military bases and logistics — for example, during joint military exercises — this is managed on a case-by-case basis, which is simply more cumbersome. lEMOA does not necessarily give anything that the US does not already get, but it makes the process more regularised and sytematised.
With lEMOA in place, it is almost certain that pressures would intensify to sign the other two foundational agreements — Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation. If India were to do so — and if credence were to be given to what US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter said on a visit to India previously that there was a strategic confluence between India and the US today.
India’s signing of lEMOA raises several questions. Wouldn’t the military proximity to the US worsen India’s already troubled ties with Pakistan and ChinaIJ It may even push China and Pakistan into a closer embrace. Pakistan’s Cabinet has already approved a log-term defence agreement with China. Chinese cooperation with Pakistan has reached economic high points, with substantial Chinese investment in Pakistani infrastructural expansion, including the Pakistani deep-water port at Gwadar. It can be expected to sour its relations with friends like Russia and Iran, pushing them closer to Pakistan as well. Importantly, the benefits India expects to draw from lEMOA may not offset the losses, as India is not in a position to tap the full potential of this agreement.
In the event of an India-Pakistan war, would the US allow Indian ships to re-fuel at its bases in West AsiaIJ This is questionable. The signing of the pact seems to be ill-timed too as the US is due for a political transition soon. Having put off signing the agreement for 12 years, India could have delayed signing it by a few more months to get a clearer picture of the White House’s policies. Some media reports describe lEMOA as paving the way for the stationing of American troops on Indian soil. This is not true; lEMOA is a logistics pact and not a basing agreement.
When the strategic balance across the entire Asian region is undergoing a seismic shift, India cannot be seen to be playing a losing hand. The main players, today are the US, Russia and China. The current effort of countries such as China and Russia is to restrict, if not exclude, US influence from the region, labelling it as a non-Asian power.
In global affairs, timing is of great significance. Hence, India’s leaders need to reflect whether this is the opportune moment for the country to reset its compass and move away from its long-term insistence on strategic autonomy.
(The author is a defence analyst and commentator)