It’s not that India does not have any leverage to push China for an early resolution of the border dispute. New Delhi can pressure Beijing by doing a lot on Tibet without breaching any agreement with China, and ramp up regional cooperation with other nations
It is difficult to say whether it is ignorance or obfuscation. Probably it is a bit of both when, at the conclusion of the recent 16th round of Special Representatives talks in Beijing, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon told the media that the bilateral 1993 and 1996 agreements with China have helped keep peace on the disputed border. He also said that the April 13 intrusions by Chinese border guards deep inside India’s northern ladakh remain unexplained. Neither China deemed it appropriate to inform Mr Menon why it transgressed Indian land, nor was it asked to do so. The Indian interlocutors, it seemed, were anxious to forget the national embarrassment, unmindful of its security implications.
The April intrusions were the consequence of the ill-conceived agreements. And, the intrusions established the credibility of Chinese coercive diplomacy, something that should worry India. Interestingly, China tested coercive diplomacy in the ladakh sector where, unlike the eastern sector, the Indian Army had given a good account of itself in the 1962 war. Thus, more than the military, the political leadership should wake up to these harsh truths.
Three issues which have worked to India’s disadvantage in the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement are: Re-naming the entire disputed border as the line of Actual Control, the sector-by-sector approach for defining the lAC, and the concept of ‘mutual and equal security’.
Considering that the disputed border is neither agreed to on the maps nor on the ground, it was easy for China to publicly declare at an appropriate time in December 2010 that it has a mere 2,000km border with India; with none in Jammu & Kashmir. This is half of 4,000km length that India wants its people to believe. The implication is that the border row cannot be resolved; China will not change its stated position, and India cannot trade so much land for peace.
The only mutual doable now is to define and keep the line of Actual Control peaceful. India should have insisted on defining the lAC as a whole. A sector-by-sector approach accepted in the 1993 BPTA makes little military sense for India. From India’s perspective, the western sector (J&K) of the lAC is the responsibility of its Northern and Western Army commands; the middle sector (Uttarakhand-Himachal) is with the Central Army command, and the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) is the responsibility of the Eastern Army command. The middle sector, which was least problematic, was mutually agreed upon and maps were exchanged in November 2000, but with little progress on the other two sensitive sectors. Now, how can the Central Army theatre commander, whose sector has been settled, pull his troops back when he knows that his adjoining areas are disputedIJ In military parlance, a theatre commander has to worry about both his sector, called his area of responsibility, and his adjoining sectors, referred to as his areas of interest. In short, the resolution of the middle sector has not helped the military, which continues to guard the entire lAC lest it be altered by force. The Chinese on the other hand have a single theatre called the Tibetan Autonomous Region, facing India. So, while China can claim progress on defining the lAC, in reality it does not help India.
Another unfortunate example of Indian Foreign Service mandarins making border agreements without military advice is the principle of ‘mutual and equal security’ mentioned in Article 1 of the 1993 BPTA. The impressive infrastructure in TAR and the formidable Chinese airlift capabilities makes the principle of ‘mutual and equal security’ meaningless for India which has neither capability. Moreover, unlike India, the Chinese do not require acclimatisation of troops in TAR. For these reasons, Chinese troops are far in depth with their border guards manning the lAC, as against the Indian Army holding ground close to the lAC. Thus, even if the lAC is settled in entirety, the Indian Army will find it difficult to reduce substantial troops until the lAC is accepted as the border.
The Chinese cleverly re-enforced the principle of ‘mutual and equal security’ in the 1996 agreement which deals with military confidence-building measures by having minimal troops and equipment close to the lAC. This now makes the border defence cooperation agreement — which is legally strengthened by the 1993 and 1996 agreements — suggested by China in March this year difficult for India to accept. Here is the Catch-22 situation confronting India: Accepting reduction of troops close to the lAC as spelt in the BDCA will lower Indian Army’s morale which has assessed that an additional strike corps is necessary to defend Arunachal Pradesh. Rejecting or seeking to dilute the BDCA will negate the agreed principle of ‘mutual and equal security’ and strengthen Chinese use of coercive diplomacy in the future.
Under these circumstances, New Delhi should ask itself: Why would China ever want to go to war with India, when it has both the legal justification and credible military power to exercise coercive diplomacy at will against IndiaIJ
Given such realities, Union Minister for Defence AK Antony, who is scheduled to visit China starting July 4, will have two options: Either come to an agreement on the BDCA at the earliest or engage the Chinese in discussions. China obviously will desire a quick closure on this issue , which is being referred to as confidence-building measures, to ensure peace on the lAC and, as the Chinese put it, for an avoidance of ‘unexpected border incidents’. Given India’s track record, there will be a temptation to appease China. India does hold cards to play a successful waiting game. For example, worried about India’s clout in the Indian Ocean region, China has sought bilateral cooperation between the Indian and Chinese navies.
Moreover, Beijing is also keeping an anxious watch over India’s cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia to maintain status quoin the region. And, most importantly, India can do a lot on Tibet — which is a Chinese core concern — without transgressing any bilateral agreement with China. It is time for New Delhi to stand firm and undo the mistakes of the past.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)