Between now and 2016, when Pakistan faces uncertainty in Afghanistan after the complete withdrawal of US troops, India can improve its military posture on Kashmir by a twin approach: Talk with the Pakistani Army, and adopt an offensive posture on the loC
Events in Kashmir and Afghanistan, where India and Pakistan have high stakes, are moving at a fast pace. While the Pakistani establishment (read, Pakistani Army) which wields a decisive say in its nation’s security policy, is determined to make the most of the opportunities, India, with a new Government and a proactive Prime Minister in Mr Narendra Modi, is measuring its paces.
US President Barack Obama has announced that the America will leave 9,800 troops for training of the Afghan security forces and counter-terrorism operations by end-2014 in Afghanistan, to remain there till 2016. He hopes to formalise this arrangement by signing the bilateral security agreement with the new Afghan President expected to be announced soon. The US broadcast is unwelcome to both the Afghan Taliban and its backers, Pakistan’s ISI, which had hoped to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan at the earliest. Strategic depth refers to the Pakistani Army’s leeway to use an extra-friendly Afghanistan’s territory against India, which it sees as the ‘existential threat’, as well as the preferred highway to China, Iran, and Central Asian Republics — in short, to dominate the geopolitics of the region.
With this aim, and to free itself of distractions, the Pakistani Army had opposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s peace overtures to the Pakistani Taliban. As luck would have it, the recalcitrant Pakistani Taliban did not reciprocate Islamabad’s extended handshake, paving the way for its bombing by the Pakistani Army. In the existing scenario, it is evident that General Headquarters, while focussing on Afghanistan, will avoid a two-front confrontation, and make a virtue out of necessity by giving Islamabad space for peace with India, provided Kashmir talks are not removed from the table.
In a zero-sum game, bad news for Pakistan is good news for India. While welcoming the US’s decision of extending its stay in Afghanistan where India, in the last decade has invested over 2.5 billion dollars in infrastructure development, New Delhi, under the October 2011 India-Afghanistan strategic partnership has extended assistance in the military field to Kabul. Afghanistan will now get lethal weapons for its Army and security forces from Moscow, to be paid by New Delhi. As this arrangement is expected to remain in place with the incoming Afghan dispensation, strong intelligence sharing between New Delhi and Kabul will ensure India need not downsize its various consulates in Afghanistan outside Kabul. In this context, the recent visit of Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh to Afghanistan where she met with the two presidential contenders and reviewed the security of the recently attacked consulate in Herat, with possibility of shifting it to a safer place, assumes significance.
Moreover, under the new National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is a reputed intelligence wizard with ample experience on Pakistan, New Delhi could surely upgrade its activities in Pakistan’s restive Provinces to counter-balance the ISI’s doings in Kashmir. Overtly, New Delhi, under the emerging power balance in the region, could strengthen cooperation on Afghanistan with Russia, the Central Asian Republics, Iran and China. Thus, with a mix of regional proactive diplomacy and intense intelligence cooperation, New Delhi could position itself well in post-2016 Afghanistan.
Closer home, cooperation between India and Pakistan seems promising, with both Prime Ministers hopeful of addressing each other’s concerns, and thereby seeking increased bilateral trade. The ghost in the room is the Pakistani Army, determined to control the tempo of bilateral talks by regulating terrorism across the line of Control. Considering that Prime Minister Modi has made it clear that talks cannot be audible in the din of bombs, India, instead of being an impassive observer, can help Prime Minister Sharif restore civil-military relations in Pakistan in his favour.
This needs an understanding through regular interaction between the political and military leadership in India. A good beginning was made by Prime Minister Modi meeting Army chief General Bikram Singh within the first week of assuming office. The available opportunity, with the Pakistani Army being busy in Afghanistan, should not be frittered away by the Army’s insistence on the old mantras. For example, in one of the interactions, Gen Singh had told me that the Army had to abide by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s agenda of economic progress, which meant maintaining a defensive anti-infiltration posture on the loC. He said this in response to my suggestion that the Army should adopt an offensive posture on the loC, implying increased training for conventional operations rather than a passive posture which leaves the Pakistani Army time for plotting mischief. The Army chief understood that I was not suggesting war but tactics which would keep the adversary in check, conscious that there will be a price to pay for any misadventure.
The need for the Indian Army is to go back to the 1990s, when Field Commanders on the loC had a free hand to respond to Pakistani provocations. There was no fence on the loC those days — a disservice done by General NC Vij in 2004. This has instilled a Maginot mindset amongst troops, is not cost effective, and provides comfort to the adversary who sleeps well at night while our soldiers patrol round the clock. So worried were the Pakistanis about Indian retaliations that they had approached the US complaining about the possibility of a sudden attack by India across the loC. Much of all this is doable today provided the Army cuts down on its counter-insurgency operations in the hinterland, which should be handed over to the paramilitary and State police forces.
The Army’s assessment that it should continue with CI ops, at least till 2016, as infiltration will increase in the run up to the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, is self-serving. If anything, the opposite appears likely as the Pakistani Army and the ISI will like to devote more attention to their backyard. Pakistan’s ‘good terrorists’ like lashkar-e-Tayyeba will indulge in more attacks on Indian consulates and assets in Afghanistan rather than go whole hog in Kashmir. This does not mean that infiltration on the loC will cease or the ISI will stop attempts to resurrect the senior terrorists’ leadership in Kashmir. But this can surely be managed with an Army-other forces partnership, with the latter taking on more responsibilities.
Therefore, given Prime Minister Modi’s enthusiasm for strengthening national security, he should know that between now and 2016 when the Pakistani Army faces uncertainty in Afghanistan, India could improve its military posture on Kashmir by a twin approach: Talk with the Pakistani Army, and adopt an offensive posture on the loC. Through the Director General Military Operation route, which was opened between the two Armies in December 2013, regular talks for peace on the loC should be encouraged. This will result in better understanding of the Pakistani Army’s perspective, which could benefit bilateral talks between the two Governments.
Meanwhile, the Indian Army should gradually move to its primary task on the loC. While the steps to be taken for this, in terms of orientation, training and capability building are known to the Army, probably the biggest move will require the Government decision. It will be to lift the Armed Forces Special Powers Act from select urban areas. This will demonstrate India’s resolve in taking the Kashmir bull by the horn.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)