After Uri, India must prepare for a war with Pakistan by expediting military procurement and supplementing it with a massive diplomatic offensive against Islamabad
The attack on September 18, on 12th Brigade's headquarters in Uri, which killed 18 Army personnel and four attacking terrorists, bore Pakistan's unmistakable imprimatur. Three questions follow. Why UriIJ Why nowIJ What should India doIJ The search for an answer to the first question must begin with considering the attempted attack on the headquarters of the Poonch Brigade on September 11 morning. The attack was foiled. Four terrorists and one policeman were killed. The two incidents together, as well as the earlier attacks, underline the fact that the ‘Uri-Poonch Bulge’, a densely-forested hilly area, difficult to traverse and hemmed in on three sides by the line of Control, is a special target of Pakistani troops because of its location and terrain, which makes terrorist advance difficult to detect.
The other cause is the bulge's strategic importance. Most Army operations against terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan through the Haji Pir Pass, are launched from Uri and Poonch. These will also be major bases for military expeditions to capture Haji Pir Pass — which the Indian Army seized in a daring operation in 1965, but gave up at Taskhkent — in any future war with Pakistan. It is, therefore, understandable that the latter would try to keep Army units in the region demoralised, disorganised and under pressure.
As for timing, one hears that Pakistan launched the September 18 attack to internationalise the Kashmir issue during the ongoing 71st United Nations General Assembly session. This sounds plausible, particularly since it may have been based on the calculation that an incensed India would launch a massive retaliatory attack that it could use to whip up the demand for global intervention to prevent a full-fledged war between two nuclear-weapon nations, and argue that the danger of a conflagration would remain as long as the Kashmir issue was not resolved and the world had a responsibility to find a solution.
The argument is engaging. But any expectation that India would launch immediate retaliatory action is unlikely to be met. New Delhi is doubtless facing flak from sections of the public and media for holding talks with Islamabad despite repeated terror strikes by spawns of the latter’s Directorate General of Inter-Services Intelligence like the lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. But while the Union Government is said to be contemplating a harsh response, it unlikely to be immature enough to rush into action that may recoil on it.
Pakistan could not be unaware of this. Hence, besides attracting international attention to the Kashmir issue, the aim was obviously to boost the enthusiasm of the stone-pelters, whose bête noire is the Indian Army, and thereby raising the level of violence in the valley. It was also a part of a calibrated strategy to escalate terrorist strikes to a point where it can launch a military operation to annex Kashmir in a situation in which the Indian Army has to both fight at the front and protect its rear from terrorist attacks and mob violence.
Such a course would be a gamble. But Operation Gibralter (1965) and the Kargil misadventure (1999) show the Pakistani Army's penchant for gambles, which has been heightened by its obsession with avenging its 1971 rout and overweening confidence stemming from being armed to the teeth for war with India by using most of the massive aid received from the United States. Besides, General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, is scheduled to retire on November 29, 2016. A war against India, whose outcome may be declared a victory even if the reality is otherwise, will not only be a fitting end to his tenure but helpful in realising his future ambitions, whatever these be.
India must, therefore, immediately begin to prepare for a war with Pakistan by expediting urgently needed military procurement, and supplementing it with a diplomatic offensive to have Pakistan globally labelled a terrorist state. Further, it must withdraw all economic concessions given to Islamabad and Prime Minister Narendra Modi must not attend the forthcoming Saarc summit there. Finally, it must at least double the annual defence allocation in the Union Budget and spend it fully. National security does not come cheap.