The solution to the Kashmir issue is not a return of Jammu & Kashmir to the pre-1953 position, as the National Conference believes it to be. The roots of alienation of the Kashmiris lie elsewhere. They must be tackled
The Kashmir-based National Conference, which suffered massive defeats in the 2014 lok Sabha and Assembly elections and in the just-held elections to the ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council, leh, on November 9, adopted a resolution that opposed the demand in the shabbily-treated Jammu and ladakh for separation from Kashmir and sought pre-1953 politico-constitutional status for Jammu & Kashmir. “Autonomy forms the bedrock of the party’s political agenda and it will continue to struggle for this goal in the future with vigour and sincerity of purpose”, the resolution, inter alia, said.
The National Conference, in addition, termed the demand in Jammu and ladakh for trifurcation as “divisive” and asked New Delhi to engage with Pakistan and the Hurriyat leadership in the Kashmir valley to address what it called “the external dimension” of the so-called Kashmir issue.
Will a return to the ‘pre-1953 situation’ in Kashmir redress the grievances of the Kashmiri Muslims and the people of Jammu and ladakh, whose watchword and battle-cry was, and continues to be, the State’s complete merger with India and application of the Constitution of India, barring Article 370 and Article 35A, to the State in fullIJ Will it recognise their right to shape their political and economic future themselves in a meaningful mannerIJ A study of the political, constitutional and administrative structure as it existed in Jammu & Kashmir prior to Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest on August 9, 1953, suggests that it will not. On the contrary, it suggests that all the powers, legislative, executive and judicial would be conferred on the Council of Ministers depriving the people, including Kashmiri Muslims, of the political rights they have exercised.
Between September 7, 1939, and January 26, 1957, the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution was ostensibly used by the State’s ruler, Hari Singh, to placate the Kashmiris. Under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, they were demanding since 1931 the replacement of autocracy by democracy. Though a legislative Assembly of 75 members was set up in accordance with the Jammu & Kashmir Constitutional Act of 1939, Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues continued their protest.
The pro-democratic leaders felt that the Act of 1939 obstructed the formation of a responsible Government and facilitated the exploitation of the people. The Act was also condemned because it was not framed by a Constituent Assembly elected on adult franchise, but by the ruler and his ‘henchmen’. Without any elected Assembly, the Act recognised the ruler as the ‘fountainhead of all essential attributes of sovereignty’ with no court, person or body having the right to overrule his measures or question their constitutional validity. The Act did not also recognise the ‘doctrine of supremacy of the legislature’ nor did it provide for an independent judiciary or grant freedom to press. The institution of ‘communal electorates’ was also introduced by the Act.
When, despite their efforts, modern democratic principles were not introduced in the State’s polity, Sheikh Abdullah and other pro-democracy leaders intensified their struggle to seek the withdrawal of the Act. This struggle ultimately developed into the ‘1946 Quit Kashmir movement’, with the National Conference cadres challenging the ruler’s authority, confronting the police, attacking police stations and other symbols of the Government, demanding the dethronement of Hari Singh and the establishment of an elected Government. To restore order, the police and the Army had to swing into action and imprison Sheikh Abdullah and other pro-democracy leaders on the charge of ‘sedition’.
Under these circumstances and in wake of the Pakistani aggression, Jammu & Kashmir acceded to the Indian dominion on October 26, 1947. Unfortunately, the State’s accession and the Sheikh’s appointment as its ‘emergency administrator’ in October 1947, did not bring any relief to the people. Sheikh Abdullah, rather than repeal the Act of 1939, chose to exploit it to strengthen his own position, marginalise his associates like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, Mohi-ud- din Kara and Maulana Masoodi, and crush his political opponents in Jammu, Kashmir and ladakh.
Ignoring the implications of a return to the pre-1953 situation in Kashmir would be suicidal. The roots of the Kashmiris’ alienation lie not in the Union laws introduced in the State after August 9, 1953, but in the misrule, bureaucratic bungling and the denial of the legitimate expression of popular will. In fact, it were leaders like Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who messed up things in Kashmir valley by rigging wholesale the 1987 Assembly election in the State; the nation has been paying through its nose ever since then.
(The writer is former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Jammu)