The Xi Jinping Government is reforming the military to prepare the men in uniform for their new goals: Providing the hard power that buttresses Beijing’s coercive diplomacy and protecting Chinese interests abroad as part of the transnational Belt and Road project
China, under President Xi Jinping, has undertaken far-reaching military reforms of its Higher Defence Management with the twin purpose of adjusting the People’s liberation Army to the changed nature of warfare and its new roles and missions. Credibility of a nation’s military power resides in its HDM which, being responsible for the political directions and war campaign planning, decides the outcome of war. These have useful lessons for India.
Unlike the Cold War, in the present globalised world integrated with commerce and trade, traditional wars between powers with nuclear weapons are passé. Instead of war-fighting, military power is necessary for coercive diplomacy which China has demonstrated against India in the Himalayas and the United States in the South China Sea. India downplays the PlA’s regular intrusions across the disputed border, and the US, while showcasing its naval might through frequent Freedom of Navigation patrols within 12 nautical miles of China’s reclaimed land in the South China Sea, has desisted from destroying Chinese infrastructure on the disputed islands. Overtime, China will shift the line of Actual Control to India’s political-military-psychological disadvantage. And, it will continue to slowly build military capabilities on reclaimed land in South China Sea.
Moreover, the PlA, traditionally responsible for continental defence, now has new roles and missions in support of Mr Xi’s Belt and Road project to protect Chinese assets and interests abroad on land and sea. While the B&R was unveiled in 2013, its conceptualisation began in 2008, when China decided to abandon the supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of keeping a low profile.
Against this backdrop, Mr Xi, on assuming power as the head of fifth generation leadership in November 2012, brought in numerous reforms in the HDM. In a first, he took over as the Chairman, Central Military Commission (the highest security policy-making forum) as well as the President of China and Chairman of the Communist Party Politburo at the same time. Unlike his predecessors, he launched a massive campaign against corruption in the PlA, with as many as 30 Generals coming under the scanner in 2015. He regularly exhorted the PlA to obey the party’s policies.
Being a triple-hatter, the Chairman CMC interacts directly with the PlA and the Politburo at the same time. Thus views of the military are known to the Politburo and the latter’s policies are acceptable to the military. The reforms are meant to ensure that once the PlA embarks in support of the B&R, it projects a clean and honest image of China abroad.
Once the overarching ethos seeped in, Mr Xi, in four steps, brought in HDM reforms. On September 3, 2015, he announced that the PlA’s strength would be reduced by 3,00,000 (three lakh) troops over five years. In step two, on January 1, 2016, he declared the creation of an Army headquarters similar to the Air Force and Navy headquarters. Hitherto, the General Staff headquarters, always headed by an Army officer, was seen as both Army and Joint Command headquarters. A new Strategic Support Force, which brings all space, cyber and electromagnetic assets, which are critical for information warfare, under one roof, was formed. These will support combat operations both for continental defence and expeditionary forces in support of B&R.
This is not all. The People’s liberation Second Artillery, responsible for nuclear weapons, was renamed as the Rocket Force. This could have been done for two reasons. China’s nuclear weapons’ assets which were earlier seen as an extension of the artillery now have been delinked from that reference, suggesting a more professional title for strategic assets which are under modernisation for providing credible deterrence. The new name also suggests that Rocket Force will only have nuclear assets under it. The PlA’s medium and short range missiles which use conventional warheads will now be under the exclusive command of concerned conventional military commanders.
The third step in HDM reforms were declared by Mr Xi on January 11. The four departments, namely, General Staff headquarters, General Political Department, General logistics Department and General Armament Department, were replaced by 15 agencies. These are: Joint Staff Department (JSD), Political Work Department, logistics Support Department, Equipment Development Department, Training and Administration Department, National Defence Mobilisation Department, General Office, Agency for Offices Administration, Office for Reforms and Organisational Structure, Office for International Military Cooperation, Office for Strategic Planning, Audit Office, Discipline Inspection Commission, Politics and law Commission, and Science and Technology Commission.
And, finally, on February 1, the seven Military Area Commands in Shenyang, Beijing, lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu were reduced to five, namely, Northern Theatre Command, Western Theatre Command, Eastern Theatre Command, Central Theatre Command, and Southern Theatre Command. Against India, the earlier lanzhou (facing ladakh) and Chengdu (facing Arunachal Pradesh) MACs were brought under the single Western Theatre Command based in Chengdu.
Overall, the HDM reforms suggest at least four things. One, the PlA has decided to give due importance to tri-Service combined operations, a must for credible military power. The JSD as the successor of the GSHQ will have equal representation from all three Services, both for the planning of nuclear and conventional operations, and in the seamless integration of their plans. Earlier, the Army had disproportionate representation in combined operations planning at GSHQ.
Better tri-Service cooperation under a single commander is also evident in the new Theatre Commands. Earlier, in the MACs, while there was unity of command under a single commander, the Air Force and the Army did two types of training. In peacetime, they honed their Service’s core competencies as well as did combined operations. Now, they will devote their total time to combined operations so that the Army and Air Force understand each other’s core competencies.
Two, the break-down of four departments into 15 agencies reporting directly to the CMC has been done to streamline functioning with focussed results and monitoring. For example, the Audit Office agency, which was not there earlier, will ensure zero corruption within the PlA. Officers of this agency will reportedly visit command headquarters and field formations to audit disciplinary cases, and submit the report-card regularly to the CMC. This will ensure a corruption free image of the PlA abroad.
Three, the renaming of the PlASA into Rocket Force is in line with China’s no-first-use nuclear policy. Earlier the PlASA was responsible for both nuclear and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. This is no longer so. The nuclear assets will exclusively be with the Rocket Force while the conventional ones will be with the Theatre Commands.
Most importantly, there will be more synchronisation between the PlA and the party. Unique to China, the PlA is supposed to be loyal to the party and not the nation, since the party and nation are considered one. Thus, the PlA is not apolitical. Mr Xi’s regular calls to the PlA to obey the party do not mean he foresees dissent. It means that in the exceptional concept where political officers, who are PlA officers doing party work and not party functionaries in uniform inside the PlA, should uphold party directives.
(The writer is the editor of FORCE news magazine)