Indigenisation of defence equipment is welcome and should be encouraged. But the process must not come in the way of the country’s Armed Forces having quick access to the best material that is available in the global market
Notwithstanding high expectations from the Modi Government, which completed 100 days in office, defence management has not changed much. Five years after India officially endorsed the need to build capabilities for a two-front military threat against Pakistan and China in beginning 2009, the Armed Forces and the indigenous defence industry remain bereft of transformational reforms needed for credible deterrence.
Ironically, India, with two military-held lines, does not have a defence policy needed to formally connect its political and military leaderships. In the absence of political directive on nature, prioritisation, and national objectives sought through military power, the Armed Forces continue to set their own aims and seek capabilities, in a compartmentalised fashion, unrelated to the threats at hand. This was fine when defeating Pakistan through a decisive victory was the sole objective of military power. Things changed with the coming of nuclear weapons, the proxy war by both China and Pakistan, increased domains of warfare, and most importantly, the emergence of China as the immediate military threat on the 3,488km long disputed border.
The Indian leadership, paradoxically, views China as a long-term strategic and military threat even after it has altered the status quo on the disputed border in north-eastern ladakh through successful military coercion in April-May 2013. By intruding 19km inside Indian land and staying put for three weeks, China managed to compel India to curtail its limit of patrolling by security forces till its perception of the line of Actual Control in the geo-politically sensitive Depsang plains. This amounted to de facto acceptance by India of the Chinese perception of lAC (the two lAC perceptions differ five kilometres to 20km in ladakh) with increased threat to deployments on Siachen glacier. China, without firing a shot, has done what Pakistan since 1984 could not do to the militarised glacier.
This instance tells us that both the perception of threat and threat itself from Pakistan and China are as different as chalk and cheese, and so, the Indian Army, with boots on ground, cannot have the same military strategy for both. Thus, the raising of the new 17 Mountain Strike Corps, while increasing the pay and allowances burden on the exchequer will not deter Chinese troops. With nine-and-half divisions already available for border defence, additional Army’s manpower needs can easily be met from the resources within, for instance, from the 80,000 strong Rashtriya Rifles forces engaged in incessant counter-insurgency duties in Kashmir. An incremental rather than mass raisings should have been done.
What India needs against China is high-quality border infrastructure, improved round the clock surveillance, and competent space, ballistic missiles and cyber capabilities, all of which are beyond the Army’s purview. This is where the Prime Minister’s Office should step in as the coordination centre. For example, despite the environment clearance for border areas, the Government should know that the Border Roads Organisation does not have the capability, capacity, leadership and good management to build urgently needed roads, necessitating a two-prong approach. The first is that the defence roads should no longer be called General Staff roads (military terminology); they should be meant for tourism with the last bit being stretched for military use. Once this is done, sector-wise contracts could be given to international companies, say Japanese or German, to build desired border roads on time. Similarly, the National Security Adviser in the PMO should, in concert with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, review and coordinate building of military capabilities for the Chinese front.
For this to happen, two long-standing organisational reforms are necessary: The need to bring the Service chiefs in policy-making loop by amending the business rules of Government of India, and to integrate defence service personnel into the civilian defence ministry. Once this is done, the need for a Chief of Defence Staff or a permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee as recommended by Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012, may not be necessary. And last but not the least, while national security requires close interaction between the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, the PMO should balance the two for the last word. For too long, the External Affairs Ministry with scant understanding of military power has formulated policies on sensitive neighbours like Pakistan and China.
On defence industry, the Government needs to do much more than raise FDI limit to 49 per cent and insist on ‘Make in India’ projects; the two requirements, unfortunately, do not square up. While defence technology, depending upon its level, can be purchased from abroad, the problem lies in its absorption. What this means is that Indian defence industry requires best management practices whose motive is profit which should be the case with any business. Only then the human talent will gravitate towards this industry leading to modernisation of production lines capable of absorbing world class technologies. For this to happen, the Government needs to not only loosen its control over this industry, come down heavily against corruption, and provide a level playing field to the private industry. It should also raise the FDI to a minimum 51 per cent to attract best management practices. A transformational rather than an incremental approach, is needed.
In the meantime, urgent defence requirements cannot be given a short shrift. Two recent examples will illustrate this point. While Minister for Defence Arun Jaitley recently cleared defence acquisitions worth Rs 40,000 crore, the bulk of orders has gone to public sector undertakings. The items include tanks, guns and missiles. While it is wonderful to support indigenous production, the fact is that these Government-supported units have abysmal export records and are not known to stick to quality control and time and cost lines. These units are in urgent need of management reforms — something that the defence bureaucracy is loathe to consider.
Moreover, there are certain critical operational gaps which need to be plugged immediately with imports. These include light Utility Helicopters and diesel submarines. By scrapping the 197 lUH deal which after years of labour was close to fruition with imports, Mr Jaitley has preferred the indigenous acquisition route, with grave implications. The lUH are needed to replace vintage Cheetah helicopters which are the lifeline for troops at Siachen glacier. Considering the obvious delay of five to 10 years in this replacement programme, operational logistics and lives of soldiers in Siachen have been put to great risk especially when threats have increased exponentially.
Similarly, by ruling out any off-the-shelf purchase of submarines for the Navy’s 75-I programme whose Request for Purchase has not been issued by the Defence Ministry despite the Government clearance since 2007, Mr Jaitley has not helped the Navy’s preparedness. It is sad that the Army and the Navy chiefs have not protested the Defence Minister’s decision in support of indigenisation at the cost of national security. So where does the buck regarding national security stopIJ
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)