Much of the analysis of the Prime Minister’s recent visit to China has been of the instant or “morning after” kind, i.e. in near real-time. And of a free-wheeling nature, i.e. independent of the reverberations (at the ground level) in China. An examination of the account of the visit Chinese officialdom has given to its own public — i.e. to appraise its impact through the lens of the Chinese press now, ex-post facto — might be a useful addendum.
The State controlled media (which is still predominant in China) is, after all, the channel through which the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party-state communicates with its citizenry. Its (the leadership’s) perceptions therefore lie embedded in the projection of India (or any country, for that matter) that is made in the media for the benefit of the populace. That projection is anything but spontaneous. There is a definite design to it — which can be revealing. It has only to be deciphered with a discerning eye.
A pioneering project recently launched at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru, seeks to do just that: monitoring coverage of India in the Chinese media with a view to spotting clues helpful for gauging the thinking behind (official Chinese) projections of the country.
The initial, trial, phase of the project concentrated on the PM’s visit. Translations of all items, reports and commentaries on India in the important official Chinese newspapers (People’s Daily, PlA Daily, Guangming Daily, and liberation Daily), and their alter ego, the “semi-official” Global Times (both Chinese and English versions), during the visit, and a fortnight before and after in the month of May, were commissioned and collated. In addition to its main focus on the official press, the compilation also includes a sizable sample of translations of comment in the non-official media. (These are displayed on NIAS’ website at http://www.nias.res.in/research-schools-isss.php.) A quick perusal reveals a number of interesting features:
Quantum: First, coverage was quite prolific --- possibly more than in the Indian Press, even if the comparison is restricted to the official Chinese press only. (Much more so if the semi-official and non-official press and digital news platforms were to be included.)
This can be seen as both spontaneous and considered. A fair bit of the coverage centred on the personality of Prime Minister Modi as a strong and transformative leader —that perhaps reflected the former. The latter (“calculated” effort) likely stemmed from a deliberated decision to signal (to India) that the Chinese side attached great importance to the visit.
Quality: That reading gets blunted somewhat, at first glance, as one moves from a quantitative to a qualitative plane because of the repetitive and prosaic style characteristic of a State controlled media environment, especially on the knotty political aspects of the bilateral relationship. Yet there are several insights to be gleamed, within the uniformity of the predictable and the expected, that make it worthwhile to go over the compilation with a fine tooth comb.
Authoritative orchestration: A clear pattern of careful orchestration of official perceptions, both before and after the high-level interaction, emerges. This is unsurprising, of course, being an arch-typical trait of Communist set-ups, State or sub-state level. (Only in case of the political aspects of the India-China relationship though; not business and economic or cultural aspects, as elaborated in the following paragraphs.)
Thus descriptions of the outcome of the visit (after it was over) were virtually the same as projected in early commentaries (of February 2015, for instance, written after the visit of External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to China) — except for the prominence given to the shared historical heritage of Buddhism and cultural commonalities and for the specifics of the economic deals, etc, signed. (Neither of the latter aspects could have been anticipated naturally, the way political aspects could have and were.)
It shows, if demonstration were needed, the value of monitoring the Chinese media on an on-going basis — the tip-offs that can be mined in advance of choreographed events from that open and freely accessible source.
Cultural diplomacy: Civilisational aspects of the bilateral relationship received considerable salience in the coverage. This is unlikely to have been planned, or a Chinese preference. Rather something that, it could be surmised, was perhaps done in deference to the visiting leader’s wishes, reflecting the realism and dexterity of Chinese diplomacy.
Considerable (intellectual) energy was clearly expended in evolving precise formulations on the specific content of the commonalities and distinctiveness of Chinese and Indian civilisational traits and treasures highlighted, Yoga and Taichi above all. “Pursuit of harmony”, striving for “balance between the body, mind and wisdom” and integration of “Heaven”, “human” and “heart” were identified as their common weal, as “thought patterns of self-reflection and enlightenment”, with the wish that they (Taichi and Yoga) “add radiance and beauty to each other” rather than “rise in solitary splendour respectively”.
Prime Minister Modi can perhaps derive due satisfaction that his initiative to light this spark in the hitherto barren landscape of India-China cultural relations did not go in vain. Especially because that creative move cannot be said to have resonated in adequate measure amongst the Indian commentariat dominating the discourse. A supercilious outlook oblivious, largely, of the value of the Indian cultural and spiritual heritage in the diplomatic arena — vis-à-vis its enigmatic Northern neighbour above all — having come in the way.
However, even in playing along with their guest’s predilection, that accommodation (of the cultural affinity factor) was sought to be set firmly within the confines of the overall Chinese political and strategic approach — of seeking to project the India-China relationship as a partnership with wider significance than bilateral and one that was working for a more equitable and peaceful world order. And not something worth pursuing for its own sake — as an end in itself, by the two countries themselves in relation to each other for promoting bonhomie and better understanding between their peoples (as was the thrust of the visiting dignitary’s appeal).
likewise, the PM’s announcement of e-visas for Chinese tourists by India unilaterally, though it moved Foreign Minister Wang Yi to ask the Tsinghua University audience for a round of applause, caused no flutters in the press - not even a headline. The Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s response to a question about its significance and possible matching response by China was also blase.
Strategic profile: A striking feature of the coverage, overall, is that it avoided painting India black (much less criticising it directly) for its uninhibited shedding of defensiveness about seeking improved relations with the USA and China’s neighbours, Japan above all. (Or even touching upon the Mongolia visit immediately after China, where India’s “comprehensive partnership” was upgraded to a “strategic” one in a spirit of “true friendship”.) Unsigned reports were totally silent on that aspect and the maximum extent to which even signed articles went was to bring the all too obvious geo-political “power balancing” aspect in within the ambit of their writings but taking care to attribute it to “Western” mischief.
An unmistakable blunting of any possible public perception of an anti-Chinese edge in India’s dalliance with the USA, Japan. etc, in other words, choosing to project those relations as “normal” and unexceptionable and not directed against China. (The English language dailies were not as restrained --- at all --- but they cater to foreigners and audiences outside China, not Chinese.)
This reserve was also evident in coverage of PM Modi’s public remarks — a studied silence was maintained, most notably, on his mention, in the presence of Chinese Premier li Keqiang at their Joint Press Statement, of the “need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realising the full potential of our partnership” (after describing it, a moment earlier, as “one of our most important partnerships”).
So also on his observation at Tsinghua University that “if we have to realise the extraordinary potential of our partnership, we must also address the issues that lead to hesitation and doubts, even distrust, in our relationship. …. The solution we choose (to the boundary question) should do more than settle the boundary question. It should do so in a manner that transforms our relationship and not cause new disruptions.”
The blanking out of those pointed remarks in the official Press, suggestive of a state of denial almost, is telling. It cannot be attributed to the taciturn Chinese diplomatic style alone. Indian diplomacy would seem to have its task cut out for it, by way of follow up action on the PM’s demarches.
Business and Economic Interaction: Such indulgence was, however, more in form than in substance; more on the political side than economic, where tangible factors and a business-like approach appears to have been the order of the day. Media articles covering the latter aspects were matter of fact, and frank, unhesitatingly articulating expectations of Chinese investors that the Indian side needed to traverse quite some distance before the promise of Chinese funding for infrastructure construction and investments in manufacturing was likely to materialise. Indian concern at the massive trade deficit was not considered worthy of the reader’s attention.
There is, of course, no reason to expect an ideological slant here in today’s China but, if anyone did, s/he might be surprised to find unhesitating mention of the ‘money making’ criterion as the ultimate determinant of Chinese investors’ decision to bring their capital to India. A more unseemly display of “capitalist greed” there might not be — from the erstwhile high priest of Communism. (Especially if juxtaposed with the disdainful characterisation of ordinary people in India as “low (in) diligence” in some non-official writings, separately.)
Strategic Comparisons: A number of (long term) comparisons with India figure in the compilation, especially the extended, non-official, part. (This was not exactly a popular pastime with Chinese analysts and commentators hitherto, possibly because of a feeling that the two nations were so far apart as to be not comparable.) They are a strategic analysts’ delight for the glimpse they afford into thought processes at the Chinese end — sometimes somewhat convoluted and even condescending but always meticulous in marshaling facts and figures, and never fanciful. The famed Chinese forte — sophistication in statecraft — could be said to be at play here, in the opinion of this columnist, an unabashed admirer of the Middle kingdom’s mandarinate’s flair for finesse.
Political Prospects: This is an extremely interesting dimension of the coverage — revealing, paradoxically, of preferences and preconceptions precisely because of the predictability and formulaic consistency of the (official) formulations. Chinese expectations from India (on the political side, in the future) were spelt out in as many words, virtually identical to pre-visit projections, time and again in several authoritative articles. An example:
“……….the two countries should seize this historic opportunity and carry out the important consensus reached between leaders to promote continuous development of China-India relations. Both sides should maintain a positive momentum of talks between leaders, expand bilateral communications, enhance cooperation on global platforms such as United Nations, the BRIC countries, the G-20, etc, and push the international order in a more fair and rational direction. Until the border problems can be resolved, both countries must properly control disputes and jointly ensure peace and stability along the border to create favorable conditions for border negotiations….”. (emphasis added)
Implicit in that formulation (repeated ad nauseam left, right and centre), it could safely be surmised, is what the Chinese side would not like to see India doing - anything that would go contrary to these injunctions. Hence the unceasing exhortations to it to go (or at least be seen to be going) strong on the rhetoric of India-China relations (so that the relationship is seen by others as being on an upward trajectory, and any possible perceptions of India joining, or lending a helping hand to, those powers who may wish to form an anti-China axis are pushed back and prevented from gaining ground).
It is a moot point, of course, whether that would be a serious expectation, or simply a smart bid to keep India on “good boy” behavior. The function of the propaganda media (in the Chinese set-up) is less to inform and more to serve as an instrument of the Party-state — a tool to buttress official designs. The former is only a constraint; it is the latter that is the objective. As such, a prime task for the media is (perceived, and taken, to be) to promote acceptability of official policies and create a psychological climate in which contravening them becomes difficult. That the Chinese media is doing quite well, it would appear - trying to make India fall in line with China’s scripted ‘line’, as much as it can.
Boundary Question, lAC, Terrorism: There was, notably, no specific mention of anything on the boundary question/negotiations — need for early/pro-active resolution etc. (not even the three stage process reconfirmed by both countries in the Joint Statement or the operationalization of new confidence building measures agreed upon during the visit) or the Indian request for clarification of the lAC — beyond the general exhortation quoted above “to create favourable conditions for border negotiations”. Or on the question of terrorism, on which the two sides agreed (for the first time) to “disrupt terror networks…….and stop cross-border movement of terrorists..…”.
UN Security Council: Nor as much as a whiff of PM Modi’s gentle but pointed observation that “China’s support for India’s permanent membership of a reformed UNSC (and NSG) will do more than just strengthen our international cooperation”. The topic might not have figured in the high level exchange at all, as far as the average Chinese reader is concerned, but for the terse reference in the Joint Statement for those who would have cared to read through it.
In general, the Chinese political approach cited above, and as elaborated in President Xi’s four point proposal, was featured in detail while the Indian side’s responses, as presented, came out as insubstantive, with no clear political thrust or objective of their own. And as not being opposed to the Chinese point of view, including on the “One Belt, One Road” proposal, which the Indian side was circumspect on.
Even the tentative readings about official China’s mind and perceptions that flow from the above can be seen to contain useful pointers for follow up (diplomatic) action. A more granular analysis might well indicate contrary nuances and possibly quite a different overall picture too. Regardless, the potential of such an (media monitoring) exercise for fine tuning the overall assessment of the impact of the visit from official and other channels (and, more generally, for putting China studies in the country on a firmer footing) should be evident.
During the visit, PM Modi had occasion observe that “Indians and Chinese don’t know each other well, much less understand each other”. Though the context of his remarks was different - possibly that of the shared cultural heritage of Buddhism and other civilisational affinities - an intensification of the Indian gaze at China through Chinese media coverage of India might be a good way to begin addressing that gap at the Indian end. To be able to “see ourselves as others see us”, in Robert Burns’ memorable poetic wish for his fellow folks, in other words.
(The writer is former Ambassador with a background on China and strategic affairs. He is currently with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, where he anchors the “India in the Chinese Media” project. Details of the project can be seen at the link at http://www.nias.res.in/research-schools-isss.php )