As we reflect on that military confrontation with Pakistan, the old adage repeats itself: Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. That is the lesson that India would do well to remember
In the early hours of September 6, 1965, exactly half a century ago, three divisions of India’s XI Corps, crossed the International Border in Punjab and in pitch darkness, moved towards the Ichogil canal.
This news flashed across the world, with newspaper headlines announcing, “Indian Army crosses into Pakistan-Indian forces in vicinity of lahore.” The second India-Pakistan war had begun.
Why did India and Pakistan go to war in the autumn of 1965IJ A conflict was not in the interest of either Pakistan or India and no major world power wanted an escalation of tension in this part of the world. Yet, for the perceptive observer, signs of conflict were all visible and apparent.
This was the time, when the Cold War was at its zenith. Pakistan had astutely sided with the West and in return, had received economic and military assistance, ostensibly to fight communism, but covertly to be used in its struggle against India.
Pakistan played its cards with panache and finesse, and in the process, bolstered its economic and military capability with aid from the Western powers. This gave Pakistan, the wherewithal to wage a war. At the same time, India was hampered by a slow growth rate and internal turmoil.
The debacle suffered at the hands of China in 1962, had left deep scars in the national psyche and consequently, India in the early 1960s, was at a low ebb, economically and militarily. India’s perceived weakness was seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to wrest Kashmir from India by force.
However, as India was in the process of augmenting its military capability, policymakers within Pakistan veered to the view that this window of opportunity was limited in time.
In early 1964, former President Ayub Khan of Pakistan constituted the ‘Kashmir publicity committee’, to keep the Kashmir issue alive. From this committee, emerged a plan in February 1965, to engineer a revolt in Jammu & Kashmir, by sending Armed infiltrators to foment violence. This was to be followed with a quick military thrust to capture the strategic Indian township of Akhnoor.
The underlying hope was that this would lead to the state of Jammu & Kashmir, falling like a ripe plum into the Pakistani hands.
The plan was, however, shelved as both President Khan and his Army Chief, General Muhammad Musa were apprehensive of such action leading to a full-scale war with India. Two months later, Ayub Khan had a change of heart and gave his assent to the plan, though his Army Chief still demurred.
The Pakistani plan consisted of two components. Codenamed Operation Gibraltar, it envisaged the infiltration of thousands of regular and irregular troops dressed as Kashmiri guerrillas into Jammu & Kashmir, to create an uprising in the State. The Pakistan Army would then move in to capture Akhnoor.
While Ayub Khan was not unaware of the possibility of his actions leading to an all out war with India, he veered around to the view that India was unlikely to expand the area of conflict.
The weapons received by Pakistan from the West gave Pakistan’s military both a quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Indians.
If India did expand the conflict, international opinion would bring the war to a swift closure. By then, Kashmir would be in the Pakistani hands. The events, however, did not unfold in the manner envisaged by Pakistan’s top brass.
Pakistani attempts to destabilise India in Operation Gibraltar in August 1965, were foiled. Much to Pakistani’s chagrin, the local people did not rise in revolt against the Indian state, but actively supported the Indian Army in neutralising the infiltrators.
Pakistan also went on to lose the strategic Haji Pir Pass to an Indian offensive, which sealed the routes of ingress of the infiltrators into Jammu & Kashmir.
Pakistan then launched Grand Slam on September 1, but a plucky Indian defence and incompetent Pakistani leadership prevented Akhnoor from falling into the hands of the enemy.
However, to relieve pressure from this sector, India was forced to extend the conflict across the International Border. All the premises on which Pakistan had based its design to capture Jammu & Kashmir were thus reduced to nought.
Today, when we reflect on what happened 50 years ago, the age-old lesson repeats itself. Weakness is a sure recipe for war and strong militaries are the best deterrent to conflict. That is the lesson which India would do well to remember.
(The author retired as a Major General from the Indian Army and is presently the editor of Salute Magazine.)