With the Chinese, one has to “walk on two legs”, to borrow their own metaphor — think big as well as small; think outside the box as well as within it; think abstract but also tangibly; Track II in addition to Track I
A “developmental partnership” was agreed upon during the recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Thirty-five years after the historic make-up visit to China by former Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1979 (first Foreign Ministerial, or political, level interaction after the 1962 conflict that had to be aborted due to the insensitivity of the Chinese in attacking Vietnam while he was still on Chinese soil), the two countries have come to a point whereby they could formally agree that Chinese and Indian “developmental goals are interlinked and should be pursued in a mutually supportive manner”. And “to leverage mutual complementarities and build a closer developmental partnership”, it should be in recognition of the fact “that their respective growth processes are mutually reinforcing”. Moreover, the endeavour should be “to make this developmental partnership a core component of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” operative between them for close to a decade now since 2005.
This was a Chinese initiative, by all accounts, which India went along with; not the other way round. It has not received due attention amid understandable preoccupation with problematic political aspects of Sino-Indian relations. While there may be no great intellectual puzzle or deep game involved here, it might still be worthwhile to try and gauge the genesis of Chinese thinking in this regard, both to get a better perspective and also to facilitate the opening on offer being put to good use.
Political Background
Politically, the trust deficit issue was foremost on the Indian mind during the visit, as discussed in this column earlier on conclusion of the visit. The key political message India sought to convey was one of circumspection and caution: that lack of trust, evident above all in the unending Chinese weiqi (their traditional, Indian chess like, board game) like play on the “boundary question” (invariably referred to as the “border issue” on the Chinese side reflecting their ploy, in keeping with their overall stand and negotiating stance, to project that much larger chunks of “territory” were in dispute than mere boundary alignment), was manifest and needed to be overcome without any further prevarication. Without beating around the bush. Also its corollary, that an improvement in the level of confidence would be necessary for India to go along with the far-reaching proposals for enhanced trans-country/continent infrastructure connectivity, unexceptionable in themselves in principle (if a trifle too grandiose for India’s liking), China wished India to join in.
Given the sophistication of their statecraft, the Chinese are unlikely to have been taken entirely by surprise in this regard; not that they would betray any signs, even if they had. Their diplomatic machine cannot have missed the misgivings aired in the run up to the visit — during the Indian electoral campaign in particular, and even earlier in fact, as part of the down-to-earth nationalist approach of the BJP. They would have had a fair idea of what their side was in for, even if not a precise one, and are likely to have come prepared mentally in a cautious, probing mood in damage containment mode; ready to listen, and absorb (while reserving rejoinders, unsaid, for a later time of their choosing after a post-visit reassessment of the overall strategic scenario confronting both countries).
That is why, perhaps, nothing was said in response (on border related issues), beyond low-key reiteration of their standard line that it was a problem left over from history which should not be allowed to impede improvement of relations. And the confidence gap complaint of the hosts parried altogether, beyond the preemptive attempt to present the sanguine Chinese take on the matter in the Chinese President’s article in The Hindu, and by Xinhua, on the eve of his arrival (which the last issue of this column had attempted to analyse).
This is where the idea of a “developmental partnership” comes in — in Chinese reckoning, it can be surmised. As a kind of second string (carrot like) to their bow, with the first (stick like tit-for-tat response) having been left unused for the present, deliberately by choice, as above. A master diplomatic stroke, which calculated right that tweaking the 2005 “strategic partnership” in the direction of a “developmental partnership” would serve a dual purpose. First, it would lend substance to the “strategic partnership” that had little concrete content to justify itself almost a decade after coming into vogue. Secondly, that it would help in making the “strategic partnership” look benign, or at least less diabolical, by shifting attention away from the (global chessboard on the) politico-diplomatic plane, where (the realist Chinese would not have failed to recognise that) India’s voicing of reservations regarding low confidence levels and lack of trust made it quite obviously anomalous, to the (more innocuous) plane of bilateral economic relations.
It is not in the realm of the unthinkable, it should be noted in this context, that the Chinese might have feared the worst in this regard (initially at an early stage, before the new Government in India blew away leverage inherent in a situation of regime change anywhere through an unsolicited public endorsement of the strategic partnership early in the day) — namely, that the Modi Government might not be ready to reiterate commitment to the “strategic partnership” with China, or even go to the extent of questioning any strategic overtones in India’s relationship with China fundamentally — and may have therefore come up with the idea of a developmental partnership as a (low priced) pre-emptive softener, playing on Prime Minister Modi’s known preference for “economics in command” relationships in foreign affairs.
That there was a slew of economic agreements and mechanisms in myriad fields in the bilateral relations repertoire to build upon in this respect would have been seen as a favourable circumstance, not the determining consideration — minus the political factor, those elements could all well have been left to proceed on their steam, without any need for an overarching umbrella of a “developmental partnership”, as they do in case of China’s relations with several countries routinely.
Substantiating the Developmental Partnership
Be that as it may, i.e. whether or not the above reading of where the Chinese came from in advancing the developmental partnership idea is a correct one, India should welcome it unstintingly, as an opportunity; some perfectly valid concerns about a possible uncomfortablytight Chinese embrace ensuing notwithstanding. It has potential for “beneficial bilateralism”, which suits India fine and should form its watchword in taking things forward guardedly.
Having agreed to the idea in principle, it is in India’s interest to exert itself and find ways of substantiating it. The last thing India would want to acquiesce in is a repeat of the pattern/practice of previous years of verbiage of the “symbolism sans substance” kind, whereby formulations were allowed to turn into shibboleths devoid of clear meaning or practical content. China must (be made to) walk the talk, as the author of this addition to the diplomatic lexicon — the onus of bringing concrete suggestions (for making the developmental partnership a “core component” of the “strategic partnership”, as agreed) to the table is on China. It should be invited to come up with tangible ways of doing so (beyond the USD 20 billion investment in Industrial Parks and other MOUs, etc, already agreed upon separately, as they are anyway part of ongoing collaboration).
That is not, by any stretch of imagination, to suggest a junior role for India or abdication of rights or any kind of passivity. Or to argue against internal brainstorming and preparation within the country, which can never do harm obviously. It is only to make a plea for mature and skillful probing of intentions and readiness for heavy lifting on the other side, before jumping into the fray. After all, apart from being the one to advance the initiative, it is China, and not India, that sits on mind-boggling mountains of foreign currency holdings; the bulk of them idling in low or zero yield bonds issued by its bete noire, the USA, without outlets for putting them to any good use.
The Asian Infra-structure Investment Bank (AIIB) launched by China recently comes naturally to the mind in this context. Indeed, it is inconceivable that either initiative (AIIB multi-laterally or the developmental partnership bilaterally with India) would have been taken by China without adequate internal brainstorming on concrete follow-up possibilities (over and above ongoing routine cooperation programmes). They have only to be gauged and discerned.
A hint about Chinese thinking were available in the Chinese President’s invitation to India to join hands with it for promoting its infrastructure linkages with the South Asian region as a whole (in his speech at the ICWA featured in the last issue of “Strategic Musings” column). This and other possibilities preferred by the Chinese side might not be acceptable to India yet, as indeed was implicit in Prime Minister Modi’s hesitant response to the Chinese President on his Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor and Asian infrastructure connectivity proposals.
The hesitation, entirely justified though it is, must not, however, be allowed to become reason for a categorically rejectionist approach in follow-up official parleys, least of all under any mistaken assumption that the proposals will never come to fruition because of Indian reservations. They should not be shunned altogether or given the go by because of the risks. The counter to clever geo-economics is smart geo-economics, not “geo-economic resistance”. The latter can be good tactics, not astrategy.
Rather the time bought by tactical stalling should be utilised, feverishly this column would argue, for solid spadework backstage to devise ways of smartly morphing the grandiose but vague Chinese proposals into acceptable variants. And intelligently anticipating other possible Chinese proposals (with a view to preparing responses to them; wherever possible assimilative, not rejectionist, ones) and coming up with doable deliverables of its own (to avoid being bogged down by the ‘second best’ perennially). The smaller and more crisp and cut and dry the latter can be, the better — that much easier to keep them manageable within well-defined strategic parameters, besides getting them off the ground speedily. Bigger omnibus projects tend to languish on the drawing boards for long periods because of the greater uncertainty associated with them and the more cumbersome, cross-sectoral coordination they call for (apart from Sisyphean kind of fresh starts they invariably entail with the inevitable changes in personnel during their long gestation periods) though, of course, they have their own place politically.
The revamped Planning Commission, whatever its name, would seem to have its task cut out for it thus vetting, and pro-actively proffering ideas for geo-strategic projects outside the defence/security sphere. It can be the Government’s brains trust for identifying the “complementarities” the China-India developmental partnership seeks to “leverage”, as per the Joint Statement. (In a remarkable coincidence, or a case of the highest levels learning from each other, President Xi has last month called for “new type of think tanks”, with Chinese characteristics, for “promoting scientific and democratic decision-making, promoting modernisation of the country’s governing system and ability, as well as strengthening China’s soft power”.)
With the Chinese, one has to ‘walk on two legs’, to borrow their own metaphor — think big as well as small; think outside the box as well as within it; think abstract but also tangibly; Track II in addition to Track I, yes, but the former squarely in the service of the latter — all desiderata easier suggested than done, no doubt, but then the challenge of dealing with a formidable neighbour waking up to its increasing economic clout doesn’t come easy.
Above all, the developmental partnership idea can be put to good use by assessing it as an opportunity for getting China to prove its bonafides — by closing the trust gap through bold and sincere actions. For example, by its effecting a quantum jump in transparency on its (medium and long term) development plans in the Tibet and Xinjiang regions adjoining India, and on the trans-boundary riverine and environment fronts, with a joint India-China mechanism to monitor them. Tall order unthinkable today; but tomorrow tooIJ For those professing to be in a “developmental partnership” that is to form a “core component” of their “strategic partnership”IJ
If Indian diplomacy can set itself this challenge — of persuading China to come round to putting its money where its mouth is, literally, as part of the process of building trust that is clearly going to be the thrust of their interaction in the near future — the peerless diplomatic duo would have sung a splendid duet, besides making a “contribution to peace and stability in the region” in compare, as invoked ever so often in their exhortations to each other and to the world at large.
(The write is former Ambassador of India to the UN and other International Organisations in Vienna, Austria, Ireland and Vietnam. At present, he is Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru)