Considering that war-fighting capabilities of India and Pakistan are linked to Kashmir — which is the most likely flash-point — it makes sense for the militaries of both countries to be involved in the negotiations, alongside diplomats, politicians and civil society leaders
The unexpected meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Ufa, Russia, was necessary and different. Unlike earlier interactions between the two leaders of warring neighbours, this one had an altered context and substance with a promise of being able to deliver.
First the context — there is political and strategic stability on both sides. Mr Modi is politically an unexceptionally strong leader, not given to work democratically with consensus; his Cabinet colleagues had clearly been upstaged by the sudden thaw in ties between India and Pakistan. Just the other day, India’s Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj had laid impossible red lines for resumption of bilateral talks; Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh had warned Pakistan of befitting retaliation to unending cross border terrorism; Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had gone public about giving Pakistan the taste of its own medicine; leading analysts, on cue from the Ministry of External Affairs, were finding virtues in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation without Pakistan and so on.
In this vitiated atmosphere when it seemed that bilateral talks had been put on indefinite hold, Mr Modi took the unusual step of calling his Pakistani counterpart at the beginning of the holy month of Ramzan and inviting him for talks. Mr Modi could not have done this out of the goodness of his heart, but for compelling strategic reasons which, for the moment are known only to the Prime Minister and his closest advisors. It would, however, not be incorrect to mention that his strategically inclined Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar would have counselled his boss that, without good relations with Pakistan, India will find it difficult, if not impossible, to retain a meaningful role (arduously built over a decade) in Afghanistan, make significant inroads into the Central Asian republics, nurture ties with Iran, and most importantly, balance China.
The context in Pakistan was also positive which is why Mr Sharif did not waste time in accepting India’s invitation for talks. With civil-military relations as good as it gets in Pakistan, Mr Sharif went into a huddle with his Army chief to decide on what should be on the table with India. Considering that the composite dialogue had not delivered, the need was to change the format; what has come out is dissimilar from earlier times. Pakistan’s core concern of Kashmir, which the Modi Government was hesitant to discuss openly, has been downplayed in the joint statement under the rubric of ‘other outstanding issues’. Pakistan has since confirmed that Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek will be taken up, away from the glare of publicity, through back-channel track-two talks to explore options.
Two issues highlighted in the joint statement for talks are terrorism and mechanism for interactions between the two heads of paramilitary forces (Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers) on the line of Control and the Director Generals of Military Operations. While the subject of terrorism affects both sides, formalised talks between DGMOs is a ground-breaking step — undoubtedly the brainchild of the Pakistan Army chief meant to provide his representative a seat on the bilateral high table.
Since India is averse to talking with the Pakistan Army with a civilian Government in Islamabad, it has been difficult for the right representatives to discuss Kashmir. India’s MEA does not hide it’s opposition to talks, whatever their nature, between the two Armies. For example, when the two DGMOs met in December 2013 to specifically discuss ways to control increased firings on the military line, the Indian MEA, according to senior Army brass involved in the talks, did its best to scuttle those talks. Earlier, the two DGMOs had, for the first time ever, met in July 1999 to discuss the terms of ceasefire after the 1999 Kargil conflict.
Just as India is opposed to interacting with the Pakistan Army over Kashmir, in Pakistan — since Rawalpindi has controlled and dictated Pakistan’s Kashmir policy after the 1947-49 war — the Army will not allow the civilian Government to get credit for resolving the Kashmir issue. It has been impossible to break this logjam. In 2008, after the exit of President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence chief, lt Gen Shuja Pasha, had reportedly tested waters by suggesting to the Indian defence advisor, during an Iftar party in Islamabad, that India should talk directly with the Pakistan Army, alongside the civilian dispensation, on Kashmir. The Indian reaction to a two-track formal interaction with Pakistan was lukewarm.
By the present ingenious arrangement of discussing Kashmir and DGMOs talks by back-channel, India’s opposition to the earlier talks’ format will be overcome, and a cushion for periodic (expected) setbacks will be provided. Moreover, it will help Mr Modi do what he should as the Prime Minister without openly going against the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh agenda of Akhand Bharat.
What would the DGMO talks mechanism accomplishIJ Plenty of things including the Kashmir issue, if both sides stay the course. Surely, the DGMOs formalised interactions will not end or lessen cross-border terrorism which, according to the Pakistan Army, is tied to progress on the Kashmir resolution. However, the talks will help build chemistry between the two Armies. This could and should get them, sooner rather than later, to discuss the Memorandum of Understanding of the 1999 lahore Accord signed by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. The MoU, signed in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests by both countries, had sought to keep an arms race in check by discussions on a range of hard-core military issues including doctrines on nuclear and conventional warfare.
If India is to honestly rationalise (called Field Force review in military parlance) its finite annual defence allocations with the need to meet the increased two-front threats, it will find that it can cut its forces facing Pakistan — since the pivot of war has decisively shifted to the mountains from the plains. Moreover, Pakistan’s acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons (which could be used in war-fighting) has closed India’s options of a deep strike into Pakistani territories with its offensive corps. The Indian Army’s 2004 doctrine of Cold Start, or pro-active strategy, at best, envisages shallow penetrations, which can be done by its existing pivot corps with appropriate combat capabilities. India really has little operational use for three strike corps, which require sizeable finances (not available at present) to keep them war-worthy. Why retain expensive war-assets which shall not be usedIJ The Indian Army’s reason (given to this writer by the Army chief, General Bikram Singh) that strike crops provide conventional deterrence is, to say the least, no longer valid.
This is not all. The two sides urgently need to discuss strategic military issues to include nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missile, ballistic missile defence, under-sea deterrence, militarisation of space, cyber and the doctrines associated with them. The truth, unfortunately, is that India needs these bilateral talks more than Pakistan, which is openly supported on these matters by its ally, China. The Pakistan Army, however, will not be averse to talking strategic matters as increased transparency will help reduce surprises and accidents.
The opposition once again will be from the Indian side, where diplomats, with little understanding of military matters, insist on talking about strategic matters. This is where the present National Security Advisor, Mr Ajit Doval, a former police officer and not a diplomat, can help shape the right agenda for the DGMO talks and monitor its progress. Considering that war-fighting capabilities of the two sides are linked to Kashmir — which is the most likely flash-point — shouldn’t the Armies be discussing it as wellIJ Once the Armies’ inputs are dovetailed with those of the back-channel talks on Kashmir issue, chances of lasting peace between India and Pakistan will brighten.
(The writer is editor FORCE newsmagazine and can be reached at pravin@forceindia.net)