It is disastrous for politicians to assume that they know everything about the country’s security and that Service chiefs know little
As Pakistan persists in promoting cross-border terrorism against India, one wonders what might have happened if, instead of ordering a ceasefire and taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations, India had continued the war and liberated the whole of Kashmir. The then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru — who approached the UN on lord Mountbatten's advice — feared that the continuation of the conflict would have led to a full-fledged war with Pakistan. But then, as Professor Ashok Kapur points out in India's Strategic Problems (lancer, 2015), Pakistan's policy was to wrest “Kashmir by force in between the 1950s and 1970s.” He adds that the “Nehru-Mountbatten decisions did not settle the Kashmir issue and exposed India to external intervention and to a debilitating internal debate and the costly involvement of the Indian Army in Kashmir.” He further states, “In sum, the decision to refer the matter to the Security Council gave the US and her allies the right and the opportunity to frame the South-Asian strategic debate according to their views and interests and at the expense of Indian views and interests.”
Failure to foresee all this was a cardinal error; Another was the failure to frame a realistic policy toward China. India, Professor Kapur points out, quickly accepted China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet “in disregard of Tibetan and British claims and the historical record that Tibet was at times independent, at times autonomous and imperial China only had a nominal claim to sovereignty over Tibet,” and “without negotiating the settlement of the India-Tibet border issue and without securing China's agreement on the McMahon line which was provisionally adopted in 1914.”
Nehru not only failed to read that China was preparing to isolate and attack India while he sought its friendship, but ignored India's own interests in the process. Professor Kapur writes, “When offered a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council in the early 1950s, India declined the US offer, choosing instead, to emphasise China's case”. He adds that “India is now chasing it when China, India's arch rival, has a veto over India's admission.”
Nehru's third major error was his non-recognition of the need to build up India's military strength despite its conflict with Pakistan and border dispute with China which began getting confrontational from 1957. Not only was very little done to modernise and expand the Armed Forces but the Defence Ministry was given to VK Krishna Menon, who played havoc with it.
Things improved vastly with YB Chavan, until then the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, taking over as Defence Minister following Menon's removal under pressure from the Congress — much against Nehru's wish. The defence budget for 1963 (Rs 867 crore) was nearly thrice that of 1962 (Rs 357 crore). The trend towards rising annual allocations continued. Procurement of arms and ammunition, thoroughly neglected under Menon who produced coffee percolators at the ordnance factories instead, improved. New divisions were trained and deployed. The result was seen in the 1965 war with Pakistan, in which India had the upper hand despite Pakistan's deployment of huge of quantities of American military hardware, including Patton tanks, received as aid from the US.
Nehru was dismissive, to the point of being insulting, in his behaviour with military officials. Indira Gandhi was not, and that explained the routing of Pakistan in the 1971 war. In the last 10 years, top military commanders were not rudely treated but the Services were starved of equipment and funds. Indeed, at 1.74 per cent of the gross domestic product, the initial defence allocation for 2014 and 2015 mercifully increased by the Modi Government after assuming office was the lowest since 1962! Nor was any significant procurement made in any Armed Forces-related area.
The messages from all this is simple: Civilian leadership must pay adequate heed to military advice on national security matters. The assumption that the Services brass knows nothing and one alone knows best, is a prescription for disaster.