Iran will continue to extend its influence over the major Shia groups in Iraq. Similar to Nouri al-Maliki, new Prime Minister Dr Haider al-Abadi needs Iranian support to keep his government in power. If the ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 succeed, it will bear some fruit in the tumultuous region
The blitzkrieg offensive of the ISIS on the Iraqi security forces has undoubtedly raised alarm bells within the Iranian establishment. Furthermore, the mobilisation of Sunni tribal groups and Baathists, coupled with the Iraqi army’s collapse, exacerbates these security concerns within Iran. But Iranians have been tactfully coping with this phenomenon and are able to push back the Takfiris from Tikrit. To make his points valid and justified the self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi has ridiculously announced, after the Tikrit’s humiliating defeat, that Prophet Mohammad himself told him to leave Mosul.
The Iranian officials have categorically denied that its forces are operating against ISIS alongside the Iraqi troops or Hashad al-Sahabi, Popular Mobilisation Forces. The incumbent Iranian ambassador to Baghdad, Hassan Daneifar, has said on record that if situation arises, we will send troops and arms to Iraq. It is only evident that Iran is pitching its cause célèbre IRGC-Qods Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani and some other military strategists in the battlefields of Iraq to assist in devising military plans in the offensive. The large billboards of Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei erected with the leaders such as Qais al-Khazaili of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr of Sadr Movement and Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim of ISCI are common sight throughout Iraq. This suggests that after the demise of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime, Iran has gained much clout in Iraq.
Compelling factors
Eighteenth-century British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary lord Palmerston once famously stated, “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” Hence, the contemporary Iranian foreign policy is primarily based on two policy objectives. Iraq is no exception. The painful reminiscences of the bloody eight-year war still keeps haunting and the “threat perception” regarding Iraq dominates the psyche of Islamic revolutionary establishment in Tehran, in particular and society, in general.
Thus, the new developments emerging from the US invasion and its aftermath have prompted Iran to become motivated to eliminate the traditional Iraqi threat by enhancing firm security and political cooperation and friendship with the new Shia-led dispensation in Baghdad in order to thwart any move to install a government that is inimical to Iran. Having a better strategic link with a friendly government can help Iran stem its traditional threat perceptions. And that objective could be possible after the consolidation of Shia political entities and their elevation to the reins of power through democratic process.
As such, Iran’s recent policy towards Iraq is shaped according to and in response to counter US goals and activities in the region. Furthermore, any long-term presence of foreign powers in Iraq will obstruct not only Iran’s national interests in Iraq, but also in the entire Persian Gulf region. Absence of Iranian activities would also encourage other regional heavyweights such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Qatar to influence Iraqi politics of post-Saddam era and obviously they would vie for achieving their own interests by supporting Sunni factions and insurgency. As a policy objective, no Iranian government has been or will be in favour of allowing the presence of or enhancing the role of foreign powers or other regional powers in Iraq. Given these facts, it is imperative for Iran to pay attention to the kind of government that assumes power in Baghdad and to strengthen friendly relations by initiating robust foreign policy to thwart the US or other regional powers’ influence.
The sectarian tinge
On the contrary, they dragged Iran in this mess, after creating the hoax of a ‘Shia Crescent’ in the region which would begin from Iran to lebanon via Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s eastern oil-rich Shia dominated al-Hasa province. These Iranian moves or for that matter the rise of Iran as a formidable geopolitical actor has given a narrow sectarian tinge. The fear of spread of Shiaism across West Asia and North Africa once again gripped the collective psyche of Arab rulers after the formation of first-ever Shia-dominated dispensation in Iraq. Without acknowledging the Iranian credentials in supporting the cause of Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sudan, most of the Arab governments tried to malign the Iranian overtures in Iraq as exclusively sectarian. Iran has also pragmatically dealt with the Shia-majority Azerbaijan’s tussle with Christian-majority Armenia in Nogorno-Karabakh conflict and gave Armenia an edge over Azerbaijan.
However, these sectarian labelling on Iran is not a new phenomenon. It was also echoed during the Islamic revolution when the Gulf Arab monarchs sensed tectonic shifts in the region. The genesis of this new phenomenon of Shia-Sunni dichotomy lies in the recent history of geopolitics, not in the early divide of Islam 1,400 years ago. The fear has further amplified by the Hezbollah’s historic success in 34-day war with Israel in 2006 and the robust assertion of Iran’s foreign policy. And now the Houthi Movement in Yemen and Syrian quagmire has added much fuel to the fire. This “fear psychosis” had popped up after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 to contain the “domino effect” of Revolutionary Islam envisaged by Iran. But, it seems that the wedge between the two denominations has started widening and it will come down after reaching certain saturation point.
Iran will continue to extend its influence over the major Shia groups in Iraq. Similar to Nouri al-Maliki, new Prime Minister Dr Haider al-Abadi needs Iranian support to keep his government in power. If the ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 succeed, it will bear some fruit in the tumultuous region. More broadly, the United States and Iran now share common interests in defeating ISIS and maintaining a stable regime in Baghdad that can transcend sectarian conflicts. Indeed, now Americans are quite aware of the fact that Iran has many levers to maintain its influence over Iraq. In the wake of contemporary security situations, Iran will keep all its resources remain intact as a powerful actor in the geopolitics of the region. It will not hesitate to use them, even if that means taking on a deeper military role in a civil war that has no end in sight. But the wedge between the two sectarian denominations will likely to be wide and open in years to come.
(The writer is a freelance Journalist, who recently visited Iraq)