Use of Special Operations Forces in asymmetric warfare may be tempting but history shows such tactics aren’t successful in the long run
It is widely believed that the right way to tackle asymmetric and irregular adversaries, for example in Kashmir, is with the use of military Special Operations Forces. Many suggest that they be used, not in direct action tasks such as conducting raids or establishing ambushes, but in a more strategic manner — for example, to carry out operations that hit the adversary’s command and control system. Others argue that if such a proxy war is being waged by countries inimical to us or by non-state actors from such countries, SOF must be used covertly to destroy such assets. Such actions restrict any scope of escalation due to lack of credible proof as would invariably happen if conventional forces were utilised for such missions.
On face value, such suggestions make sense, and seem like the logical course to take as India has witnessed over the years, to our cost in Kashmir, where irregular forces trained by Pakistan's Special Services Group commandos have been operating with relative impunity. Similarly, the neutralisation of Osama Bin laden by US SOF is another textbook example that supports such an outlook. Also, remember that the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was initially trained and equipped by Indian SOF and were indeed extremely effective against Sri lankan forces for a considerable period of time.
However, both the ethical and practical viewpoint, the support for SOF is deeply flawed. let us take the case for setting up irregular forces for carrying out guerrilla warfare in hostile states. History has shown that whether it was the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lTTE in Sri lanka or even the various militant outfits in Pakistan, all these forces have invariably turned on their supporters. The Bangladesh campaign of 1971 is probably one of the sole exceptions.
With regard to the employment of SOF in combating insurgencies, it may be worthwhile to remember that all insurgencies are political movements supported by the local population and can only be resolved through political means which implies that the Government leadership and the rebel leaders will have to talk and come to a compromise. The military establishment can only ensure that the rebel movement is sufficiently neutralised and violent action curtailed. Armed cadres, however, can only be neutralised by the targeted use of force which will be completely dependent on effective intelligence. This is only feasible when security forces are able to carry out physical domination of the affected region; this implies establishing a counter-insurgency grid, putting boots on the ground, and the need for deployment of regular light infantry troops. While SOF may have a role in certain contingencies, to expect such forces to be the linchpin of such a campaign is to miss the wood for the trees.
The very fact that the United States and its allies were unable to sustain the deployment of large numbers of regular light infantry troops on a long term basis and their subsequent attempts to increasingly rely on SOF, has contributed substantially to their defeat in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This was despite their expansion of SOF almost three-fold in the past decade. Their attempt to eliminate the rebel leadership has also been largely ineffective because as one leader is eliminated, a new one replaces him. Also, obtaining specific actionable intelligence has always been a problem.
Moreover, elimination of popular rebel leaders only hardens opposition to the Government, makes it difficult for the latter to find a credible leader with whom it can negotiate. In any case, using SOFs are against all norms of democratic behaviour. Finally, while there will be times when SOF may be utilised to eliminate terrorist leaders and networks using such methods, caution against using irregular warfare tactics and methods to combat insurgencies is called for. Otherwise, we may find that we may have bitten off more than we can chew.