The visiting Afghan President seems to be pro-Pakistan, but given India’s connections and popularity in Afghanistan, it is unlikely to be marginalised there. Also, the Iran-US rapprochement is good news for Delhi’s Afghan strategy
As Afghan President Ashraf Ghani completes his first visit to India after taking office, it is imperative to take a look at how the India-Afghan relationship is shaping up in the post-Karzai era. The change in Afghan administration last year changed the tone and tenor of Kabul’s strategic partnership with New Delhi. The consequences have been felt widely and deeply.
Mr Ghani honoured China by travelling to Beijing for his first foreign trip. And before visiting India, he has been to Pakistan twice. Mr Ghani has also retracted the Hamid Karzai-era demand for heavy military equipment from India while simultaneously fulfilling a long-standing Pakistani wish for the training of Afghan Army cadets in Pakistan.
The state of undeclared conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, witnessed during Mr Karzai’s tenure, has been replaced by unusual bonhomie. The trilateral peace process between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China has also been interpreted as Pakistan’s efforts to get an upper hand in the talks between Afghan Government and the Taliban. Does this mean that India has been knocked out of the regional balance of powerIJ Not necessarily.
India has many interests in Afghanistan, the most proximate country in its extended neighborhood: Afghanistan’s strategic location between Central and South Asia, the threats posed to Indian security from events in Afghanistan, and the necessity to ensure that Afghanistan’s internal vulnerability is not exploited by Pakistan.
A sovereign Afghanistan, where Pakistan is denied any hegemony and domination, contributes to India’s security. If Pakistan were once again able to make Afghanistan into a puppet regime, it will be able to focus its Army on the border with India, and Afghan territory could be used once again to train terrorists in asymmetric warfare against India, particularly in Kashmir.
On the surface, Mr Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan seems problematic and has been subjected to heavy attack, particularly from those who support Mr Karzai’s pro-India policy. They reasonably argue that Pakistan has invested so much emotional, social and human capital in Afghanistan, during last three decades, that having a client regime in Kabul has become Pakistan’s default position.
Mr Ghani has to think seriously of the coordination of Pakistan’s efforts with Saudi Arabia and China for pacifying Afghanistan. The onus will be on China to pressure Pakistan to facilitate the talks between the Ghani regime and the Taliban. Since China has largely remained aloof from Afghan affairs, it cannot boast of having high-quality contacts among the militants. Thus China’s understanding of the Afghan conflict is likely to be shaped by Pakistan’s wily motivations and militaristic perception, perpetuating the very disadvantage that, perhaps, Mr Ghani is attempting to avoid.
With the Iran-US rapprochement becoming a reality now, it will be much easier for Modi Government to explore depth in its relations with Iran. As Iran’s geopolitical stock is set to rise, Pakistan’s ability to influence events in Afghanistan is going to be substantially compromised. Although an Islamic bond does exist between Iran and Pakistan, Tehran has consistently undercut Islamabad’s designs in Kabul. One should not forget that Iran cooperated with India in strengthening the Northern Alliance resistance to the Taliban.
The Afghans should not be blamed for feeling that a rapprochement between the US and Iran will relieve their country from the grip of Pakistan, as the only trade and transit route. Although American forces will remain in Afghanistan for just one more year, the US may be tempted to explore the Iran route to Afghanistan rather than being dictated by Pakistan.
The Islamic State’s first deadly terror attack in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad on April 18 also makes the likelihood of Iran-US cooperation in Afghanistan more real. Both, the Americans and the Ghani administration, have expressed fears of the Islamic State gaining a foothold in the region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan has remained volatile in recent months. Iran accuses Sunni militants, based in Balochistan, of mounting attacks inside Iranian territory, but Pakistan has either dismissed the allegations or asked for more evidence.
Moreover, given the broad spectrum of contacts that New Delhi has made with the ethnically diverse Afghan elite, and India’s formidable popularity among the Afghans, it is impossible for any regional power, including Pakistan, to marginalise India in Afghanistan. Even the Taliban would not like to blindly do Pakistan’s bidding, if it decides to be part of the governing structure.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur)