A continuity rather than a break from the past is reflected in the pattern and structures visible in the Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan
The geographical logic has greatly animated the geopolitical contours of the South Asian region. Its impact on external and internal policies is effectively illuminated in the foreign policies, which have been adopted by the South Asian states at various points of time. Indeed, an appropriate example of this dialectical interaction between the internal and the external is manifested in the sectarian strife being witnessed by Pakistan.
The Pakistan Security Report 2013, published by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a think-tank based in Islamabad, has claimed that the number of sectarian conflicts has increased since 2011. It notes that Baluchistan has bore the brunt, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/FATA, Sind and then Punjab. The means adopted in the various incidents of violence and an understanding which has been arrived at for addressing these episodic events reveal an emerging triad among sectarian groups, extremist groups and covert and overt support by political parties. This emerging trend suggests that not only this triad will exacerbate the societal fabric of Pakistan, but also polarise the polity and society of Pakistan, further raising the broader questions associated with the nature of leadership exercised in post-colonial states.
In an article published in 1972, Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi made an attempt to theorise the nature of state in post-colonial societies. Taking Pakistan as a case study, Alavi advanced the idea that the concept of state is not primarily an extension of class interests, as believed by the Marxists, but that the state was a “relatively autonomous” entity, which “mediated” the competing interests of the primary stakeholders. The state according to Alavi, acted on behalf of these classes in order to preserve the social order, which these states inherited after the collapse of colonialism. As a result of sustaining certain structures (particularly the military-bureaucratic oligarchy), which Pakistan inherited from British India, a distinct static political culture evolved, which post-1947 minimised spaces for alternative voices. These spaces got further squeezed with Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation policies post-1977. As a result, progressive voices got marginalised and the spaces which emerged in the process were occupied by sectarian and radical groups. Thus, incidents of Shia-Sunni conflict, which were almost absent before 1970s, became more frequent. A primary reason for this were the political changes which were taking place in Pakistan’s neighbourhood at the regional level and the strategic Cold War rivalry between the US and Russia at the international level. The Iranian revolution of 1979, for instance, had domestic ramifications for Pakistan. Political patronage of Saudi Arabia to the Sunni community and Iran to the Shia community had its own consequential domestic repercussions. History shows that the thesis of a secular Pakistan, which Jinnah articulated in his first address to the Constituent Assembly in August 1947, somewhere failed to accommodate and pre-empt the wildcards, which the changing geo-politics of the region would offer to Pakistan in future.
A continuity rather than a break from past is thus reflected in the pattern and structures visible in the Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan. A recent report titled “Unending Violence in Pakistan: Analysing the Trends” published by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, a New Delhi-based think-tank looks at the emerging structures and patterns in Pakistan. Tracing the linkage between political parties and militant groups in the electoral campaign of 2013, it claims that there was a covert understanding between the militant group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Pakistan Muslim league-Nawaz (PMl-N), the federal government headed by Nawaz Sharif at the Centre and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It argues that in the course of electoral campaign in May 2013, the TTP had openly threatened parties like Pakistan Peoples Party, Awami National Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, whereas no threats were made against PMl-N and PTI. Explaining the reasons for differences in spatial sectarian violence in Pakistan, it argues that the reason why Punjab has been relatively bereft of rising sectarian tensions is the alleged mutual understanding between Sunni extremist groups and the Punjab government, where the latter would avoid cracking down on these groups in return for sparing the province. As a consequence of this arrangement, the report argues, while Punjab will be spared of violence, it nevertheless would emerge as a potential jehadi hub in future. While such views of accommodation also find resonance in Pakistan’s national media, and other fora, the cobweb of internal and external interests clearly reveals the complex interactions which govern the causes behind such incidents. Redressal and response mechanisms to such conflicts and violence are thus hostage to the emerging politics of accommodation, perpetuated by the state which is ‘just’ the balancer for the competing interests of the stakeholders. This shift from a mediator (which Alavi enunciated in 1972) to a balancer, points towards the declining state capacity of Pakistan.
This subtle ‘balancing’ or the ‘politics of accommodation’ which the Pakistani state is evolving into, has unleashed the chain of mutual retaliation since 90s, where the minority Shias — which includes around 13 per cent of the total Muslim population in Pakistan as compared to the overwhelming Sunni majority —have adopted equally reactionary violent tactics to protect themselves. The attack on a Sunni seminary in Rawalpindi on November 2013 by Shias is a case in point. The South Asia Terrorism Portal’s tabulation of incidents of sectarian violence is an instructive pointer.
Few incidents of Shia retaliation, which span last two years, reveal that Shias have been targeting members of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a Sunni extremist group. For instance, on January 18, 2013, cadres of ASWJ were killed on lasbela Bridge in Karachi. On February 1, 2012, aprominent member of Sunni Supreme Council and secretary general of a welfare organisation was killed in Hangu District. On July 6, 2012, religious scholar Maulvi Abdul Qasim, hailing from Sunni school of thought, was shot dead in Musa Colony in Quetta. On December 24, 2012, a Sunni prayer leader was gunned down outside a mosque in north Karachi. These sporadic incidents portent a trend in making. While the Shias from Sind, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have also alternatively been demanding justice from their governments, the Sunni extremists have however, continued their attacks with impunity.
As one celebrates the 68th anniversary of Jinnah’s Direct Action call, one is indeed reminded of Jinnah’s first constituent Assembly speech of August 11, 1947. Jinnah stated, “You are free, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state.” Promising as these words are, the sectarian strife reveals that the idea of Pakistan is indeed getting blurred with every incident of sectarian violence.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Dept of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi)