The problem with more small States is that they will throw up more regional parties who can hold the Centre to ransom. Also, the more the number of regional parties, the more likely will be fragmented mandates in general elections and instability
The recent announcement by the Congress Working Committee with regard to the UPA Government’s intention to carve out a separate State of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh, has once again sparked off a nationwide demand for smaller States and a debate on their viability, with both its advocates and opponents taking extreme stands. The demand for Telangana, comprising the Telugu-speaking areas of the erstwhile princely State of Hyderabad, has been there right since the time of India’s independence. Except for the Telugu language, there was and is very little in common between the people of Telangana and other regions of the State, namely Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra.
To begin with, Telangana was never under direct British rule, unlike the Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions of Andhra Pradesh, which were part of British India’s Madras Presidency. It may be recalled that the States Reorganisation Commission, appointed in 1953, to study the creation of States on linguistic basis, was not in favour of an immediate merger of Telangana region with Andhra State, despite their common language.
In paragraph 382 of its report, the Commission Report said, “Opinion in Andhra is overwhelmingly in favour of the larger unit; public opinion in Telangana has still to crystallise itself. Important leaders of public opinion in Andhra themselves seem to appreciate that the unification of Telangana with Andhra, though desirable, should be based on a voluntary and willing association of the people and that it is primarily for the people of Telangana to take a decision about their future”.
In fact, then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was initially sceptical of merging Telangana with Andhra State, fearing a “tint of expansionist imperialism” in it. He reportedly compared the merger to a matrimonial alliance having “provisions for divorce” if the partners in the alliance cannot get on well. Finally, the new State of Andhra Pradesh came into being on November 1, 1956, with assurances to Telangana in terms of power-sharing as well as administrative domicile rules and distribution of expenses of various regions.
However, the honeymoon did not last long, with the people of Telangana expressing dissatisfaction over the implementation of the agreements and guarantees made at the time of the State’s merger. Following the Jai Andhra agitation in the Seema-Andhra region in 1973, against the protections (mulki rules) given for the Telangana region, the Government of India diluted the guarantees provided in the pre-merger Gentlemen’s agreement, thereby leading to massive agitations across the Telangana region.
Thus, the proposed bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh is more of a ‘de-merger’ than the creation of a separate State. If the creation of Bangladesh has busted the myth that people belonging to the same religion constitute a nation, the de-merger of Telangana has proved that language alone cannot be a unifying factor.
While political parties such as the BJP and the BSP are in favour of small States on the grounds that such States are administratively more convenient and give greater say to the local populace in matters of governance, States such as Jharkhand, where independent MlAs like Madhu Koda became Chief Ministers and amassed wealth vastly disproportionate to their income, showed the inherent fragility of polity in the newly-carved out utopias often touted as the ultimate panacea for misgovernance and mal-administration in large States.
There are also fears that the creation of small States can lead to increased regionalism or parochialism which can fuel separatist sub-national tendencies. Some of the demands are based purely on irredentist claims, for example, the demand for Gorkhaland on ethno-linguistic grounds.
A look into history will reveal that in the late 18th century, Darjeeling was part of the Sikkim Chogyal’s territory, which was overrun by the Gorkhas of Nepal at the beginning of the 19th century. Following the Anglo-Gorkha war in 1814, Nepal had to cede all the territories annexed by the Gorkhas from the Chogyal, who subsequently gave it to the British East India Company. The question is: How far do we go into historyIJ Going by that logic, perhaps some decades later, illegal Bangladeshi immigrants settled in Assam and elsewhere in the country can seek separate statehood.
As for language, dialect and cultural issues, there cannot ever be an end to such demands. From Bodoland to Karbi Anglong, Assam is up for grabs. Kumaonis and Garhwalis in Uttarakhand too are different in terms of language and culture though there is no such demand till now. By conceding to such demands, will we be undoing the Herculean efforts made by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to integrate the country into a single entityIJ
Even as many political and militant groups in Nagaland have been demanding the creation of a Greater Nagaland or Nagalim including Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, four districts of eastern Nagaland — Tuensang, Mon, longleng and Kiphire — have placed a demand for a separate State, citing neglect by the ‘stronger Naga tribes’.
With 28 States alone, India has so many regional parties that fractured verdicts and consequent instability have become an integral part of polity, both at the Centre and the States. A dozen more States going by the demands, including those made by letterhead organisations with no ground support, would mean scores of regional parties and, thereby, more blackmail, more fractured mandates and a more fragmented polity. Will it ultimately lead to the balkanisation of IndiaIJ
Though some of the demands including for Gorkhaland are not new, many have emerged over the last few decades, which witnessed the Union Government increasingly becoming weaker and heavily dependent on the regional parties for its survival. Does this augur well for the country, is the million dollar question.
On the other hand, larger States also pose several challenges. Notwithstanding the fact that the UPA has been reduced to a minority, they are surviving just on the support of two mutually antagonistic parties from a single State. Thus, with their parliamentary strength, large States can determine not only the fate of Governments at the Centre but also influence policies. Even the most bitter opponent of the Union Government in small States like Chhattisgarh or Goa would not think of daring the Centre to withdraw all its civil servants from their State, as has been done by the Samajwadi Party Government in Uttar Pradesh.
One dreads to imagine a situation, though unlikely, wherein national parties would score less than the number of seats obtained by a regional party in a State such as Uttar Pradesh. And what if that State under some maverick leader decides to secede from the countryIJ After all, the powerful Nizams of Hyderabad never bequeathed their powers to the British or the French and tried to remain independent even after independence. Smaller States created by the NDA Government, including Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, have done comparatively well, in contrast to their situation as part of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively.
The smaller the States, the lesser would be their monopolistic or hegemonistic tendencies and political clout as is the case with larger States. Moreover, all States would be equal partners in progress.
Thus, both small and large States have their advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, the demand for statehood has to be studied on a case-to-case basis. Certain parameters, such as developmental yardstick, aspirations of the local population, economic and administrative viability and convenience, are aspects that have to be factored into before taking a call.
Political gains, as is apparent from the CWC decision on Telangana, should not be the guiding factor in such critical decisions. In any case, more States cannot replace decentralisation and devolution of powers to the grassroots as the ultimate guarantor of good governance.
(The author is Senior Fellow and Editor at the Vivekananda International Foundation)