Afghanistan is back on rails, or so it seems, despite the characterisation by foreign media that ‘tenuous path to joint governance’ has started with ‘an awkward hug’ between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah
On September 21, 2014, proving many analysts wrong, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the two presidential candidates of Afghanistan agreed to work together. The build-up to the final agreement was anything but assuring. Weeks ago, Abdullah had threatened to walk out of the power-sharing talks. Ghani had agreed to virtually everything Abdullah had asked for; even then, the final disagreements over who would chair the meetings of the cabinet seemed to upturn months of efforts to bring the two leaders together giving rise to worrying signs regarding the future of a country fraught with uncertainties for decades now.
Finally, speculation has come to a happy end. Afghanistan is back on rails, or so it seems, despite the characterisation by foreign media that “tenuous path to joint governance” has started with “an awkward hug” between Ghani and Abdullah.
The Challenges Ahead: Economic Woes
Having crossed the first hurdle, there are a lot of issues that are hanging fire for both leaders to attend to. The economic situation is alarming. So much so that in the first week of September, Afghan Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal announced that he would not be in a position to pay the security forces their salaries by the end of the month. For all practical purposes, the foreign funds have started drying up over the last two years and the GDP growth rate has fallen dramatically, for example from 15 per cent in 2012 to 4.2 per cent in 2013.
In 2012, at the NATO Chicago Summit, conservative estimates suggested that Afghanistan would require at least $4.1billion dollar per year to keep its security forces — then 2,28,500 strong — going. Today, after the much-needed surge in the face of Taliban assertion, the Afghan force level has reached 3,25,00 mark. This comprises Afghan National Army and Afghan Police Force. Revised estimates based on Chicago calculations would suggest that Afghanistan would at least require close to $6bn alone for maintaining its security force at the current level, which many would argue is utterly underpaid, undertrained and under-equipped.
Assertive Taliban
Coming to the security situation, the overall scenario in the country is far from comforting. The Taliban have asserted itself in a big way. As per reports based on leaks from official sources, the Taliban are getting their firepower and direction from sources across the Durand line. There are fears that a 1996-like situation may soon emerge where one might witness active role played by security agents of the neighbouring country dictating Taliban offensive in Afghanistan.
The Taliban are reportedly dominant in 18 out of 34 provinces and are making fast inroads into the north, traditionally dominated by non-Pashtun ethnic groups. They are determined to bring their model of Islamic rule to Afghanistan. Their gaining control over Helmand, infamous for poppy cultivation, is no good news for the Afghan government.
The Drip from NATO
Against this backdrop, the promise of financial support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by NATO is quite assuring. In the recent meeting at Wales on September 4-5, NATO members increased annual aid to Afghanistan by one billion dollars from $4.1 billion to $5.1 billion till 2017. NATO also reportedly made new commitments regarding equipping and providing the Afghan forces with modern weapons and building the Afghans air force. The continued presence of combat contingent on Afghan soil was, however, made conditional to signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).
Full financial responsibility by 2024IJ
The NATO summit declaration also held out several warnings to the Afghan government. It made it clear that the financial aid will flow till 2017 in its present shape, but urged the Afghan Government “to continue and strengthen efforts to fight corruption”, and “to review the force structure and capabilities of the ANSF to achieve a sufficient and sustainable force”. Citing the commitments at Chicago, the statement held that Afghanistan should assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.
A lot will depend on the will and capacity of the new government taking over from Karzai to bring about stability and start engaging the international community for investment in Afghanistan’s newly discovered mineral sector. China and India have already expressed their interest. If peace prevails, Afghanistan may be able to do remarkably well in the next five six years to be able to earn enough revenue to sustain itself, and throw off the yoke of foreign dependency.
Stability, easier said than done
However, bringing about stability in Afghanistan is easier said than done. There are so many issues to be resolved before Afghanistan can attain political stability. The most important among them is the issue of bringing about reconciliation among disparate fighting groups in Afghanistan. They have their own agendas. Despite the presence of a 3,25,00-strong national force, almost each district has its own regional or local strongman, an euphemism for warlords. Fear of an uncertain future — post-withdrawal — has made these forces even more insecure and led them to strengthen their private militias in the event of possible civil war.
There are more worrying signs of ethnic consolidation taking place all over again in a much more heightened form. The show of strength by Tajik forces in the capital during the observation of the national martyr’s day marking the assassination of legendary Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Masood, despite the appeals of Abdullah and Amrullah Saleh, was a disturbing reminder of the way the security situation might worsen. On that day, followers of Abdullah went round the city in open vans demonstrating their firepower and shooting in the air, and booed members from the Ghani camp when they came on the podium to speak.
Ghani-Abdullah rapprochement a few days later may be a good beginning. But the ghosts may be stalking in the dark still. In this context, it is important to ask, can Afghanistan turn over a new leafIJ True, the post-election rigmarole sapped Afghan energies and complicated matters. But will Ghani-Abdullah duo be able to work without hassles and usher in a new dawn in AfghanistanIJ
Task of tall order
Well, this is a task of very tall order for a system transplanted in Afghanistan not long ago. The process is still in its infancy. Unlike the post-war efforts, under the Marshall plan, in Europe where it was easier to sell western concepts of rights, liberty and democracy, in Afghanistan, even after two presidential elections, the process is still in its infancy.
Moreover, the centralising impulses (to be distinguished from centripetal pulls) of the presidential system imposed in hurry under the Bonn Process has not been able to change the existing power structures on the ground. The state of Afghanistan, right since its inception, has been an overly decentralised entity, with Kabul exercising power when it must but leaving the constituent units — tribal areas dominated by one group or other often fighting among themselves — with lots of autonomy as it deemed necessary to keep disparate groups together.
It will befit Ghani and Abdullah to quickly work on a constitutional amendment to make the system more decentralised and federal in nature and take the system to the people outside Kabul, rather than choosing to rule over the vastly different areas with different socio-cultural reflexes through puppets or strongmen of Kabul’s choosing. Democratic deficit has been at the root of the present crisis in Afghanistan. This can only be addressed by making the system at the local levels more representative and autonomous. The second biggest problem worrying foreign donors and investors is corruption, which has to be addressed with sincerity and determination. They must also learn how to keep their followers under check for there is a larger fear of their sectional interests trumping national interest and adversely impacting Afghan future.
In their task to take the process forward, Ghani-Abdullah duo must also be assisted by regional countries, which should not look at Afghanistan either as their strategic backyard or as a battleground for their competing interests. Countries having maximum stake and influence in Afghanistan — Pakistan and Iran — have a major role to play here. Given Pakistan’s unreasoned fear of India, a regional consensus is hard to come by. Rather than helping the process of a genuine reconciliation, Pakistan has been enabling forces acting against consolidation of the process of stabilisation in Kabul. This is a major challenge that the new Government in Kabul will have to deal with, as much as its predecessors did with little success.
Anyway, well begun, half done. Perhaps the Afghan leaders have taken their lessons from the Iraqi experience. From a functioning state with sectarian harmony, Iraq today is divided against itself. In contrast, from being an anarchical society for long, Afghanistan has shown some promise of inter-ethnic harmony and the will to work together — as the two leaders agreed in August this year — to preserve “the achievements of the dynamic democratic experience of the past thirteen years” as “a guiding principle in the realisation of a national reform programme”. One only hopes that the process will chug on.
(The writer is Coordinator, and Fellow, South Asia Centre, IDSA, New Delhi)