Talks are a process and not a solution. India should build its retaliatory capability to deal with Pakistan’s threats
The National Security Advisors of both India and Pakistan have decided to meet each other in the midst of Gurudaspur attacks, which were later followed by several ceasefire violations across lOC. The Indian Government has faced criticism for adopting 'talks' as a diplomatic tool to end the stalemate with Pakistan's side. It is important to remember here that it is not just the terrorist attacks or ceasefire violations but the linkages with the nuclear weapons of Pakistan which has made such kind of ‘talks' as the only available alternative to New Delhi.
Since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, New Delhi stands at a disadvantaged position as it is facing terrorist attacks and constant ceasefire violations which it cannot escalate to the conventional or limited war because of the presence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The nuclear weapons of Pakistan are further combined with Islamabad’s refusal to adopt the policy of ‘no-first-use’, which makes things complicated for India. The withdrawal of India's ‘cold war doctrine' clearly manifests that Pakistan's policy of using terrorist attacks under the nuclear umbrella has worked against India.
Pakistan’s refusal to adopt the ‘no-first-use’ policy is further combined with its quest for tactical nuclear weapons, making it more difficult for India to strategically deal with the terrorist attacks. Tactical nuclear weapons are ‘battlefield' or ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons', which are distinct from the bigger and strategic variety of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan is following the policy of the US, while developing tactical nuclear weapons. The US had developed and deployed nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet aggression in western Europe. Pakistan's plutonium production reactor in Khushab and missiles like Nasr, with a small range of 37 km, show that country’s determination to develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used early in a conflict.
General Khalid Kidwai, a top advisor to the Pakistani Government, in a conference at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, said, “A tactical weapon makes war less likely.” If analysed in the present context, this makes the position of India more complicated. It clearly shows that Pakistan will continue to have terrorist strikes against India while India runs short of military options to deal with Pakistan.
Tactical nuclear weapons became more worrisome due to the fact that the civilian population lives in border areas of both India and Pakistan. Therefore, tactical nuclear weapons can result in heavy damage to the civilian population. This has further complicated the position of India and shows its inability to deal with terrorist strikes or ceasefire violations. Even if India decides to have tactical nuclear weapons, it will not be able to use it due to the presence of its ‘no-first-use’ policy.
So, this brings us to the other question: Should India change its nuclear policy as it has placed the country in a disadvantageous positionIJ It will be difficult for India to change its ‘no-first-use’ policy. The first reason is that such policies are adopted by states which have complete confidence in their retaliatory capability. A turnaway from the ‘no-first-use’ policy will show a lack of confidence from the Indian side in its retaliatory capability. It can also provoke Pakistan to strike first in case of a conflict. Also, it will require India to keep its nuclear weapons on high alert, which will make South Asia a dangerous region.
Second, a shift from the ‘no-first-use’ policy will degrade the international position of India as it is trying to depict itself as a responsible nuclear power. It is only due to its image of a responsible nuclear power that India has got membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and also managed to secure a civil nuclear deal with the US. It is only on the basis of being a ‘responsible nuclear weapon state' that India is trying to bid for the United Nations Security Council’s permanent membership. Therefore, it is not viable for India to move away from the ‘no-first-use’ policy.
As a result, a stalemate-situation continues, as Pakistan persists with its terrorist attacks under the framework of the nuclear deterrence while India runs out of military and strategic options. Under such circumstances, there are two possible military solutions which India can take to strengthen its position.
The first is to strengthen its retaliatory capability so that Pakistan will be apprehensive in carrying out nuclear attacks in case of conventional strikes. Steps have been taken by India in this direction by developing INS Arihant and the missile defence system. However, there is a long way to go. India needs to send proper deterrence messages, showing its will and capability to carry out conventional attacks and to retaliate in case of nuclear attacks. So far, India has failed in this endeavour.'
The second solution is that India should develop ‘smart conventional weapons' on the line of what the US has done, which can be used in case of Pakistan's tactical strike. The US has conventional weapons which match up to nuclear weapons on the issue of lethality, but they do not emit harmful radiation. Such weapons will make Pakistan think twice before it launches its tactical weapons against India.
As it has been said, ‘Talks are a process and not a solution', and, therefore, India should bolster its military capability to deal with the upcoming terrorist threats from Pakistan.
(The writer is a PhD scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is researching nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles)