Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi will have to bear in mind that, when the Army is out of power, it seeks to destabilise the situation internally and create conditions where foreign Governments actively seek a coup
So what’s so special about Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s visit to IndiaIJ Going by the string of editorials and the like, you would say, quite a bit, wouldn’t youIJ The main ‘meat’ is economics — literally our major export was “cuts of Boneless Bovine Frozen Meat’ — Union Ministry of External Affairs’ jargon for beef. Presumably, he’ll be feted by all and sundry for the revolution, his courage and what not. But there are very clear indications that he may just falter and the process to remove him is already in place.
Note that he is clubbing his visit to India with a trip to Pakistan. Not surprising, given how much Egypt has in common with latter systemically. The first is the Army’s all-encompassing control. The headlines of course recount his chimerical victories — sacking Egypt’s Army chief Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and dissolving the real Cabinet, which is the Supreme Council of the Armed Force. Variously, these have been hailed as a great success by Arab Spring optimists. The pessimists have always pointed out that this is a backroom takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood with too much power centralised in the hands of the President. Either way, this is seen as the beginning of a slow process of demilitarising the Egyptian establishment.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the real power of the Egyptian military lies in its commercial and industrial empire. Pakistani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa coined a term for this: Milbus, which is an acronym for Military Business. In Pakistan, estimates indicate that anywhere between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of the economy is military-controlled. Egypt is not that far off either. But here an important distinction needs to be made between Pakistan/Egypt and the other great former Milbus state, Turkey.
Despite being a closed market for long, Turkey has inculcated an entrepreneurial class that fitted the Right-wing pattern — rich and religiously and socially conservative capitalists. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the chief example of that. While the class grew rich based on trade, it grew powerful internally based on religious conservatism that still has great appeal in the underdeveloped interior. One clumsy attempt after another, these Islamic parties were swiftly removed from power by military coups. The coups were ostensibly to protect the secular nature of the state; in reality they were to protect the military’s interests. But that secularism meant an attempt to disassociate itself with a religious stereotype in wanting to be a part of the European Union.
The European Union demanded certain restrictions on the Army and on having absolute civilian supremacy. Having learnt from past mistakes the Islamists became even stronger advocates of the EU than the military. Taking power again in 2003, in those initial years the Justice and Development Party did not touch the Islamist agenda even with a bargepole. The leaders delivered both a booming economy, spreading the benefits to the interior regions, and also pushed for an EU membership to shield themselves from the Army. It was after the market had been opened to enough independent entrepreneurial control that they made their moves against both the ostensibly secular system and the Army. But all of this was because geography, experience and economics intersected at one point in time.
Egypt is not so lucky. This is the Islamists’ first experience with power. There are some signs that they are edging out the Army in a sophisticated manner, but only superficially so far. But here they are caught in cyclic logic. On the one hand they can’t neutralise the Army till they neutralise its economic empire. On the other hand, if they start neutralising the economic empire, they provoke a coup. It is telling that geriatric old Mr Tantawi was sacked and the visible interface, the SCAF, was disbanded. The real military power though lies with the National Defence Council — the only military body mentioned in both the 1956 and the 1971 Constitutions. Though headed by the President, it is stacked with a military majority.
During the January disturbances this year the NDC even threatened to declare an emergency. This is the one body that Mr Morsi has not yet laid his hands on. But here comes in the Army’s plan. While they’ve been remarkably restrained with protests, there is a more sinister side to this restraint — implied incitement. Note how inefficient the Army was when it came to controlling the siege of the Israeli embassy. Yet, within seven minutes of a call by then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Army despatched paratroopers to break the siege. This is not ‘restraint’, but it is a deliberate effort to allow the situation to spiral out of control. Mr Morsi has not tampered with the Army’s operational structure, yet by most accounts the Sinai is out of control with terrorists having a free reign and blowing up pipelines to Israel. It is precisely because of such incidents that Mr Morsi will be unable to attract investment and deliver a Turkish-style boom to his voters.
This cycle is far too reminiscent of Pakistan for any sub-continental nation to miss. When the Army stays in power, it usually gets rid of its own that is a liability. No comparison is exact, but what happened to former President Pervez Musharraf is what happened to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and what happened to Mr Tantawi is what happened to Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, Jehangir Karamat.
When the Army is out of power it destabilises the situation internally and creates conditions where foreign Governments actively seek a coup. Notice how, during Mr Musharraf’s period, most Western authors thought democracy was the answer. Today many of those same authors insist that the West should be dealing with the Army directly. That’s jargon for “We would prefer a coup but we can’t publicly support you if the coup happens”.
So, between two example of political Islam colliding with a Milbus system, is stuck President Mr Morsi. There are no easy answers for him or any template for him to choose. All that the Egyptian Army needs is one big mistake to reclaim the throne. Mr Morsi has very few good options and far too many opportunities to make big mistakes. If he thinks the Pakistani politicians can provide him with answers to nix the military, both Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari are rather bad role models.