Agricultural western part comprises primarily of ethnic Ukrainians who prefer a strong relationship with the EU, while industrial eastern and southern part predominantly comprises ethnic Russians who favour closer economic and cultural ties with Moscow. This has virtually divided Ukraine right through the middle.
Ukraine’s ‘February Revolution’ has brought the country to an existential political crossroads. Who would have predicted that Europe’s second largest country will be facing such a quagmire when ex-President Yanukovich refused to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) back in November, 2013. His decision to instead opt for closer economic ties with Russia paved the way for a series of mass demonstrations in Kiev and western Ukraine which borders Poland. It ultimately brought about Yanukovich’s ignominious exit and his flight to the safer eastern part of the country bordering Russia. This in a way highlights the ‘east Vs west’ division both within Ukraine and the external geopolitical elements at play. These factors along with popular discontent over an inefficient government, massive corruption, oligarchial rivalry and economic stagnation led to the current political crisis.
Against this backdrop, the ethno-linguistic fault lines within Ukraine merit significant attention. On one hand, the industrial eastern and southern part predominantly comprises ethnic Russians settled there since the Tsarist times. They speak Russian and favour closer economic and cultural ties with Moscow. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is based in Crimea. This region formed the core of Yanukovich’s support base. On the other hand, the agricultural western part comprises primarily of ethnic Ukrainians who prefer a strong relationship with the EU. The general pattern of voting also reflects the deep divisions in the society. So while Yanukovich has managed to win the majority of votes in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine in the previous two elections, his opponents have done the same in the western part of the country. This has virtually divided Ukraine right through the middle.
A closer analysis reveals that the east has a strong economic foundation but is devoid of a distinct national identity while it is just the opposite for the west.
Yanukovich’s gamble of seeking Russia’s economic support, at the cost of a closer partnership with the EU, was perhaps aimed at tiding over the impending financial crisis. However, it backfired spectacularly. The notion that he was willing to overlook the ambitions of Ukrainians residing in the western part of the country brought them out on the streets in full strength. The US and EU did their part in adding fuel to this popular discontent. The threat of ‘Western’ sanctions, a calculated influx of radicals into the protests and increase in violence sealed his fate. Consequently, the ‘East vs. West’ fault lines, both within and outside Ukraine were laid bare.
However, Ukraine is no stranger to a revolution. There exist a few similarities with the ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004, in the way it gave vent to popular discontent against the ruling regime. However, use of violence and overthrowing of a democratically elected government sets it apart from the events of a decade ago. This has ominously set a dangerous precedent.
The developments also have some parallels with the Arab Spring. The protesters were unified by their anathema towards the incumbent in power. There are expectations of the establishment of a liberal democracy. While it is too early to gaze into the Ukrainian future, the Arab Spring is a testament to the mismatch between expectations and the final outcome.
In fact, the events in Ukraine have the potential to inspire the entire neighbourhood, from Belarus to Russia and Central Asia. In recent times, there have been a series of protests in Kazakhstan against the sharp devaluation of its currency while more than five hundred people had gathered in Moscow against the jailing of activists held for participating in a protest rally against President Putin.
For Ukraine, the real challenge of national reconciliation starts now. The opposition ‘troika’ of Vitali Klitschko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tyahnybok in a way represented the aspirations of Ukrainians living in the west and protesting in the Maidan. But what about the interests of people living in the east, who have traditionally favoured strong ties with RussiaIJ The protesters for sure did not represent them. Support for Yanukovich still runs high in this region despite legislators of his own party rebelling against him. There also appears to be two power centres in the country: Parliament and the Maidan. How the government manages to balance these competing interests and builds national consensus will determine the unity of the country.
Already, there are rumblings in the east and unfurling of Russian tricolour in Crimea at the expense of Ukrainian flag indicates a highly combustible atmosphere. Regional legislators have challenged the powers of Parliament. The Parliament on its part has just repealed a 2012 Bill which will see Russian being dropped as the second language in regions where more than ten per cent of population speak Russian. Roughly around fifty per cent of Ukrainian regions meet this criterion. This may further marginalise the ethnic Russians. Interestingly, the eastern part of Ukraine comprises ten regions with the highest economic output in the country while five with the lowest are situated in the western part. One can ignore this vital fact at his own peril.
Any prolonged instability in the east may be the harbinger of Russia’s direct involvement in Ukraine. President Putin will surely act to prevent the chaos from spreading towards Russia. A military intervention, akin to the 2008 Georgia outcome, appears unlikely at present even though one of the largest post-Soviet combat readiness drill has been initiated in the western military district. However, Russia has enough leverages ranging from trade sanctions to control over gas supply and its prices, to influence developments in Ukraine.
The current identity struggle glaringly highlights the power vacuum in Ukraine. The opposition ‘troika’ had taken a united position during the protests but they each have their own interests and ideology. The Parliament has been entrusted with authority to manage the country for the time being. But elections scheduled for May is likely to determine Ukraine’s national unity.
There also exists deep mistrust and disappointment towards the political leaders in general. The arrival of Yulia Tymoshenko from exile may have galvanised her supporters. But many of the present economic, political and social problems have their roots during her term in office post the ‘Orange revolution’. The other leaders are considered either too inexperienced or unpredictable. The involvement of right-wing nationalist party ‘Pravyy Sektor’ and other radicals may further exacerbate the existing tensions. Then there is the question of oligarchs’ proven ability to influence decision making irrespective of who is in power.
Whoever takes charge has an enormous task at hand. The Ukrainian economy is on the brink of collapse while people’s aspirations are sky high. Russia is unlikely to release additional funds till there is clarity on the orientation of the next government. The EU will be inherently constrained by the dismal state of its Eurozone. Any support from the International Monetary Fund will depend on initiating painful economic reforms involving reduction in social spending, de-regulation of the currency and so on. With elections due in May, it will only take a braveheart to sell this unpopular but critical idea to the people.
If Ukraine were to tide over this crisis, it is essential that a balance of power be established between the east and the west. While the talk about ‘decentralisation’ and giving greater autonomy to the east has gained momentum in the last few days, the final outcome will depend upon the leverages of external geopolitical actors who have a stake in the crisis.
(The writer is a Researcher with Europe-Eurasia Centre at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses {IDSA}, New Delhi)