Given the overall situation, shouldn't Narendra Modi take charge of India's defenceIJ Surely, the country needs a full-time Defence Minister, but more than that it requires the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet Committee on Security to provide direction
As India expectantly waits to hear Prime Minister Narendra Modi from the ramparts of the Red Fort on August 15, I must confess that I am disappointed with the Government’s performance on defence issues. Given Mr Modi’s development mantra which relies on secure borders, the perception that a BJP-led Government is traditionally sensitive to defence matters, the Prime Minister’s bold public utterances on Pakistan and China, and a proactive diplomacy in the neighbourhood which presupposes military muscle, it was hoped that India would do a course correction if not a transformation to make its borders safe. So far, there are few indications of this happening.
Given enhanced military threats on two disputed borders and geo-political turmoil that has seized the world, Mr Modi is expected to give out his vision or policy on defence. Backing off from the rhetoric of fighting a two-front war, the Government is required to prioritise threats, decide its political objectives with key nations, and tell the Armed Forces what military power should do to help achieve national security targets.
Take China, which should be India’s national security obsession. In an alarming development, Beijing has unilaterally slashed its disputed border with India into half: India says its border is 3,488km long while China has declared it to be a mere 2,000km. The border, which is neither agreed on maps nor on ground is prone to transgressions, which China does at will. India does not have capability to win a war against China now; nor given China’s rapid rise, will it be possible in the foreseeable future. A balancing of China is possible, but this requires a clear politico-military-economic strategy, which does not seem to be on the anvil.
Then, we have China’s closest ally, Pakistan. The civilian Government there wants good overall relations with India, but its Army is fixated on Kashmir resolution. As the Pakistani Army controls national security, and believes that it has credible nuclear and conventional prowess to thwart Indian Armed Forces, it continues unabashedly with cross-border terrorism into Jammu & Kashmir. Mr Modi has conceded that Indian Army has lost more soldiers in proxy war than conventional wars with Pakistan.
The way out for India is in three steps which it does not want to consider: One, talk with both the civilian Government and the Pakistani Army. Two, focus on Kashmir resolution as much as on development. And three, direct the Indian Army to prepare for conventional war rather than waste itself on unending counter-insurgency operations, which should be done by paramilitary forces.
Next, India should decide on its relations with the US. This is important to meet two key objectives: Technology and balancing of China. For example, senior Government officials have told me that the only forward movement on the border resolution with China was in 2005. Then, China concluded the significant ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles’ on the border issue because it perceived a strategic shift in geo-political environment with the signing of the framework for closer ties between India and the US which led to India also being courted by European nations. Unfortunately, after the signing of the 2008 civil nuclear deal, relations between India and the US have fallen short of expectation on various counts. The central issue, of course, is a lack of understanding by both sides, especially India, of what is expected from the partnership.
Specific to defence, the US Defence Secretary, Mr Chuck Hagel, has recently spelt out the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative in New Delhi. This will not be easy to implement because the road-blocks in the way are 49 per cent FDI, which is not good enough for technology transfer; level-playing field for Indian private defence industry, which is not possible with secretary, defence production as India’s representative to DTTI talks; and India’s nuclear liability law, which does not satisfy the US commercial interests. Now, if the US defence and nuclear companies, which had helped in the 2008 India-US civil nuclear deal are unhappy, there is little likelihood of the US helping India get membership of the four exclusive regimes for technology, namely, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. Without technology, Mr Modi’s desire of indigenisation in defence will not be realised. India will continue to import equipment, usually with strings attached, from abroad.
If India is indeed serious about having a vibrant national defence industry, all public-sector units, ordnance factory board, and Defence Research and Development Organisation need immediate transparency and accountability, which is missing. Take the case of DRDO’s ballistic missile programme that started in 1984. Of the total five missiles that the DRDO had set out to make, one (Trishul) was abandoned as the defence services simply refused to accept it, another (Nag) is nowhere near realisation, and (Akash) after years of bickering was accepted with reluctance. The other two missiles (Prithvi and Agni) are strategic, with which the users have little to do; their assurance levels are, to say the least, uncertain.
let’s now take the three defence services. The Army, Air Force and the Navy have accepted the idea of building capabilities for two fronts without the Government telling them, or they collectively deciding on what constitutes proportionate military power for national objectives. Each service has its own war doctrine depending upon what it thinks needs to be done, based on which equipment imports are sought. Yet, instead of preparing for war, the services are engaged in tasks which give rewards and visibility.
For the Army, it is CI-ops for which it is making unrealistic geo-political scenarios to ensure that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act stays in Jammu & Kashmir. It is being helped by Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh’s recent statement that there is no consensus on the AFSPA. Given the mandate of the Government, can it not do what is good for the countryIJ
The Navy, with its limited sea-going ships, is flogging them on coastal defence since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in addition to intense anti-piracy and diplomacy roles. Shouldn’t the Navy chief stand up and ask the Government for a clear time frame when the Indian Coast Guard would take charge of coastal defence dutiesIJ The Air Force, which has the most important role in the existing conventional war matrix, is woefully short of its central requirement: Combat aircraft. Yet, successive Air Force chiefs have followed the mantra of take-what-you-get.
Given the overall situation, shouldn’t Mr Modi take charge of India’s defenceIJ Surely, India needs a full-time Defence Minister, but more than that it requires the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet Committee on Security to provide direction.
(The writer is a former Indian Army officer and now Editor, FORCE, a newsmagazine on national security)